The Times front page – 23 January 2019
By Tony Collins
Criminal trials were delayed, jurors unable to enrol and witness statements inaccessible.
Quoting a tweet by the authoritative @BarristerSecret, the BBC said the “entire digital infrastructure” of courts was “broken for days”.
@BarristerSecret added,
“No accountability, no lessons learned.”
In the Spectator, Matthew Scott, a criminal barrister at Pump Court Chambers, said,
“Nobody seems to know exactly what has gone wrong or, if they do, they do not like to say.”
His Spectator blog was headlined,
The Spectator – 24 Jan 2019
“The most irritating fault has been for a few days the near total seizure (or ‘major service degradation’ to use the official non-explanation) of the secure email system (‘CJSM’) which for several years now has been the only authorised means of written communication between the Crown Prosecution Service and defence lawyers, probation, prisons, police and others.”
The Law Society Gazette said,
Law Society Gazette – 22 Jan 2019
The Law Society Gazette gave examples of how the problems had caused disruption and angst in the criminal justice system. It said,
“Major disruption that affected multiple Ministry of Justice IT systems last week continues to cause chaos.
“Lawyers on the front line have told the Gazette that trials have been delayed, jurors have been unable to enrol and practitioners have been prevented from confirming attendance that will enable them to get paid.
“Last week the ministry’s digital and technology team said most systems were improving. However, the Gazette has spoken to practitioners whose experiences suggest otherwise.”
A criminal barrister who spent the day in Leicester Crown Court said none of the court’s computer systems was operational, jurors could not be enrolled, and no advocates could sign into the Ministry of Justice’s XHIBIT system, an online service that logs lawyers’ attendance so they can get paid.
A lawyer at Lincoln Crown Court said the XHIBIT system was down again. The Crown Court Digital Case System, on which all cases are accessed, was also down.
A criminal defence solicitor arrived at Highbury Magistrates’ Court in London at 9.15am, where there were several clients in the cells. But jailers did not know which courts the cases would be heard in and because there was no wi-fi in the building magistrates had no access to any papers on their ipads before the hearings.
“The Gazette was told that several people attended Scarborough Magistrates’ Court last week to make statutory declarations in respect of driving matters. ‘Most of these people had come suited and booted, with all the anxiety that marks ordinary members of the public out as different from the frequent flyers who regularly come before the courts.
“These poor souls were left hanging around all morning, until 1pm, when they were advised that the systems were still not back up. Two of them agreed to come back on an adjourned date, 14 days later, but one of them explained that he couldn’t take further time off work. He was asked to come back in the afternoon, in the vain hope that the case management system might be back online.”
Former government chief technology officer Andy Beale quoted The Times in a tweet,
In another tweet, Beale said,
The Guardian reported yesterday (28 January 2019) that the Ministry of Justice knew its court computer systems were “obsolete” and “out of support” long before the network went into meltdown, internal documents have revealed.
The MoJ document, entitled Digital & Technology, said, “Historical under-investment in ageing IT systems has built our technical debt to unacceptable levels and we are carrying significant risk that will result in a large-scale data breach if the vulnerabilities are exploited.”
It added, “We have a Technology 2022 strategy, but it is not funded to help us address the long-term issues with current systems and allow us to make best use of new technologies to improve service delivery.”
It referred to a database used by 16 employment tribunal administrative offices in which the “scale of outage” accounted for 33% of incidents over the previous six months. Users were unable to access systems for a “significant number of hours”.
The report cited problems such as “risk of database corrupted leading to data loss; unable to restore service in a timely manner”, and added: “Judges say they will put tribunal activity on hold because of the poor running of the application.”
Government response
In the Commons, the government’s justice minister Lucy Frazer, responding to an urgent Labour request for a statement on the IT problems, was relaxed in her comments. She said the disruption was “intermittent” and the problems were merely “frustrating”. She added,
“The issue that has arisen relates mainly to email systems. There has been minimal disruption, I am told, to the courts system as a whole.”
She said there had been an “infrastructure failure in our supplier’s data centre”.
“The Prison Service has not been affected and—to correct inaccurate reporting—criminals have not gone free as a result of the problem. We have been working closely with our suppliers, Atos and Microsoft, to get our systems working again, and yesterday we had restored services to 180 court sites, including the largest ones.
“Today (23 January 2019), 90% of staff have working computer systems. Work continues to restore services and we expect the remainder of the court sites to be fully operational by the time they open tomorrow morning. We are very disappointed that our suppliers have not yet been able to resolve the network problems in full.
“This afternoon, the permanent secretary, Sir Richard Heaton, will meet the chief executive of Atos and write personally to all members of the judiciary. I am very grateful to all our staff who have been working tirelessly and around the clock, alongside our suppliers, to resolve the issues.”
Labour’s Yasmin Qureshi asked if Microsoft and Atos have paid any penalties to which Frazer gave a vague, non-committal reply,
“… the permanent secretary is meeting the supplier’s chief executive this afternoon and of course we will look carefully at the contracts, which include penalty clauses.”
