Category Archives: change management

BBC’s DMI project – another fine mess that was predictable

By Tony Collins

A National Audit Office memorandum published today on the BBC’s failed £125.9m Digital Media Initiative is a reminder – as in most failed big IT-enabled projects – that the causes have nothing to do with software and everything to do with management and people.

The NAO’s memorandum tells an all too familiar story with government IT (and the BBC is a public sector organisation):

– Over-optimism about the ability to implement

– Over-optimism about the ability to achieve the benefits

– Unclear requirements

– No thorough independent assessment of the technical design to see whether the DMI was technically sound

– The successful completion of the most straightforward of technology releases for the DMI, but these proved an unreliable indicator of progress.

– Technical problems and releases not meeting user expectations which contributed to repeated extensions to the timetable for completing the system, eroding user confidence and undermining the business case.

– Poor internal reporting. “The governance arrangements for the DMI were inadequate for its scale, complexity and risk. The BBC did not appoint a senior responsible owner to act as a single point of accountability and align all elements of the DMI. Reporting arrangements were not fit for purpose,” said the NAO.

– In the same way as the DWP failed with Universal Credit to take full account of recommendations in review reports, the BBC “did not adequately address issues identified by external reviewers during the course of the programme”.  The BBC had been aware that business requirements for the DMI were not adequately defined.

The BBC estimates that it spent £125.9m on the DMI. It offset £27.5m of spending on the DMI against transfers of assets, cash and service credits that formed part of its financial settlement with DMI’s previous developer Siemens. This left a net cost of £98.4m.

The BBC cancelled the DMI without examining the technical feasibility or cost of completing it, said the NAO.

The Corporation has written off the value of assets created by the programme, but is exploring how it can develop or redeploy parts of the system to support its future archiving and production needs.

Diane Coyle, Vice Chairman BBC Trust, said:

“We are grateful to the NAO for carrying out this report, which reinforces the conclusions of the PwC review commissioned by the Trust. It is essential that the BBC learns from the losses incurred in the DMI project and applies the lessons to running technology projects in future.

“The NAO’s findings, alongside PwC’s recommendations will help us make sure this happens. As we announced last December, we are working with the Executive to strengthen project management and reporting arrangements within a clearer governance system.  This will ensure that serious problems can be spotted and addressed at an earlier stage.”

Amyas Morse, head of the National Audit Office, said today:

“The BBC Executive did not have sufficient grip on its Digital Media Initiative programme. Nor did it commission a thorough independent assessment of the whole system to see whether it was technically sound.

“If the BBC had better governance and reporting for the programme, it would have recognized the difficulties much earlier than May 2012.”

Comment

The DMI project is exemplar of all that tends to go wrong in big government IT-enabled projects. Strong independent oversight and independent reviews that were published would have provided the accountability to counterbalance over-optimism.  But these things never seems to happen.

There are also questions about why the BBC took on the project from Siemens  and turned what could have been a success into a financial disaster.

NAO memorandum on the BBC’s Digital Media Initiative

Are Govt IT-based project disasters over? Ask the Army

By Tony Collins

When senior civil servants know an IT-based project is in trouble and they’re unsure how bad things are, they sometimes offer their minister an all-encompassing euphemism to publicly describe the status of the scheme – teething.

Which may be why the defence secretary Philip Hammond told the House of Commons in November 2013 that the IT project to support army recruiting was having “teething” problems.

Now Hammond knows more, he says the problems are “big”. He no longer uses the “t” word. Speaking about the £440m 10-year Recruitment Partnering Project in the House of Commons this week Hammond said:

“Yes, there are big problems with the IT and I have told the House on repeated occasions that we have IT challenges…”

Only a few days ago Cabinet Office minister Francis Maude suggested that Government IT was no longer a byword for disaster, though he accepted there were still challenges.

In a speech on how he expected the UK to become the G8’s most digital government by next year (whatever that means) Maude said: “… it’s great news that DVLA is about to launch online driving records which can be used by anyone with a driving licence as well as by the insurance industry.

“Back in 2010 our digital offering was limited at best and government IT was a by-word for disaster … There are still challenges but with the help of the Government Digital Service I am determined that the UK will be the G8’s most digital government by next year.”

A few days later The Times reported on a leaked Gartner report on the army Recruitment Partnering Project. The report expressed concerns about the entire plan, including a poor project management team and delays that were allowed to spiral out of control.

It claimed that the Army’s recruitment division had failed to challenge MoD policy in 2011 that had apparently favoured the less suitable of the two competing bidders chasing the contract.

Hammond is said to be mulling over a £50m payout for Capita to build a new infrastructure for the recruiting system instead of trying to integrate it with systems supplied by the “Atlas” consortium under the Defence Information Infrastructure project. Hammond told the House of Commons this week:

“… there have been initial difficulties with that recruiting process as we transition to the new recruiting arrangements with Capita.

“In particular, we have encountered difficulties with the IT systems supporting the application and enlistment process. The decision to use the legacy Atlas IT platform was deemed at the time to be the quickest and most cost-effective way of delivering the new recruitment programme.

“An option to revert to a Capita hosting solution was included in the contracts as a back-up solution.

“I was made aware in the summer of last year that the Army was encountering problems with the integration of the Capita system into the Atlas platform. Since then we have put in place a number of workarounds and mitigation measures for the old IT platform to simplify the application process, and we have reintroduced military personnel to provide manual intervention to support the process.

“Having visited the Army’s recruitment centre in Upavon [Wiltshire] on 30 October, it became clear to me that, despite the Army putting in place measures to mitigate those problems in the near term, further long-term action was needed to fix the situation.

“It was agreed in principle at that point that the Atlas system was not capable of timely delivery of the Capita-run programme and that we would need to take up the option of reverting to Capita building a new IT platform specifically to run its system, which will be ready early next year.

“… we have already taken action to bring in a range of new initiatives that will make it progressively easier and quicker for applicants … the introduction this month of a new front-end web application for Army recruitment; a simplified online application form; more streamlined medical clearance processes …

“With an improved Army recruitment website, streamlined medicals and an increase in the number of recruiting staff, recruits should see a much-improved experience by the end of this month.

“.. we are looking at further ways of improving the management of the recruiting process in the intervening period before the introduction of the advanced IT system now being developed in partnership with Capita, which is expected to be deployed in February 2015…”

Vernon Croaker, Labour’s defence spokesman, said the recruitment project was an IT fiasco. He wondered why Hammond had initially described the problems as teething.

“Today we have learned [from newspapers] that the problems are even worse than anyone thought and still have not been fixed.

“Will the Defence Secretary tell the House which Minister signed off the deal and who has been responsible for monitoring it?

