Category Archives: managing change

Summary Care Record plods on

By Tony Collins

Pulse reports that the Summary Care Record database had 13.1 million records by 22 March 2012, which is around the number the DH had expected for April last year.

It reports that the figures have prompted David Flory, deputy NHS chief executive, to call for ‘rapid further progress’ on the rollout.

In his latest quarterly report on NHS performance, Flory highlighted the SCR as an area for improvement. “Implementation does not meet expectations and rapid further progress is needed,” said Flory. “While performance has improved, the rate of this improvement is beneath the expected trajectory.”

The number of patients with an SCR has almost doubled from around seven million a year ago. Sixteen PCTs have more than 60% of patients with an SCR.

Critical Mass

In February, Kilburn GP and SCR director Gillian Braunold was reported in Pulse to have said the rollout has reached a ‘critical mass’ in some areas. Out-of-hours providers, and those in urgent care and hospitals are viewing about 1,600 records a week.

Braunold said information within the SCR was changing some therapeutic decisions. She also said there was also evidence from areas where end-of-life care plans had been uploaded to care records that more patients were dying in their preferred place.

Nurses at NHS Direct are to have access to care records and the DH is working on plans to replace HealthSpace and enable patients to access their full patient record.

Comment – The devil’s in the detail

It is difficult to put Dr Braunold’s comments into context without published independent evidence of which there is little or nothing that’s recent.

In public, NHS Connecting for Health has never wavered in proclaiming the success of the SCR but it has sought to control authoritative information on the SCR programme.

CfH commissioned an independent UCL report on the NPfIT SCR  “The devil’s in the detail”, but asked researchers to, for example, delete the cost of the SCR programme. CfH also removed passages from official SCR documents it gave the UCL researchers.

The final UCL report , which said in a footnote ” financial data deleted at the request of CFH”,   found that there were inaccuracies in the SCR database. UCL researchers also learned that the SCR database could not be relied on as a single source of truth.

Some CFH staff found the notion of possible ‘disbenefits’ of the SCR difficult to conceptualise, said the UCL report.

There is no doubt that an accurate and well-populated SCR would be useful, especially for out-of-hours doctors. They need to know – at least – what drugs patients are taking and what if any adverse drug reactions they have had.

As the DH tells patients: “Giving healthcare staff access to this (SCR) information can prevent mistakes being made when caring for you in an emergency or when your GP practice is closed.”

But a national database is not the way forward. It is unlikely to be trusted as accurate or up-to-date. It would be better to give patients and clinicians access to locally-held NHS-sourced information. We’ll report more on this separately.

Meanwhile the SCR plods on at a high cost – more than £220m so far. BT, the SCR’s main supplier, will be pleased the programme is continuing, as will those civil servants and consultants who have been involved with the programme for several years. But whether the database is of real value to doctors and patients we don’t know for certain. The DH tends not to publish its independent advice.

Summary Care Record a year behind schedule, DH warns – Pulse

Time for truth on Universal Credit IT

By Tony Collins

A normally-reliable contact says that the IT project for Universal Credit is in trouble.

A deadline this month to lock-down features in the scheme will not be met, says the contact. This failure will jeopardise the go-live date of October next year for the start of Universal Credit.

The contact also says that the Government will make an announcement on the scheme in September which may refer to a write-off of at least £150m on the IT project. The suggestion is that although the scheme is in trouble officials may be reluctant to impart the whole truth to ministers.

We wonder about the difficulties of agreeing system features when there are so many parties involved in the IT project: HMRC, DWP, local authorities, banks and private sector employers. The contact also says Oracle is having trouble handling functionality.

Officially all is well. The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Iain Duncan-Smith, spoke with confidence about the future of the scheme in the House of Commons last week.

That said, he told Parliament on 5 March about the “issues and problems” related to HMRC’s Real-Time Information project which is an essential part of the Universal Credit IT project. He said: 

HMRC, which is now responsible for this measure, meets me and others in the Department regularly. We have embedded some DWP employees in the HMRC programme; they are locked together. They are, as I understand it, on time, and they are having constant discussions with large and small employers about the issues and the problems, and assessing what needs to be done to make this happen and to make all the changes.

“We must remember that all those firms collect those data anyway; the only question is how they report it back within the monthly cycle. We are on top of that but, obviously, we want to keep our eye on the matter.”