Frazer later said the problem related to a “server” which raised questions about how the failure of a single server, or servers, could cause widespread chaos in the courts.
Labour’s Steve McCabe said the server problem was not a single or unusual event.
“… her Department has been receiving reports of failures in the criminal justice secure email service for at least six months now”.
Police systems
The BBC reported last week that problems with a police IT system were causing some criminals to escape justice.
Nine forces in England and Wales use Athena from Northgate Public Services. They are Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Kent, Norfolk, Suffolk, Warwickshire and West Mercia. The system is designed to help speed up the detection of crimes.
But officers told the BBC’s Victoria Derbyshire programme that it crashes regularly and is overly complicated, meaning some cases are not built in time or dropped.
Developers Northgate Public Services apologised for problems “in small areas”, which it said it was fixing.
A joint response from nine police forces said Athena – which has cost £35m over the past 10 years – had been “resilient and stable, although no system is perfect”.
The system was introduced following a government directive for forces to share intelligence after the Soham murders of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman, in 2002.
Officers said the intelligence-sharing function works well but problems arise when they use the system to build cases for the Crown Prosecution Service.
The delays it causes means officers can struggle to get the information together in time to charge suspects or the cases are not up to a high-enough standard and are dropped.
Serving officers at Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire and Essex told the programme the process could now take up to twice as long.
The BBC did not name any officers who revealed details of the problems because they could face disciplinary action for speaking out. Their comments included:
- “The first two weeks it (the system) was brought in were the worst two weeks of my entire career. It’s overly bureaucratic. It doesn’t understand the police investigative process at all. From day one, it malfunctioned. Four years on, it is still malfunctioning”
- “It often requires information that is totally irrelevant and if you miss just one data entry point (like whether a solicitor is male or female), I have to reject the whole case and send it back to the officer”
- “Even for a simple shoplift, I probably have to press about 50 buttons, with a 30-second minimum loading time between each task”
- “There have been incidents where charges have been dropped because of the inadequacies of the system. There have been cases of assaults, albeit fairly minor assaults, but these are still people who should be facing criminal charges”
- “It slows the whole criminal justice system down. At the moment, it is not fit for purpose. This is the most challenging time I have come across. We’re at breaking point already. This has pushed some officers over the edge”
- “When you’ve got detainees in a custody block who’ve got various illnesses and ailments, medical conditions that are all recorded on there and they need medication at certain times – it became very dangerous because we were unable to access the records”
The nine forces – which also include those in Cambridgeshire, Kent, Norfolk, Suffolk, Warwickshire and West Mercia – said in a joint statement that they had been working with the supplier to identify and correct issues as they arose.
“Over the 12 months up to November 2018, there have only been 72 hours of total downtime and there are detailed plans in place of how to manage business when this occurs.”
Northgate Public Services, which created Athena, said 40,000 officers accessed the system and benefited from improved criminal intelligence.
It said it was working to make improvements to the “complex system”.
“We recognise there are a small number of areas of the solution where improvements can be made and we apologise for any difficulties this has caused.
“We are working hard with the customer and other parties to make these improvements as a priority.”
Comment:
As @BarristerSecret said,
“No accountability, no lessons learned.”
In central and local government, accountability means suppliers sometimes have to pay small penalties. Outsourcing supplier Capita last year paid Barnet Council about £4.2m in compensation for poor performance.
It was a fraction of the hundreds of millions Capita has received from Barnet Council.
Sometimes the opposite happens and it is the supplier that wins money from the government after a failure.
The Home Office sacked Raytheon over problems on an e-borders IT systems and ended up paying Raytheon £224m in compensation.
The Department of Heath ended up paying Fujitsu hundreds of millions of pounds after the supplier’s contract to deliver systems under the National Programme for IT [NPfIT] was ended.
A major failure in one area of the public sector will not stop or deter officials from awarding the same supplier a major contract in the same or another part of the public sector.
Were a major failure or legal dispute to preclude a supplier from bidding for further UK public sector work, most if not all major suppliers would today have little UK government business.
A solution?
There is an effective way to encourage IT suppliers and the public sector to avoid public service failures. But the senior civil service isn’t interested.
That solution would be to publish – after every major public services failure – a full, independent third-party report into what went wrong and why.
Some senior officials seem unruffled by public criticism or even contempt after a services failure. But particularly in some of the major departments, there is a high-level fear of the full truth emerging after an administrative disaster. Departments would do almost anything to avoid IT-related failures if reports on the causes were routinely published.
But unless there is a Parliamentary or public clamour for such internal analyses to be published, they will remain hidden or uncommissioned.
When the National Audit Office publishes a report on a departmental failure, the report has usually been agreed and signed off by the department; and it is usually a one-off report.
When public services descend into chaos, as happened in the court service last week, immense pressure falls on the IT teams to restore normal services urgently. But without the routine publication of reports on major IT-related public service failures, where is the motivation for senior officials to avoid chaos in the first place?
House of Commons debate on the courts’ IT failures
Thank you to Celina Bledowska for her tweet alerting me to the criminal justice IT problems.
Campaign4Change 