“… Will the Secretary of State also confirm that £15.5m has been spent building the existing flawed computer system behind the project? Finally, is it correct that this continuing disaster is costing taxpayers £1 million every month?…”

Croaker quoted a minister Andrew Robathan as telling MPs on 10 April 2013 that the “Recruiting Partnering Project with Capita…will lead to a significant increase in recruiting performance”.

Croaker said: “Is there any Member of this House, any member of our armed forces or, indeed, any member of the British public who still believes that?”

In March 2012 Capita announced that the Recruitment Partnering Project was valued at about £44m a year for 10 years and was expected to deliver benefits in excess of £300m to the armed forces. It would “release military recruiters back to the front line” said Capita.

Comment. Francis Maude is probably right: there don’t seem to be as many big IT-based project failures as in previous decades. But then the truth isn’t known because progress reports on big IT-related schemes are not published.

Indeed little would be known about the Capita Recruitment Partnering Project is not for the leaked report to The Times. Without the leak, public information on the state of the project would be confined to Hammond’s “teething problems” comment to MPs last November.

Internal and external reports on the state of the Universal Credit IT project continue to be kept secret.  It’s not even clear whether ministers are properly briefed on their big IT projects. Hammond almost certainly wasn’t last year. IDS was left to commission his own “red team” review of Universal Credit IT.

Perhaps the “good news” reporting culture in Whitehall explains why the NHS IT scheme, the NPfIT, continued to die painfully slowly for 7 years before senior officials and ministers started to question whether all was well.

Hammond is still getting wrong information. He described “Atlas” systems in the House of Commons as the “legacy IT platform”.

The Atlas contract for the Defence Information Infrastructure was awarded in 2005 for 10 years. It doesn’t even expire until next year. It may be convenient for officials to suggest that the reason Capita has been unable to link new recruitment systems into the DII network is because DII is old – legacy IT.  But the multi-billion pound Atlas DII project cannot be accurately described as “legacy” yet.

If ministers don’t get the truth about their big IT projects until serous problems are so obvious they can no longer be denied, how can Parliament and taxpayers expect to get the truth?

Lessons from NASA?

NASA put in place processes, procedures and rules to ensure engineers were open and deliberately adversarial in challenging assumptions. Even so it has had difficulties getting engineers to express  their views freely.

Diane Vaughan in her excellent book “The Challenger Launch Decision” referred to large organisations that proceeded as if nothing was wrong “in the face of evidence that something was wrong”.  She said NASA made a series of seemingly harmless decisions that “incrementally moved the space agency towards a catastrophic outcome”.

After the loss of Challenger NASA made many changes. But an investigation into the subsequent tragedy of the Columbia space shuttle indicated that little had actually changed – even though few of the top people who had been exposed to the lessons of Challenger were still in position.

If NASA couldn’t change when lives depended on it, is it likely the UK civil service will ever change?  A political heavyweight,  Francis Maude has tried and failed to get departments to be more open about progress or otherwise on their big IT-based projects.  Permanent secretaries now allow the out-of-date “traffic light” status of some projects to be published in the annual report of the Major Projects Authority. That is not openness.

The failure so far of the Recruitment Partnering Project, the routine suppression of information on technology-based scheme such as this, and the circumscribed “good news” briefings to ministers, suggest that government IT-based project failures are here to stay, despite the best intentions of the Cabinet Office, GDS and the Major Projects Authority.

Thank you to campaigner Dave Orr for his email on the recruitment project

Big 4 Universal Credit IT suppliers punished?

By Tony Collins

The  latest draft business case for Universal Credit suggests existing IT suppliers will have little to do with the “end-state digital solution” that is  due eventually to support the roll-out of UC.

The Department for Work and Pensions will use a mixture of its own and external people for the end-state digital solution.

Computer Weekly quotes part of the draft business case as saying:

“To extend the current IT solution we will be using a standard waterfall delivery approach largely using existing suppliers and commercial frameworks, in order to de-risk delivery and ensure UC continues to have a safe and secure introduction.

“The end-state digital solution will be delivered using an agile, and therefore iterative, approach as advocated by the Cabinet Office with significantly less reliance on the large IT suppliers delivering the current UC IT service.”

Politicalscrapbook.net picks up Computer Weekly’s report and says that Iain Duncan Smith “punishes Universal Credit IT suppliers“. 

Costs

Computer Weekly quotes the draft business case as putting the cost of the end-state solution at £106m – comprising external IT costs of £69m and in-house “Design and Build” team costs of £37m.

The total cost of UC IT is now put at £535m – down substantially on the £673m estimate in the DWP’s December 2012 UC business case.

UC project at “red” 

Yesterday the Guardian reported that Francis Maude and his team at the government digital service have objected to the twin-track approach to UC but were outflanked by “a majority” of other government ministers and project advisers, leaked minutes say.

The twin-track approach to UC IT means that the DWP and its main suppliers – HP, Accenture, IBM and BT – continue to develop existing systems (a blend of legacy and new technology) while a separate team develops a new “end-state” system for use by the end of 2017. It’s unclear how the two systems will differ. 

Computer Weekly quotes the latest draft business case as saying it is “unclear what the digital service will deliver and to what timescales”.

Due to the multitude of problems facing universal credit, the project has been coded “red” overall, according to the Guardian.

Comment

Computer Weekly has done well to gain sight of the latest draft business case for UC.

Whoever wrote the draft appears to accept the Cabinet Office’s case for departments to “move away from large ICT projects” and thus “reduce waste, provide a more flexible approach to complex business requirements that are likely to change over time and reduce the risk of project failures”. (National Audit Office, Universal Credit: early progress). 

But is the DWP simply telling the Cabinet Office what it wants to hear?  All the signs are that the big money at the DWP will continue to go to its main IT suppliers. 

The £106m agile “end-state digital solution” is a bonus system which may or may not materialise.  It is in essence a big, agile research project and the DWP is having trouble finding IT professionals to work on it.

If ever it’s a success it could start to replace existing UC IT in 2017 or beyond. But that may never happen. The DWP has already spent more than £300m on existing UC technology and is set to spend a lot more: around £90m. The DWP is unlikely to scrap it.

So HP, IBM, Accenture and BT are all but guaranteed a large income stream from the non end-state UC technology.

Even without the UC project the big 4 are guaranteed a large income from the DWP’s other work which includes:

– Personal Independence Implementation – 2.8bn 2011–2016
– Fraud and error programme – £770m  2012–2015
– Child maintenance group change 1.2bn 2009–2014
– Pensions reform Enabling Retirement Savings programme 1.04bn 2007–2018
– State Pension reform – single tier £114m 2012–2017
– Specialist Disability Employment programme – £203m 2012–2014

The big 4 will also continue to receive a large chunk of the DWP’s IT budget for maintaining and upgrading the existing software, hardware and networks.