Problems with the IT for Universal Credit – the Government’s leading “agile” software project – may bring a smirk to the faces of those who believe that departments cannot manage agile-based schemes. But agile proponents have long said that Universal Credit is only partially agile – and they have argued that agile should not be mixed with traditional software-writing approaches.

Suppliers on Universal Credit, which include HP, Accenture, IBM,Capgemini and Oracle, are not particularly well known for their love of agile on Government IT projects.

Time for the truth  

The Department for Work and Pensions is refusing to publish any of its reports and assessments on the IT for Universal Credit. The secret reports include:

–   A Project Assessment Review in November 2011

– Universal Credit Delivery Model Assessment Two (McKinsey and Partners)

– Universal Credit end-to-end Technical Review (IBM).

Comment

Officials and ministers speak publicly about the solid progress on Universal Credit IT while refusing to publish their internal reports on progress or otherwise of the scheme.

Past NAO reports have shown that ministers and sometimes senior officials are sometimes kept in the dark when major IT-related projects go wrong. Project steering groups are told what they want to hear. The Programme Board on the NPfIT discussed successes with enthusiasm and hardly mentioned serious problems, judging by minutes of its meetings.

We hope that all is well with Universal Credit IT. The project is, after all,  an advert for innovation in the public sector. If it’s in trouble the truth should come out. Keeping it quiet until September means that suppliers will continue to be paid for several months unnecessarily – perhaps to keep them supportive?

Labour was overly defensive and secretive about its many IT-related failures whereas “openness” is the coalition’s much-favoured word. It’s a pity it has yet to be applied to the Universal Credit IT project.

Secret DWP reports.

Who’ll be responsible if Universal Credit goes wrong?

Banks “unlikely to deliver” Universal Credit

Universal Credit IT plans too optimistic warn MPs.

Universal Credit latest

Is Choose and Book failing?

By Tony Collins

Choose and Book, which is one of the limited successes of the NHS National Programme for IT, may be “withering on the vine” says Pulse.

It reports that the Department of Health is investigating a fall in the proportion of GP referrals made through Choose and Book. Several PCTs have described Choose and Book as “failing”.

Pulse says that the Government’s notional target is for 90% of GP referrals to be made through Choose and Book, but the latest figures indicate usage has fallen from a high two years ago of 57%, to around 50% in January 2012

Initiated in 2004, Choose and Book is now in use in every PCT and provider organisation across the NHS in England, including many independent sector organisations that deliver services to the NHS under a standard, national contract.

Choose and Book provides patients with the offer of choice of hospital and clinic and a booked appointment.

The Department of Health told Pulse that there have been falls in use in some areas but it was committed to ‘embed Choose and Book into daily clinical practice’.

Choose and Book was classified as ‘failing and worsening’ in February board papers from Bristol, North Somerset and South Gloucestershire PCTs, says Pulse.

DH press release in 2003

A Department of Health press release on the award of a contract for an electronic booking system to Atos said in October 2003 said

“By the end of 2005, every hospital appointment will be booked for the convenience of the patient, making it easier for patients and their GPs to choose the hospital and consultant that best meets their needs.”

Pulse suggests the drop in interest may be because GP practices are no longer paid to use Choose and Book.

Through “local enhanced service” payments to GPs, primary care trusts have given family doctors a strong reason to use Choose and Book. The payments to GPs have ranged from about 50p to about £4 for every patient booked through Choose and Book. That funding is drying up.

A locum GP who commented on Pulse’s website suggests that Choose and Book will fall into disuse without financial incentives: “I couldn’t fit it [a Choose and Book appointment] into a ten minute consult what with QOF [quality and outcomes framework, part of the GP contract] the patient’s list etc – had to do referrals at the end of the day, so never used it.”

Comment

The failure of Choose and Book to reach anything like the original target of 100% use throughout the NHS shows the fallacy of paying people, in this case GPs, to use national IT systems.

New IT should be so needed that its use doesn’t depend on special payments to the end-users. Choose and Book was trumpeted by some major suppliers as a simple and obvious solution – rather like an airline reservation system; and after years of bedding down the technology works. But GPs cannot be forced to use it.

The Department of Health had considered the NPfIT  to be the centre of universe, and that doctors would want to use it for the common good.