Business cases are written by experts in the writing of Whitehall business cases.  Their main purpose is to provide a case for the Treasury to release funds for a project. They give current thinking on costs and benefits. The documents are revised when these change significantly.

So the statement in the UC draft business case that the new end-state digital solution will rely “significantly less” on existing UC IT suppliers means little: it is subject to change.

And the words “significantly less” are  unexplained. They may have no scientific basis. 

Worrying

The big 4 suppliers continue to be all-important to the DWP – and are so enmeshed that they decide at times how much they should be paid, suggests the NAO.

From its latest report on the UC project, the NAO comments on the DWP’s lack of control of suppliers :

– “In February 2013, the Major Projects Authority reported there was no evidence of the Department actively managing its supplier contracts and recommended that the Department needed to urgently get a grip of its supplier management.”

– “[The DWP has] limited IT capability and ‘intelligent client’ function leading to a risk of supplier self-review.”

– “[The DWP has] inadequate controls over what would be supplied, when and at what cost because deliverables were not always defined before contracts were signed.”

– “[The DWP has an] over-reliance on performance information that was provided by suppliers without Department validation.”

– ” … the Department did not enforce all the key terms and conditions of its standard contract management framework, inhibiting its ability to hold suppliers to account.”

So it would be naively optimistic to suppose that if the big 4 were to be frozen out of the end-state solution for UC that it would make much difference to their income from the DWP.      

UC in chaos or not?

A generous interpretation of all the available evidence on the UC project so far is that the DWP is working through, and understanding, the difficulties on an immensely complicated IT-enabled project.

And supporters of the twin-track approach could argue that two completely independent sets of teams are working in parallel and in discreet competition to produce the most successful system. One team comprises the big 4 using waterfall and the other a largely in-house team using agile.  Eventually one system will prevail, even if it’s 2020 or beyond that it handles securely online all types of claims. On completion the system will simplify benefit claims and cut the costs of administration.

A less generous interpretation of the available facts is that the UC IT project  is in chaos and that vast sums continue to be poured into a poorly formed strategy that nobody in government will concede is failing;  all parties are preoccupied with resolving problems as they arise and expecting irrationally that things will come good in the end.  Nobody should expect the full truth to emerge from those who have a deep interest in the project’s success including IDS and his permanent secretary Robert Devereux.

Howard Shiplee, head of the UC project, may still be getting his head around how chaotic things are. The highly capable David Pitchford, who headed UC  for a few months before he quit the civil service last year, came close to saying the project was in chaos. His Major Projects Authority said in February 2013 that the DWP needed to “rethink the delivery approach”, said the NAO.

Indeed the UC project shows many of the usual signs of a government IT-based project failure:

– major changes in the basic assumptions between the business case of December 2012 and the latest draft business case
– excessive secrecy (keeping secret a succession of internal and external reports on the project).
– defensiveness (continued DWP claims that problems are historic)
– a high turnover of leaders
– a culture of good news that “limited open discussion and stifled challenge”, said the NAO
– a lack of control of suppliers (NAO)
– repeated delays
– suppliers that get paid regardless of whether their systems are contributing to a  successful project.

To me things look chaotic but I hope I’m wrong. I’d like UC IT to work. IDS and Shiplee will probably know the whole truth – and they are still in post, to date.  If Shiplee leaves the project before the general election that could be an indication of how bad things really are.   

Will Universal Credit be complete by 2020?

By Tony Collins

Comment

Much of what Iain Duncan Smith said at the Work and Pensions Committee yesterday made sense. In essence the DWP’s plan is to delay putting most of the  claimants onto the Universal Credit system until the technology is proven to work.

But there is little evidence it will work at scale, handling reliably and accurately millions of claimants and complex cases. It emerged yesterday that the DWP has still not yet agreed with suppliers a specification for the UC systems, and the latest business case has yet to be approved. How can anyone say on the basis of the limited work so far that the technology will work?

And Howard Shiplee,  Director General of Universal Credit, made the point yesterday that the technology is only part of the story. For UC to work there have to be changes in culture, operational procedures within the DWP and the retraining of tens of thousands of staff.

IDS is doing what various sets of ministers and officials did during the distended failure of the NHS’s £11bn computer programme, the National Programme for IT [NPfIT]: in assuring Parliament all was well they always used the future tense. The programme “will” give everyone in England an electronic patient record. But nothing was delivered that provided evidence the promises would be fulfilled. It took a new government to admit the NPfIT was a failure.

UC differs from the NPfIT in a crucial way. The NPfIT did not need to work. It was conceived at the top without support from the NHS. Many hospitals didn’t want centrally-bought IT foisted on them. The NPfIT was wanted, in the main, by a small number of politicians, officials and big suppliers. UC is needed and wanted. Simplifying the horrifying complex benefit systems has all-party support. Shiplee is right when he says UC has to work. But he didn’t yesterday commit himself to a timeframe.

The last major benefits computerisation project – called “Operational Strategy” – took about 10 years to finish. It did not achieve the promised financial benefits and benefit systems were not combined as originally intended but, in the end, the technology worked well for its time.

If UC does work there’s every reason to believe it will be in a similar timeframe to Operational Strategy: about 10 years. But could IDS keep his job while saying UC will be fully delivered in 2020 or beyond? I doubt it.

Patient records go-live “success” – or a new NPfIT failure?

By Tony Collins

John Goulston says the go-live of a new patient records system at his trust is a “success”.

He should know. He’s Chief Executive of Croydon Health Services NHS Trust. He’s also chair of the trust’s Informatics Programme Board which has taken charge of bringing Cerner Millennium to Croydon’s community health services and the local University Hospital, formerly the Mayday.

He was formerly Programme Director of the London Programme for IT at NHS London – a branch of the NPfIT.

In a report two weeks ago Goulston said the trust deployed the “largest number of clinical applications in a single implementation in the NHS”. Croydon went live with Cerner Millennium on 30 September and 1 October 2013.

Said Goulston in his report:

“Administrative functions do not engage clinicians; providing them with a suite of clinical functionality has been justified as each weekday approx. 1,000 staff are logged on and using the system. CHS [Croydon Health Services] has in Phase 1 deployed, in addition to patient administration, the largest number of clinical applications in a single implementation in the NHS England.”

BT helped install Millennium at Croydon under the National Programme for IT.  The trust’s spokesman says the Department of Health provided central funding, and the trust paid for implementation “overheads”.  The Health and Social Care Information Centre was the trust’s partner for the go-live.

The Centre is the successor for Connecting for Health. It has taken on CfH’s officials who continue to help run the NPfIT contracts with BT and  CSC.

Goulston said that Cerner and BT have paid tribute to the trust which installed Millennium in A&E, outpatients, secretarial support and cancer services, and elsewhere.

“Our partners Cerner, BT and Ideal have commented that the Trust has undertaken one of the most efficient roll-outs of the system they have worked on, with more users adopting the system more quickly and efficiently than other trusts … the success we have achieved to date is the result of the efforts of every single system user and all staff members,” said Goulston.

Best Cerner implementation yet?

Optimistic remarks about their launch of Cerner Millennium were also made in 2012 by executives at the Royal Berkshire NHS Foundation Trust.  Their optimism proved ill-judged.

Of the Millennium go-live at Royal Berkshire, trust executives said that it “had been considered to be the best implementation of Cerner Millennium yet and that despite staff misgivings, the project was progressing well”.   This positive message should be disseminated, they said.

Months later they told the Reading Chronicle of patient safety issues and a financial crisis arising from the Millennium implementation.

A Royal Berkshire governors Rebecca Corre was quoted as saying: “There is a patient safety issue when staff write down observations and then there is an hour before they can get it onto the computer. If it is an experienced nurse, they may pick up a problem, but others may not.”

Ed Donald, Chief Executive of Royal Berkshire was quoted as saying:

“Unfortunately, implementing the EPR [electronic patient record] system has at times been a difficult process and we acknowledge that we did not fully appreciate the challenges and resources required in a number of areas.”

Are executives and managers at Croydon Health Services NHS Trust  now similarly afflicted with an unjustified optimism about the success of their Cerner go-live?  

Past consequences of NPfIT go-lives hidden?

The Department of Health has claimed benefits for the NPfIT of £3.7bn to March 2012 but there have been trust-wide failures: thousands of patients have had their appointments, care or treatment delayed by difficulties arising from past implementations of patient record systems under the NPfIT.  For thousands of patients waiting time standards have been exceeded or “breached” because of disruption arising from troubled go-lives.

In nearly every case trusts made it difficult for the facts to come out publicly. Vague or unexplained fragments of information about the consequences of the NPfIT implementation appeared  in different board papers over several months. The facts only emerged after a journalistic investigation that required scrutiny of many board papers and follow-up questions to the trust’s press office.

So Campaign4Change investigated Croydon Health’s implementation of Cerner Millennium to see if the Francis report’s call for a “duty of candour” over mistakes and problems in the NHS have made any difference to the traditional fragmentation of facts after NPfIT go-lives of patient record systems.

The Francis report called for “openness, transparency and candour“.  Trusts were told not to hide sub-standard practices under the carpet. The health secretary Jeremy Hunt said it can be “disastrous” when bad news does not emerge quickly and the public are kept in the dark about poor care.

To my questions about the Cerner Millennium implementation Croydon trust’s spokesman always responded promptly and tried to be helpful. But it appears that trust executives have given him limited information about consequences of the go-live, and have preferred to indulge the “good news” NHS culture that Jeremy Hunt warned about.

On being asked what problems the trust has faced since the go-live the spokesman gave various answers that made no mention of the problems.

“All of our staff received training on the system, and we are continuing to offer our teams support as it is embedded.”

What of the problems arising from the implementation, and has the board been fully informed?

“Millennium has featured regularly on the Corporate Risk Register presented to each Part 1 Board meeting.   In addition, implementation has received detailed confidential consideration at Part 2 of Board meetings, (which is why you won’t find it in our public board papers).”

Given Francis’s call for duty of candour,  should the trust be more open about its problems?

“The initial roll out for CRS Millennium was introduced over three days at the Trust, with a phased approach.  We did this to ensure the system was working in each department, before introducing it in another area.

“We are monitoring waiting time performance and records management so we can identify any issues if they emerge. The system is still being introduced in some services and when this is completed we will be able to assess the overall programme,” said the spokesman.

Does Croydon’s unwillingness to give in its statements to me any details of problems indicate that the culture of a lack of transparency in the NHS will be hard to change, no matter how many times Jeremy Hunt talks about the need for candour when things go wrong?

The spokesman:

“I’d like to be clear about the Trust’s approach:

  • The Trust board has been cited on the roll out of CRS Millennium and any potential risks throughout the process.  As I previously noted, the board received an update in September.  The board meeting, which will take place on Monday of next week, will receive a further update from the Chief Executive.  The papers from this meeting will be published on our website and the meeting takes place in public;
  • A meeting chaired by the Chief Operating Officer has reviewed any operational matters arising on a daily basis.  This is an internal meeting for clinicians and managers which has informed the implementation process;
  • Patients and visitors to the hospital have been kept fully appraised of the introduction of the system and were made aware that they may experience some delays to the check-in process while staff became familiar with the new computer system;

“These actions would suggest that the Trust has been transparent in its approach.  You are welcome to review the board papers when they are published.”

Serious problems now emerge

Croydon did indeed publish its board papers on 25 November 2013 – which is to its credit because not all NHS trusts publish timely board papers.

But it’s mostly in the small print of various board papers that details emerge of Millennium-related problems. The shortcomings are mentioned as individual items rather than in a single, detailed Cerner Millennium deployment report.  This leaves one to question whether trust directors have an overview of the seriousness of the difficulties arising from its implementation of a new patient records system.

These are some excerpts from deep inside Croydon’s latest board papers:

Breaches in waiting time standards

– “CRS Millennium (Cerner) Deployment -Network downtime – Week 1.  In particular, the significant network downtime in week 1 (BT N3 problem) led to no electronic access to Pathology and Radiology which resulted in longer waits for patients in the Emergency Department (ED) leading to a large number of breaches. This was a BT N3 problem which has been rectified with BT providing CHS with the required scale of N3 access (>600 concurrent users and >1,600 users on any day – which is the largest network usage of any trust in England).”

– • “Hospital Based Pathways: The deployment of CRS Millennium was a particular challenge in the month across the multiple service areas within the Directorate of A&E, Surgery and Maternity.

• “Cancer & Core Functions: With the implementation of CRS Millennium, the open pathways part of RTT [referral to treatment – patient waiting times) may fail the standard – validation will be completed after the narrative for this report… “

Excessive waits in A&E

– “The main drivers adversely affecting the performance in the month [October 2013) for A&E were the deployment of CRS Millennium and the commencement of winter pressures due to the seasonality change.  A&E  4-Hour Total Time in Department Target: 95.00%. Actual: 91.57%.”

Over budget

“The Trust position as at October is an adverse variance of £4.1m. This is a significant deterioration on the Month 6 position. The movement is mainly due to a significant reduction in income mainly as a result of operating issues caused by the Cerner deployment (£0.9m)…  Actual £14.8 (£14.8)m; Budget £10.7m; Variance £4.1m.”