The fact is that GPs  care only about their patients – which is as it should be – and if they consider the system detracts from the time spent with their patients the common good becomes an abstract, indeed meaningless, concept.

Choose and Book was always a good idea, a fun thing to work on. But does a 50% take-up after nine years justify the hundreds of millions spent on it? The Department of Health is hopeful the scheme will eventually succeed. But then the DH has always been confident the NPfIT would succeed.

DH to investigate fall in the use of Choose and Book – Pulse.

Universal Credit: who’ll be responsible if it goes wrong?

By Tony Collins

When asked whether Universal Credit will work, be on budget and on time, Ian Watmore, Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office, gave a deft reply. He told Conservative MP Charlie Elphicke on 13 March 2012:

“From where I sit today, I think all the signs are very positive. I am never going to predict that something is going to be on time and on budget until it is.”

If the plans do not fall into place who, if anyone, will be responsible? In theory it’ll be Iain Duncan Smith, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. But as Watmore told the Public Administration Committee, there are several other organisations involved. Although the DWP and HMRC are building the IT systems, the success of Universal Credit also relies on local authorities, which are overseen by the Department for Communities and Local Government.

There are also the Cabinet Office and the Treasury whose officials seek to “ensure that what is going on is appropriate” said Watmore.

If Univeral Credit goes awry all the departments may be able to blame the private sector: the employers that must pass PAYE information to HMRC so that the Revenue’s Real-Time Information element of Universal Credit can work.

David Gauke is the minister responsible for HMRC so would he take some of the blame if Real-Time Information didn’t work, or was not on budget, or was delayed?

Or would the main IT suppliers Accenture and IBM take any of the blame? Highly unlikely, whatever the circumstances.

There is also a dependency on the banks.

But nothing is wrong … is it?

All those putatively responsible for Universal Credit continue to say that all is going well.

Duncan Smith told the House of Commons on 5 March 2012:

“We are making good progress towards the delivery of universal credit in 2013, and I have fortnightly progress meetings with officials and weekly reports from my office. I also chair the universal credit senior sponsorship group, which brings together all Government Departments and agencies that are relevant to the delivery of universal credit.

“Design work is well under way and is being continually tested with staff and claimants, and the development of the necessary IT systems will continue in parallel.”

He said that universal credit will reduce complexity by putting together all the benefits that are relevant to people going back to work – though benefit systems that are not relevant to the coalition’s “Work programme” will not be included in the DWP’s Universal Credit IT consolidation.

To reduce risks Universal Credit will be phased in over four years from October 2013, each stage bringing in a different group of claimants.

But …

Campaign4Change has asked the DWP to publish its various reports on the progress of Universal Credit and it has refused, even under the Freedom of Information Act. It seems the DWP’s secretiveness is partly because all of the risks related to Universal Credit have not been mitigated. We will report more on this in the next few days.

Meanwhile to try and answer the question in our headline: who’ll be responsible if Universal Credit goes wrong? The answer is: the private sector probably. Or rather nobody in the public sector.

Can hundreds of millions be spent on Universal Credit in an agile way?

Universal Credit suppliers Accenture and IBM look to India for skills.

Is Universal Credit a brilliant idea that’s bound to fail?

Universal Credit latest

Universal Credit and the banks.

Francis Maude reforms by saying “no” – a “massive” number of times

By Tony Collins

Cabinet Office minister Francis Maude has intervened to reject departmental projects a “massive” number of times says Ian Watmore, Cabinet Office permanent secretary and former Government CIO.

Evidence Ian Watmore gave to the Public Administration Committee last week suggests that the Cabinet Office’s saying “no” repeatedly to departmental projects has changed behaviours within the civil service.

Watmore, the Cabinet Office’s permanent secretary, told Tory MP Charlie Elphicke, that Francis Maude and his officials now have the power to challenge departments’ civil servants who try and ignore Cabinet Office recommendations.

“In the past, those controls did not exist so they [officials in departments and agencies] could ignore us if they wanted to and carry on as before,” said Watmore. “Under the new regime, they cannot do that because in the end, if they ignore the recommendations that we come to, then they have to seek approval for the expenditure they were going to make on their projects and Francis Maude would, in his own words, happily say ‘no’ in such situations, and say ‘no’ again until people actually came to the table and changed what they were doing.”

Elphicke: Has he done so to date?

Watmore: Yes, an absolutely massive number of times.

Changing behaviour

Since departments have found it harder to get the Cabinet Office to endorse their projects, departmental officials are now “bringing their plans to us much earlier in the timeframe because they do not want us saying ‘no’ when it is well advanced”,  said Watmore.

“So we are getting into a dialogue with them early on about what the best way of doing something is. When we have agreed on the best way of doing something, when it comes back for approval, it gets nodded through and that is working much more effectively.”

Watmore added that the Cabinet Office’s controls will become redundant over time “because people will behave the right way”. He said: “Like the Carlsberg complaints department was the analogy I had in my head; it exists but it is never used.. At the moment we use it a lot because, left to their own devices, people would do things that were suboptimal when you look at it from across Government.

“Francis Maude is in a position to say, ‘No, you are not doing that. You are going to do it this way and reuse somebody else’s system or somebody else’s way of doing things’. He is very hands-on and vigorous at doing that.

Comment:

Watmore’s evidence confirms that Maude remains the mainspring of change in the way government works. Without Maude the unreasonably costly status quo would prevail.  He may be in danger of spinning. But how many ministers like to say “no”? He is invaluable for that reason alone.

What will happen when Maude is promoted, stands aside or retires?  The minister who likes to say “yes”  will earn the respect of some of his civil servants. The refreshing thing about Maude is that he is happy to take his plaudits from taxpayers, not officialdom.

Watmore’s evidence to the Public Administration Committee, 13 March 2012.

Institute for Government open letter on civil service reforms – the problems and opportunities.

IT crisis management – an ongoing NHS case study

By Tony Collins

When a public-facing go-live goes wrong should communications be neutral in tone – or accentuate the positive?

On 8 December 2011 North Bristol NHS Trust went live with the Cerner Millennium electronic patient records system under the NPfIT programme.

At first Trust staff thought the difficulties were confined to a mix-up over outpatient appointments but it later transpired that there were 16 “clinical incidents” between 1 December 2011 and 17 January 2012 that were related to the Cerner Millennium implementation.

The Trust has published regular public information notices on the benefits, expected benefits, and problems arising from the Cerner implementation.

Reassuring in tone, the notices have made no mention of anything more potentially serious than administrative “issues”:  non-existent appointments were set up and letters sent to patients in error. The notices said that though the “issues” caused disruption and frustration, patient safety had not been compromised. The Trust apologised to staff and patients.

Clinical incidents

No mention was made in the notices of staff having reported clinical incidents in which the new patient records system was a causal factor. The NHS usually categorises  each clinical incident as a  “near miss” or “actual harm”.

In Campaign4Change’s various conversations with the North Bristol Trust over the potential seriousness or otherwise of its IT problems, one thing has been clear: it is pleased with the level of public information it has given out over the problems:

–       regularly-updated messages on its website,

–       briefings to the media including interviews for regional BBC and ITV channels by Ruth Brunt, the Trust’s chief executive,

–       board papers,

–       on-time answers to requests under the Freedom of Information Act

–       leaflets and posters placed in outpatient clinics and on car parking machines explaining that the Trust was implementing a new computer system and apologising for any delays patients may experience

The Trust also gave GPs a dedicated telephone number, fax number and email address for GPs or their patients to contact for further advice.

Profuse public information

We agree that the Trust has run a diligent public information campaign; and its communications staff have always responded quickly to our calls –  and with the documents we requested. The staff were frank in answering our questions. They told us that no decision has been taken yet on whether the Trust will publish the results of an independent inquiry into the Cerner implementation.

But if the Trust doesn’t publish the lessons from its Cerner implementation, it may wish to be reminded of a warning by the Local Health Board of Merthyr Tidfil, at the top on its Clinical Incident Reporting Policy paper: –  To err is human; to cover up is unforgivable; to fail to learn is inexcusable.         

If the Trust does not publish how will others learn from its mistakes?

Accentuate the positive?

The quantity of public information released by North Bristol NHS Trust is not an issue – but how informative is  it? Does the wider culture of the Trust still force staff to accentuate the positive?