“Cerner Millennium: Plan YTD [year-to-date] £245,000; Actual YTD  £621,000;

Significant loss in income

“… A new patient administration system was deployed in the Trust on the 30th September and 1st October (Cerner Millennium). The deployment has resulted in significant loss in income in September and October £ 1.1m. Trust performance on Activity Planning Assumptions and Key Performance Indicators is substantially worse than plan …”

Extra costs

“Medical £412k and admin £148k agency levels continue to be high due to cover for vacancies, annual leave, sickness and release of staff for Cerner training. The Trust has also incurred additional costs associated with the Cerner deployment (£600k) including overtime payments to administration staff and training costs.”

Bid to recover Cerner costs?

“… The Trust is currently forecasting a deficit position of £17.8m, which is £3.3m off the plan submitted to the NHS Trust Development Authority. This is a £3m movement from the month 6 forecast and is as a result of operational issues caused by the Cerner deployment. The current projected impact is an additional costs £1.7m and a loss in activity £1.1m . An application is to be made to recover the additional cost/losses relating to the Cerner deployment [of £2.9m] …”

HSCIC support for delays

“Cerner Millennium – Revised implementation date to Sept 2013 (achieved) ,with resultant additional costs including additional PC requirements of £146k, specialist support services £300k, procurement costs £91k, data cleansing costs £200k.

“Health& Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) has confirmed support for the delayed implementation will be provided, accounting treatment of support to be confirmed with Department of Health.”

More money to stabilise operational position?

“As a result of operational issues caused by the Cerner deployment , Income is significantly reduced in October. The forecast assumes that the Trust will resume normal operating levels from November and that an element of the income lost will be will be recovered in the latter part of the year. A business case is being submitted to the Trust Board for additional investment in Cerner to stabilise the operational position.

“If there are further operational issues due to the Cerner deployment then this will significantly impact on the year end forecast…”

Over-optimism?

Principal risk -reporting output from Cerner is not accurate or timely. Officer in charge: CEO. Before go-live risk scores: June 2013 – 16; July – 16; Aug  – 10; Sept – 10. After go-live risk score (for Oct): 20 [high risk of likelihood and consequences]

Principal risk – operational readiness following the implementation of Cerner. Officer in charge: COO.  Before go-live risk score 15. Post go-live: 20. Risk rating before go-live – Green. After go-live – Red.

Red risks

Corporate Risk Assurance Framework

Nine risks are reported as Red [two of which relate directly to Millennium]:

“… Reporting output from Cerner is not accurate or timely. Data migration was successful. However reliance on external provider as internal knowledge has not yet been fully gained. A data quality dashboard with exception reporting is in place.

“… Operational readiness following the implementation of Cerner CRS Millennium impact conveyed to Trust Development Authority e.g. ED [Emergency Department] reporting and cost overruns

Risk scores

– Failure of CRS millennium to deliver anticipated benefits – 12. Officer in charge: CEO

– Reporting output from Cerner is not accurate or timely – 20. Officer in charge: CEO

– Operational readiness following the implementation of Cerner – 20. Officer in charge: COO

Croydon’s trust’s response to problems

Said John Goulston, Croydon’s CEO, in his latest [November 2013] report to the board of directors:

“The issues being encountered now with CRS Millennium are not due to any lack of integration testing with legacy applications or testing of workflow. They can be attributed to changing from a 25 year old Patient Administration System (Patient Centre) which did not require working in real time, was simple and intuitive to use, easily configurable and flexible to our needs.

“CRS Millennium’s patient administration functions are almost the complete opposite and the language used is new for our staff i.e. conversations, encounters etc. For our staff it has been a big ask for them to step into and up to such a complex application.”

He added: “The benefits of the new system are that each patient will have a single accurate electronic record that can be viewed and kept up-to-date by hospital and community clinical staff. This will eventually mean less time searching for patient notes, missing documentation and duplicating patient information…

“As with any massive change, there are still some challenges to tackle in making the system work effectively for every single user, in a diverse and complex organisation.

“However the success we have achieved to date is the result of the efforts of every single system user and all staff members. I would like to thank all our staff for their hard work in getting the Trust to this important stage.”

The trust spokesman gave me this statement on the problems:

“The Trust board has been given regular reports on the roll out of CRS Millennium and any potential risks throughout the process, not least through its regular reviews of the Corporate Risk and Board Assurance Frameworks.  As I previously noted, the board received a specific update in September.

“As you already know, November’s board meeting received a further update from the Chief Executive.  The papers from this meeting were published and the meeting takes place in public;  Those attending are invited to put forward questions.

“A meeting chaired by the Chief Operating Officer continues to review operational matters.  This is an internal meeting for clinicians and managers which has informed the implementation process;

“Patients and visitors to the hospital have been kept fully appraised of the introduction of the system and were made aware that they may experience some delays to the check-in process while staff became familiar with the new computer system;

“As you highlight from the board report, Cerner & BT noted that ‘the Trust has undertaken one of the most efficient roll-outs of the system they have worked on’   The papers also note some operational challenges as the system was rolled out.  These have been addressed as part of the daily meetings I reference above – these are mainly concerned with users familiarising themselves with the system and have been addressed through the support and training staff received.

“In terms of the costs, the introduction of CRS Millennium has been supported by central funding from the Department of Health with the Trust paying the implementation overheads.   These costs are a matter of public record and the Trust publishes annual Accounts as part of its Annual Report.”

Comment

When you go into hospital it’s reassuring to know the directors will be well informed and open about problems that could affect you.

The approach of Croydon Health Services NHS Trust to openness about its problems is not reassuring. It is no better or worse than other trusts that have implemented Cerner’s Millennium. In fact the timely publication of its board papers means it is more open than some.

But it should not require a time-consuming journalistic investigation to establish the consequences for patients of an NPfIT go-live. It has required just such an investigation after the go-live of Millennium at Croydon.

Board directors will not have the time to dig for, and piece together, information about internal problems that could delay patient appointments, treatment and care. They need the unpalatable facts in one place. Croydon Health Services has failed to make it easy for patients or board directors to see what has gone wrong.

NPfIT deployments at other trusts have led, cumulatively, to thousands of patients having appointments that were disrupted, or who had to wait longer to be seen than necessary, or whose records were not available, or who were seen with another patient’s records.

In shying away from telling the whole truth trusts take their cue from the top: the Department of Health has always made it hard to establish facts about anything to do with the NPfIT.  Said the Public Accounts Committee in its report The National Programme for IT in the NHS: an update on the delivery of detailed care records systems in July 2011:

 “It is unacceptable that the Department [of Health] has neglected its duty to provide timely and reliable information to make possible Parliament’s scrutiny of this project.

“Basic information provided by the Department to the National Audit Office was late, inconsistent and contradictory.”