The first of the Trust’s website statements on the problems of the Cerner implementation came about five weeks after the go-live. The opening sections of the statement made no mention of any problems. Indeed a series of bullet points listed the benefits of the system:

  • Patient records will now be securely stored electronically on a single system, replacing paper records.
  • Authorised clinicians can quickly find and share information on patients and their medical history and no longer rely on paper filing records.
  • Clinicians will also be able to access records at the patient’s bedside and can input information and statistics immediately.
  • Patients will no longer have to repeat their details to different clinicians as they will be accessible in one place.
  • Tests and outpatient appointments can be set up immediately with the patient.

The Trust’s website statement went on to say that “many”wards as well as A&E at Frenchay Hospital [Bristol] are using the new system.

Only if you’ve read this far will you see a reference to problems.

“However, we have experienced some unexpected problems in the last few weeks with outpatient appointments…”

“Huge improvements”

The current media statement is, again, more upbeat than neutral.  The vague mention of problems is countered by the equally vague claim of “huge” improvements.

“At North Bristol NHS Trust we have been implementing a new electronic patient record system to replace an outdated, less efficient system. Our wards, two minor injuries units, the Emergency Department, theatres and maternity are using the new system.

“However, we have experienced some unexpected problems with some of our outpatient clinics resulting in non-existent appointments to be set up and letters sent to patients in error. Our priority is always patient safety and we are clear that this has not been compromised.

“These issues have caused disruption and frustration for our patients and our staff and we recognise that this has not delivered the level of service that we expect, and the public expect, from us. We apologise wholeheartedly for that.

“Our staff have shown real commitment, hard work and dedication to continue to deliver patient care. Our Information Management & Technology Team worked very hard to rectify these problems as quickly as possible and we have seen huge improvements.

“The system in all outpatient clinics has now been rebuilt and relaunched. These clinics are now in a position to effectively use the new electronic records system. We anticipate there will be a further transition period for staff in those clinics. We firmly believe that the new system, once fully implemented, will improve services for our patients and provide real value.”

Campaign4Change pointed out to North Bristol that board papers on the troubled Cerner implementations at Barts and The London were commendably detailed and informative.

Barts had referred breaches of government targets on waiting times, complaints from patients, delays in the reporting of statutory and other trust performance information, extra costs, losses of income because of reduced activity, and the effect of data errors. There has been little of any of this from North Bristol’s public information campaign.

Freedom of information

Indeed North Bristol has refused to answer questions that were asked under the FOI Act by D Haverstock of the South West Whistleblowers Health Action Group.

The Trust refused Haverstock’s requests for:

–        a copy of your Cerner implementation plan, including pilot

–        the criteria on which the go-live decision was taken

–       a copy of the issues log for the implementation, with a full history of closed and open items.

–        reports on Cerner Project Board/Steering Committee meetings.

The Trust did give Haverstock a vague answer to her question on whether the Trust will have to take over the running costs of Cerner from 2015 when the Department of Health’s NPfIT contract with BT ends.

The Trust said the running costs for Cerner will become the Trust’s responsibility from October 2015 – but it doesn’t know for certain what the costs will be.

“The exact costs are still being calculated, but will be around the same levels as our previous patient administration system, we estimate,” said the Trust.

North Bristol declined to answer Haverstock’s other questions because “at this time the Trust feels that to answer your questions regarding the Cerner Millennium implementation would compromise our position with BT and Cerner”.

Rightly, Haverstock challenges the Trust’s use of the word “feels”. Rejections of FOI requests should be based on facts not its feelings.

Says Haverstock in her request to the Trust for an internal review: “Subjective feelings are not a valid reason for rejecting an FOIA request. What is your objective, evidence base for rejecting this request? [Thank to Theyworkforyou.com for this information.]

Comment

Poorly-designed health IT can kill, according to a US Institute of Medicine report “Health IT and Patient Safety Building Safer Systems for Better Care” in November 2011.

The report says:

“Poorly designed health IT can create new hazards in the already complex delivery of care.

“Although the magnitude of the risk associated with health IT is not known, some examples illus­trate the concerns.

“Dosing errors, failure to detect life-threatening illnesses, and delaying treatment due to poor human–computer interactions or loss of data have led to serious injury and death …”

There’s no evidence that the problems at North Bristol have caused any harm to patients. Indeed the Trust, in reporting the clinical incidents in response to a BBC’s reporter’s FOI request, says its “robust safeguarding processes, as well as additional checks and balances in all departments” have “ensured that clinical safety was not compromised and no patients were put at risk”.

It adds: “Our priority is always patient safety and there is no indication that this has been affected.”