Unanswered questions

Croydon has questions to answer, such as how many breaches of waiting time standards it has had, and may still be having, due to problems arising from the go-live. Other unanswered questions:

– What does a “a large number of breaches” in the Emergency Department mean? Have each the patients affected been told?

– Why are the risks related to the implementation much higher after go-live than before, given that the trust has had years to prepare for the go-live, and the many lessons it could have learned from other trusts?

– Exactly what problems are still affecting patients?

In a post-Francis NHS, Jeremy Hunt has demanded openness about mistakes and problems. There is an agreed need for change – but how can Hunt change an NHS culture – indeed a public sector culture – in which senior executives, in troubled IT implementations, will always emphasise the good news over the bad, perhaps hoping the bad will always remain hidden?

Did DWP mislead MPs and media over Universal Credit?

By T0ny Collins

Today’s report of the all-party Public Accounts Committee “Universal Credit: early progress” goes beyond criticisms of the scheme in a National Audit Office report of the same name on 5 September 2013.

Public Accounts MPs say the Department for Work and Pensions gave “misleading interviews to the press regarding progress after it became aware of difficulties with the programme”.

And as recently as July 2013 the “Department denied that there were problems with the programme’s IT when it gave evidence to the Work and Pensions Committee”.

These criticisms are against a background of the DWP’s refusal to publish any of the many internal and external reports the department has commissioned on the project’s progress, problems and challenges since 2011.

The Times today says that work and pensions secretary Iain Duncan Smith and members of his parliamentary team are “understood to have approached at least three Tory MPs on the cross-party [Public Accounts] committee to ask them to ensure that Robert Devereux, Permanent Secretary at the Department for Work and Pensions, was singled out for censure”.  In the end there was only limited criticism in the PAC report of Devereux – under his formal title of “Accounting Officer”.

Comment

If the DWP has been misleading the press, giving incorrect evidence to Parliament, and keeping secret its reports on the problems and challenges facing one of the government’s most important IT-based programmes – all of which seem to be the case – is it an institution that regards itself as uniquely outside the democratic process?

On big IT projects, officials are not motivated by money and concern for their jobs as are private sector boards of directors. When a private company gets it wrong and loses tens of millions on a project, the share price may fall, individual bonuses may be hit, and jobs, including the CEO’s, may be at risk.

In the public sector getting it wrong rarely has any implications for officials. They have only the threat of departmental embarrassment as a deterrent to getting it wrong. But they need not fear even embarrassment if they can mislead the press and Parliament and keep secret all their internal and external reports.

If a lack of transparency, culture of denial, and the misleading of Parliament continue to characterize big risky IT-based ventures in central government, one has to ask whether Whitehall is congenitally ill-suited to running such programmes.

The Public Accounts Committee warned in a report in 1984 about the risks of large public sector computer programmes. That report came after a series of project disasters.

So what has been learned in the last 30 years – other than that central departments are poorly equipped managerially – or democratically – to handle big IT-based programmes and projects?

These are some of the Public Accounts Committee’s findings:

MPs try to be positive

“We believe that meeting any specific timetable is less important than delivering the programme successfully. There is still the potential for Universal Credit to deliver significant benefits, but there is no clarity yet on the amount of savings it will achieve.”

Culture of denial

“The programme had also developed a flawed culture of reporting good news and denying that problems had emerged. This culture resulted from the desire of senior staff within the programme to show publically that they were able to push the programme forward, at the expense of ensuring that adequate controls were in place or listening to concerns raised about its delivery.

“Although the Department has tried to tackle this culture, it gave misleading interviews to the press regarding progress after it became aware of difficulties with the programme, and as recently as July 2013 the Department denied that there were problems with the programme’s IT when it gave evidence to the Work and Pensions Committee.”

Shocking absence of control over suppliers

“There has been a shocking absence of control over suppliers with the Department neglecting to implement basic procedures for monitoring and authorising expenditure…

“The Department recognises its supplier management has been weak, risking value for money.  Four main suppliers – Accenture, IBM, Hewlett Packard and British Telecom – have provided IT systems for Universal Credit, and by March 2013 the Department had paid them £265m out of the £303m spent with suppliers on IT systems.

“In February 2013 the Major Projects Authority found no evidence of the Department actively managing its supplier contracts, resulting in suppliers being out of control and financial controls not being in place.  The Department has yet to provide a comprehensive assessment of how much of this expenditure has proved nugatory, although the Major Projects Authority believes it will be a substantial figure running into hundreds of millions of pounds.”

Lack of oversight

The lack of oversight allowed the Department’s Universal Credit team to become isolated and defensive, undermining its ability to recognise the size of the problems the programme faced and to be candid when reporting progress…

“Oversight has been characterised by a failure to understand properly the nature and enormity of the task, a failure to monitor and challenge progress regularly, and a failure to intervene promptly when problems arose.

“Senior managers only became aware of problems through ad hoc reviews, mostly conducted by external reviewers, as inadequate management information and reporting arrangements had not alerted them that things were amiss.

“Given its huge importance to the Department, the Accounting Officer [Robert Devereux] and his team should have been more alert to identifying and acting on early warning signs that things were going wrong with the programme

Blinkered culture remains?

“Risk was not well managed and the divergence between planned and actual progress could and should have been spotted and acted upon earlier. The Department only reported good news and denied the problems that had emerged. The risk of a similarly blinkered culture remains as the Department will be working to tight timescales to get the programme back on track.”

Problems hidden

“It is extremely disappointing that the litany of problems in the Universal Credit Programme were often hidden by a culture prevalent in the Department which promoted only the telling of ‘good news’.

“For example, officials were aware that a critical report highlighting many of these issues had been discussed internally for months. Indeed, there are real doubts over when officials became aware of these problems and it is difficult to conceive, based on the evidence we were presented with, that officials within the Department did not know of them before July 2012.”

Shocking absence of financial and other controls

“There has been a shocking absence of financial and other internal controls and we are not yet convinced that the Department has robust plans to overcome the problems that have impeded progress.”

Did the DWP do anything well?

“The Department initially adopted a piecemeal approach to delivering the programme.

“In 2011 it identified over a hundred different types of users for Universal Credit, and initially sought to design IT solutions for each set of circumstances individually. It was only in early 2012 that the Department decided to stand back and try to establish a clearer picture of what the programme’s overall shape might look like.

“During the summer of 2012 the Department became aware of the problems that Universal Credit faced. It was first alerted by concerns raised in a supplier-led review, commissioned by the Secretary of State, which reported in July.

“The Department subsequently established that the programme’s progress was stalling because there were a number of unresolved issues which had become intractable, particularly relating to the level of security needed for identity assurance and protection against fraud and error and cyber-attack.