But would we know if patient safety had been affected? In its public information campaign the Trust has been prolific. But the accent on the positive, rather than a neutral and factual account of the specific problems, has left us with little confidence that all the truth has yet come out.

In an IT-related crisis it is not a mass of information that the public and media regard as helpful but specific answers to specific questions. Has North Bristol managed its IT-related crisis well? Up to a point, Lord Copper.

MP questions costs of North Bristol Cerner system

Sir David Nicholson challenged on North Bristol’s Cerner costs

North Bristol system has more problems than anticipated.

North Bristol hits appointment problems

Cerner system “too entrenched” to be scrapped.

M&A-led IT change project creates integration challenge for United Airlines

By David Bicknell

Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) frequently create IT project and change management headaches when companies’ systems have to be integrated.

The latest example of a system migration creating a change headache appears to be United Airlines’ adoption of Continental Airlines’ reservations platform, as the New York Times recently reported.

The New York Times said that United Airlines suffered service problems including flight delays, faulty kiosks and jammed phone lines as it tried to work through technical problems in its efforts to combine the United and Continental reservation systems. The two companies first announced their merger in May 2010.

The United and Continental problems appear to mirror the problems that US Airways Group experienced when it tried to  combine the reservations systems of America West Airlines and US Airways following a merger in 2005.

Related Links

A Mergers & Acquisitions Playbook for CIOs, Part 1

A Mergers & Acquisitions Playbook for CIOs, Part 2

Fliers’ Alert: United, Continental merger comes Saturday

Is Francis Maude starting to spin – without realising it?

By Tony Collins

Francis Maude is, perhaps, the most effective Cabinet Office minister in decades.

If the business world divides into two main types of character, black and white, and grey – neither being better or worse than the other –  Maude is black and white.

He wants clarity. He shuns subtlety and complexity. He has no time for civil service sophistry and equivocation, or the coded language of some supplier representatives. He wants cuts in the cost of contracts and doesn’t want to hear long arguments on why things are not that simple. He had deep reservations over doing a new deal with CSC over the NPfIT.

A strength of Maude and his colleagues at the Cabinet Office has been the absence, or at least scarcity, of exaggerated and unsubstantiated statements of efficiency savings, of the sort made repeatedly during Labour’s tenure.

Is that beginning to change?

In the past fortnight Maude has made two major claims that are not based on published evidence.

• Maude said spending on SMEs has risen from 6.5% to 13.7%.  It’s not clear how that figure is calculated. There’s a good analysis of the tenuousness of the claim by Peter Smith of Spend Matters. How much of the increase in SME work is down to unaudited claims by large companies that they are giving their SMEs more work?

• He said that £200m has been cut from Capgemini’s Aspire contract with HMRC. [Aspire also involves Fujitsu and Accenture.] He has received much good publicity for the claim. Said the Telegraph yesterday:

“He [Maude]  announced that ministers had successfully renegotiated one deal on computers and tax systems for HM Revenue and Customs.

He said the new contract, with Capgemini, would save £200 million on the deal previously agreed.”

Last year Mark Hall, deputy CIO at HMRC was reported as saying that the Aspire contract was on course to save more than £1bn. Is the £200m quoted by Maude in many news articles this week new?

And none of the articles mention the total cost of the Aspire contract – so from what is £200m being cut?

At one point, according to Mark Hall, the estimated cost of Aspire rose to £10bn from its original estimate of £2.83bn over 10 years. This means that cost increases on the Aspire contract are measured in billions – which puts the £200m savings figure mentioned by Maude into context.

And have Maude and his team offered Capgemini anything in return for a price cut, such as an improved profit margin? [The contract is on an open-book accounting basis]. This week’s Cabinet Office statement on the £200m cut gives no help here. An HMRC FOI response in 2010 and an NAO report in 2006 show that costs of Aspire are fluid. They change according to internal demand; and pricing arrangements are complex. HMRC has refused FOI requests to publish the contract so how can anyone put the claimed £200m savings into a contractual content?

In 2007 negotiations between HMRC and Capgemini extended the 10-year contract by three years, to June 2017; and there’s an option to extend Aspire  for a further five years to 2022. In return for the contract extension Capgemini has already guaranteed savings of £70m a year and a further £110m a year from 2012. Are these savings in addition to the £200m a year Maude has announced? Or the £1bn savings mentioned by Mark Hall?