“The Department had been previously unaware of the programme’s difficulties because its internal lines of monitoring, intervention and defence, intended to identify and mitigate such problems, were not working properly. Governance arrangements were not remotely adequate, and the Accounting Officer [Robert Devereux] discussed progress with the head of the Universal Credit programme only every two or three weeks.

“The Department had inadequate performance information to scrutinise and challenge the programme’s reports of its progress, so internal reporting arrangements did not flag up that things were amiss. The Department’s corporate finance undertook insufficient work to ensure there was an appropriate control environment in place, and the Department’s process for ministers to sign-off higher-value contracts was weak.

“The Department’s senior management had relied on ad hoc reviews, mostly conducted by external reviewers, which only provided an occasional snapshot of the programme, instead of ensuring effective internal systems were in place to monitor and challenge progress. However, during 2012 the problems surfaced more clearly as the Universal Credit team became unable to respond to recommendations made by such reviews.”

Will Universal Credit ever work?

“The Department remains uncertain about key details of its final plans. It does not know how much can be delivered online, when this will be available, and what activities will continue to require face-to-face meetings.

“ The Department also does not know what the final cost of the IT will be, or the savings the programme is expected to deliver. Nor does it know when it will close down the other benefits that Universal Credit will replace.”

The Department has a target of enrolling 184,000 claimants on Universal Credit by April 2014 and has launched limited pilot schemes.”

Says the PAC report: “The current rate of progress is significantly below target, however. Only around 2,500 claimants were registered at the time of our hearing in September, and the Department was unwilling to speculate what number will be enrolled by next April.”

In a steady state Universal Credit is expected to deal with 10 million people in about 7.5 million households, making 1.6 million changes in circumstances each month.

Security versus usability

“The Department is aware that the system must include suitable security arrangements if Universal Credit is to operate effectively and deliver its intended benefits.  However, the Department has not yet finalised such a solution, and was unable to say when two key components – those countering fraud and error and confirming claimants’ identity- would be completed.

“The Department has found it particularly hard to establish the right balance between security and usability. The development of an effective security system has been hindered by security not being integral to the design of IT components from the outset, but instead being retro-fitted into systems, and suppliers working on different assumptions and to different standards. To address this, the Department told us it has now brought security issues together in one place, with one senior official responsible for overseeing this part of the programme.”

DWP response to PAC report

A Department for Work and Pensions spokesperson told the BBC

“This report doesn’t take into account our new leadership team, or our progress on delivery,” it said. “We have already taken comprehensive action including strengthening governance, supplier management and financial controls.”

The DWP said it did not accept “the write-off figure quoted by the committee” and expected it to be substantially less”.

A spokesman for Iain Duncan Smith told the BBC that he had “every confidence” in the team now running the programme, including Mr Devereux – whose position  some newspapers have suggested is under threat.

“Both the National Audit Office and the public accounts committee acknowledged a fortress mentality within the Universal Credit programme,” he said.

“Iain was clear back in the summer about how he and the permanent secretary took action to fix those problems.”

PAC report: Universal Credit: early progress

National Audit Office report: Universal Credit: early progress

More IT-based megaprojects derail amid claims all is well

By Tony Collins

If one thing unites all failing IT-based megaprojects in the public sector it is the defensive shield of denial that suppliers and their clients hold up when confronted by bad news.

It has happened in the US and UK this week. On the Universal Credit  project, the minister in charge of the scheme, Lord Freud, accepted none of the criticisms in a National Audit Office report “Universal Credit: early progress”.   In a debate in the House of Lords Lord Freud quoted from two tiny parts of the NAO report that could be interpreted as positive comments.

“Spending so far is a small proportion of the total budget … and it is still entirely feasible that [universal credit] goes on to achieve considerable benefits for society,” said Lord Freud, quoting the NAO report.

But he mentioned none of the criticisms in the 55-page NAO report which concluded:

“At this early stage of the Universal Credit programme the Department has not achieved value for money. The Department has delayed rolling out Universal Credit to claimants, has had weak control of the programme, and has been unable to assess the value of the systems it spent over £300 million to develop.

“These problems represent a significant setback to Universal Credit and raise wider concerns about the Department’s ability to deal with weak programme management, over-optimistic timescales, and a lack of openness about progress.”

And a shield of denial went up in the US this week where newspapers on the east and west coast published stories on failing public sector IT-based megaprojects.  The LA [Los Angeles] Times said:

As many as 300,000 jobless affected by state software snags

“California lawmakers want to know why Deloitte’s unemployment benefits system arrived with major bugs and at almost double the cost estimate. The firm says the system is working.”

The LA Times continued:

“Problems are growing worse for the state’s Employment Development Department after a new computer system backfired, leaving some Californians without much-needed benefit cheques for weeks.”

The Department said the problems affected 80,000 claims but the LA Times obtained internal emails that showed the software glitches stopped payment to as many as 300,000 claimants.

Now lawmakers are setting up a hearing to determine what went wrong with a system that cost taxpayers $110m, almost double the original estimate.

Some blame the Department’s slow response to the problems. Others point the finger at a Deloitte Consulting.

The LA Times says that Deloitte has a “history of delivering projects over budget and with problematic results”. Deloitte also has been blamed, in part, for similar troubles with upgrades to unemployment software in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Florida, says the paper.

“We keep hiring the same company, and they keep having the same issues,” said Senator Anthony Cannella.  “At some point, it’s on us for hiring the same company. It’s faulty logic, and we’ve got to get better.”

In 2003 California planned to spend $58m upgrading its 30-year-old unemployment benefits system. By the time the state awarded Deloitte the contract in 2010  the cost estimate had grown by more than $30m.

The Department handed out $6.6bn to about 1 million unemployed Californians in 2012. The software was expected to ease the agency’s ability to verify who was eligible to receive benefits.

Problems began when the Department transferred old unemployment data to the new system. The software flagged claims for review — requiring state workers to manually process them.

The LA Times says that officials thought initially the workload would be manageable, but internal emails showed the agency was quickly overwhelmed. Phone lines were jammed. For weeks, the Department’s employees have been working overtime to clear the backlog.

A poor contract?

In a contract amendment signed two months ago California agreed to pay Deloitte $3.5m for five months of maintenance and operations costs. Those costs should have been anticipated in the contract said Michael Krigsman, a software consultant who is an expert on why big IT-based contracts go awry. He told the LA Times:

“It’s a striking oversight that maintenance was not anticipated at the beginning of the contract when the state was at a much stronger negotiation position.”

By the time the middle of a project is reached, the state has no choice but to stick with Deloitte to work out bugs that arise when the system goes live, he said.

System works

Loree Levy, a spokeswoman for the Department, said the system is working, processing 80% of claims on time. As for the troubles, she said, “There is a period of transition or adjustment with any large infrastructure upgrade like this one.”