The good news is that HMRC’s CIO is Phil Pavitt who is a natural sceptic of big outsourcing deals. If anyone is going to achieve genuine savings on Aspire it is Pavitt. Indeed he has given some details of his negotiations. But the contractual context remains abstruse.

Comment

Doubtless Maude believes the figures he has announced on SMEs and Aspire are correct but without substantiation they will mean little to anyone except the media. Maude, perhaps, needs to trust his own cautious instincts than listen too much to his advisers. Otherwise he’ll begin to sound more like Labour ministers who repeatedly made claims the NAO found difficult to substantiate.

The important and impressive work Maude is doing to cut the costs of running government should not be trivialised and debased by spin. Announcements on what he is doing to cut costs and make government more open are usually helpful. But Maude should the first to differentiate the real – in other words the factually corroborated – from aggrandising and flimsy political claims.

Lessons from “stupid” NHS IT scheme – Logica boss

Some wise words from Andy Green, CE of Logica, on lessons from the NPfIT and other failures

By Tony Collins

Andy Green, CE, Logica

Andy Green, chief executive of Logica, speaking to the BBC’s Evan Davis about the NHS National Programme for IT, NPfIT, said:

“It is a stupid thing for the supply chain to have answered, and it’s a stupid thing for the customer to have asked for.”

Green was speaking on Radio 4’s The Bottom Line about corporate “cock-ups and conspiracies”. Other guests were Phil Smith, chief executive of Cisco UK and Ireland, and entrepreneur Luke Johnson.

Green, who joined Logica as CEO in January 2008, said he was in one of the bidders for the NPfIT when he was at BT.

The plan, he said, had been to put the same system into every hospital but later foundation hospitals were able to opt out of the NPfIT.

“Half way through [the NHS IT programme] foundation hospitals were invented,  and suddenly foundation hospitals did not have to go with what the NHS said at all”.

He added: “There were fundamental errors in the whole procurement process, and then real difficulty in delivering what had been promised.”

Evan Davis said the NHS IT scheme had cost billions, achieved little and had been running for years. He asked Green: “What’s the story?”

Green said some things went well including the supply of a network that connects pharmacies and doctors. But …

“What  had been promised by the supply chain was fantastic software that had not been designed yet that was going to completely revolutionise hospitals and delivering that proved to be horrendous… in the end it is foolish to set out on a programme that is going to take seven years with a fixed procurement up front, which says we all know everything about it …”

Lessons

Green spoke of the need for the supplier to understand exactly what the customer wants and whether it is deliverable before the parties agree to draw up a project specification.

“I think the world is beginning to learn about incrementalism. Let’s do something that we can all see and understand.

“Some of our clients we now work with in common teams – we call it co-management – and only when we have worked out exactly what is going to work in the client, and we can deliver, do we specify it as a project.

“Those things tend to go a lot better. We have got used to the fact that we don’t know everything.”

Luke Johnson

Luke Johnson, who is a former chairman of Channel 4, criticised IT suppliers for not getting it right often enough.  “I have bought quite a lot of projects and been involved as a customer many times… As a customer it is a very scary thing because clearly you are not an expert. Your providers are experts and yet they do not seem to be able to get it right often enough it seems to me, given how much they charge.”

Green said there is a high failure rate in the IT industry. “The client sets out one view at the beginning and then they have to change. The sensible defence to this is the partitioning into smaller items and relationships.

“We bluntly always think of our clients over the long run. You need to know people so that you can sit down and have a decent conversation. Too often when these things start to go wrong everybody runs for the contract. Experienced buyers and sellers do not do that: they run for each other and they talk it through, and they work it out, and they put it back on track.

“It’s value that matters. It’s doing something that really changes Patisserie Valerie’s business. [Luke Johnson is chairman of Patisserie Valerie.] What can you do that would transform that. If you can get that done, then if it over-runs by 20% it probably does not matter.”

Luke Johnson: “It depends how much money you’ve got.”

Lowest-price bids

Phil Smith, Cisco

Phil Smith of Cisco said government often has the biggest problems because “they squeeze so much in procurement there is little good value and goodwill left”.He said that on good projects problems are tackled by cooperation but “if every piece of value has been squeezed out before you procure it, your only option is to get something back from it”.

Beware procurement experts

Johnson said if procurement experts take control, and their mantra is to save money, it can often lead to trouble. “I fear that in many aspects of business, it gets down exclusively to price rather than value.

“Quality is out the window. They [procurement experts] can show a saving so they have justified their bonus but the supplier may be rubbish.”

Green said government is in a difficult position when a project starts to go wrong. “You are stuck in a procurement and the poor individual responsible is almost certainly facing a union or a consumer group or a doctor who doesn’t want the thing to happen anyway.”

Evan Davis made the valid point that the costs of projects in the public sector have to be underestimated to get approved. Realistic estimates would be rejected as too costly.

“… The person who is championing this project has to demonstrate to superiors that it is not too expensive. It is only by taking the cheapest bid and starting the thing off that you can sell the project higher up and of course down the line it costs a heck of a lot more.”

Luke Johnson: “We all know in many sectors there are providers that will take things at cost or even less with a view that they will somehow bulk it out and make a margin on the way. They know the client will need variations.

Innovation means taking risks

Luke Johnson: “If you want an innovative society, if you want one that is willing to take risks, to generate new technologies, new jobs, new businesses, then it involves failures and cock-ups.

“I think the British have got vastly better in recent years in accepting that as part of the journey and that is incredibly healthy.”

BBC R4’s The Bottom Line – Cock-ups and conspiracies.

Why prompt decision-making is critical to the success of IT projects

By David Bicknell

Research from the US-based IT projects specialist Standish Group suggests latency between decisions is a major contributor to project delays and failures.

“Projects get behind a day at a time. My observation is they get behind because people cannot make decisions. Therefore, it is important to establish a process that enables you to quickly gain the decision information you need,” says Mike Sledge, chief executive of corporate performance company Robbins-Gioia.

There are literally thousands of decisions that have to be made during the life of a project. Standish Group research shows that for every $1,000 in project cost, the organisation will need to make 1.5 decisions. A $1 million project will produce 1,500 decisions, while a $5 million project will have 7,500 decisions. During a typical medium-size ERP system implementation the organisation will have to make more than 10,000 decisions.

“The key reason for making fast decisions has nothing to do with always making right decisions. It has everything to do with being open to mistakes,” says Richard Mark Soley, chairman and CEO of the Object Management Group (OMG). 

Standish Group took the case of two US companies in the same sector that were both implementing customer relationship management (CRM) systems. Both companies were similar in size, number of accounts, and salespeople. They even used the same software package.

Both started to implement a CRM system about four years ago. One finished in six months and the other has still not finished. The key difference was the one that finished in six months had a hard stop and had set up a rapid decision process to reduce decision latency.

Standish Group goes on to say that while the volume of decisions comprising a project can be a problem, it is actually the time that lapses from when an issue first arises until a decision is made that causes most difficulties.

For example, if the average decision latency is only one-hour, then the added decision time to a $1 million project is six months (1,500 decisions = 1,500 hours). On the other hand, if the project team can cut the latency time in half, it adds only three months to the project time (1,500 decisions = 750 hours).

With this insight into the corrosive effect of slow decision-making on project success, and after years of research in project management performance, the Standish Group decided to develop The Dezider, a real-time information decision support solution to help organisations cut decision-making time in half through greater stakeholder participation and more information.

The intention behind The Dezider is to connect individuals with their co-workers, stakeholders, peers, superiors, friends, and family as an aid to decision-making.

One way to increase decision velocity, decrease latency, and increase people’s participation is to simplify large issues by breaking them into smaller issues and decisions. (You may recognise something of an Agile-like approach to decision-making here)

The Dezider enables the ability to create a series of minor or micro issues and to construct a stream of responses to achieve quicker, easier, and more comprehensive answers. Each of these micro issues can then be directed to the proper level, role, and/or responsible person(s).

What usually happens in organisations is that people are busy doing their main jobs and often put off project tasks such as participating in project decisions. The Dezider offers a feature that gently reminds project participants that they have an outstanding issue and the team is waiting for their response.

Another feature within Dezider provides the ability to match the type of decision with the roles of the people making the decisions. For example, a technical decision should have a technical person making the decision. On the other hand, a business decision should have a business person making the decision.

There are more details about the impact of decision-making on projects, and about The Dezider on the Standish Group blog. Standish Group is probably best known for its Chaos research into project management leadership and best practices.