Deloitte spokeswoman Courtney Flaherty said the new California system is working and that problems are not the result of a “breakdown or flaw in the software Deloitte developed”.

System not working?

While there seems to be no project disaster in the eyes of the Department and Deloitte Consulting, some of the unemployed see things differently. One wrote:

“I am a contract worker who had to fight for my unemployment benefits. I won my case and yet they still cannot pay me… It’s been more than 3 weeks since I won my appeal and as of this moment, I am owed 13 weeks of back payments. To add insult to injury, they cannot send me current weeks to certify and they refuse to even try to help me to get back into the online system.

“I blame Deloitte, but it is California that carries the heaviest burden of fault… We’re nearing November and they still haven’t fixed an issue that began over Labor Day? Nonsense!

“This is untenable for everyone affected …We are owed reparations as well as our money at this point. It’s a funny word, affected. That means families and individuals are going hungry but can’t get food stamps or welfare. It means evictions and repossessed cars. It means destroyed credit, late fees, years of turmoil and shame for people already dealing with unemployment. Shame on you California.”

Another wrote:

“ … Not communicating is NOT an answer. Unemployed individuals caught up in the nightmare were told to be patient.  Rents and other expenses were still accumulating.  But [when you] add on additional fees: late fees, restoral fees, interest fees, etc…….you get the picture.

“Dear Governor Brown,

“Please reimburse me for all additional fees I’ve had to absorb to survive this fiasco.  You are going to make me payback any overpayments, but ignore the cost to the unemployed taxpayer.  This is  appears to unfair.  Perhaps Deloitte should pay us back from their contracted funds before they receive their final payment.  I am saving all of my receipts to deduct from my 2013 tax return.

“BTW Gov Brown – I am still waiting on additional payments as of today and DMV registration for my vehicle was due on 10/20/13.  Are you going to waive the penalty for late payment? Am I the only one with this question?”

Scrutiny

California’s state Assembly has set a date of 6 November 2013 for a hearing into the Department’s system upgrade.

“We’re going to look at EDD, the contractors and others to see how the system broke down so we can avoid this in the future,” said Henry Perea, chair of the Assembly’s Insurance Committee, which has oversight over the jobless benefits program.

On its website Deloitte says:

“Deloitte continues to help EDD [Employment Development Department] transform the level of service it provides to unemployed workers and improve the quality of information collected by EDD. The next time unemployment spikes, California should be ready to meet the increased demand for services.”

Massachutsetts IT disaster?

On the opposite coast the Boston Globe reported on an entirely separate debacle (which also involved Deloitte):

          None admit fault on troubled jobless benefits system

“… even with the possibility that unemployed workers could face months more of difficulties and delays in getting benefits, officials from the Labor Department and contractor, Deloitte Consulting of New York, testified before the Senate Committee on Post Audit that the rollout of the computer system was largely a success.

“‘I am happy with the launch,’ said Joanne F. Goldstein, secretary of Labour and Workforce Development, noting that she would have liked some aspects to have gone better.

“Mark Price, a Deloitte principal in charge of the firm’s Massachusetts business, acknowledged that software has faced challenges during the rollout, but insisted, ‘We have a successful working system today. ‘’’

NPfIT shield

A shield of denial was up for years at the Department of Health whose CIOs and other spokespeople repeatedly claimed that the NPfIT was a success.

Comment

If you didn’t know that Universal Credit IT wasn’t working, or that thousands of people on the east and west coasts of the US hadn’t been paid unemployment benefits because of IT-related problems, and you had to rely on only the public comments of the IT suppliers and government spokespeople, you would have every reason to believe that Universal Credit and the jobless systems in Massachusetts and California were working well.

Why is it that after every failed IT-based megaproject those in charge can simply blow the truth gently away like soap bubbles?

When confronted by bad news, suppliers and their customers tend to join hands behind their defensive shields. On the other side are politicians, members of the public affected by the megaprojects and the press who have all, according to suppliers and officials, got it wrong.

Is this why lessons from public sector IT-based project disasters are not always learned? Because, in the eyes of suppliers and their clients, the disasters don’t really exist?

None admit fault on troubled jobless benefit system

State fired Deloitte

Complaints continue despite claims system is under control

As many as 300,000 affected by California’s software problems

California’s predictable fiasco?

Are Whitehall IT business cases largely fictional?

By Tony Collins

Today’s report on the e-Borders programme by John Vine, the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, is a reminder that central government business cases for major IT-based projects can be largely fictional.

Says the Vine report:

“The failure to identify these risks in the 2007 business plan meant that the original data collection targets, set out in the e-Borders delivery plan, were unrealistic and were always likely to be missed.”

It adds:

“The e-Borders programme business case indicated that e-Borders would allow foreign national passengers to be counted in and counted out of the UK, providing more reliable data for the purposes of migration and population statistics, and in planning the provision of public services. However, we found that the data set collected by e-Borders was not extensive enough for these purposes.”

And:

“Management information shows that between January and September 2012, 2,200 arrests took place as a direct result of the identification of wanted persons. This was less than the original estimate provided in the 2007 business case, which had anticipated 8,200 arrests per year based on the Semaphore pilot.”

One Whitehall insider said that experts are employed to write business cases to a template.  But do any of the promises in the business cases have to be fulfilled? It seems not.  Do business cases have to be realistic? The history of IT-based projects and programmes in central government shows that they don’t have to be.  

Business cases make promises on targets, any savings and costs.  When the targets in the business prove unachievable a new business case is written, and when the revised targets also prove unachievable another is written and so forth.

By the time assumptions in the business case have been properly tested the writers of the business cases are likely to have moved to other departments. Nobody is ever held responsible for writing a business case that proves to have been fictional. And why should they be? The writers of the business cases are in no way responsible for delivering the results.

The National Programme for IT in the NHS – NPfIT –had so many revised business cases nobody counted them.  Perhaps officials at the Department of Health knew they were largely fictional or, to put it more politely, aspirational. But the Treasury requires tick-box business cases to be written to justify money allocated to a project. Is there any point in a business case that’s not realistic? Perhaps. It allows money to be spent on a project that, based on realistic assumptions, would probably not be approved.

Below are the results of the e-Borders business case of 2007. Most of the promises haven’t been fulfilled.

The e-Borders system was based on Project Semaphore which was delivered by IBM in 2004 and it’s clear from the Vine report that the system  has been a success. Project Semaphore is still used because its replacement, which was commissioned in 2007, has been a standard government IT-based disaster with suppliers claiming that government kept changing its mind and the requirements, and the government saying milestones were not met.  In July 2010 the e-borders contract with “Trusted Borders” was terminated.

Vine’s report today,  Exporting the border’? An inspection of e-Borders October 2012 – March 2013, has a table (figure 18) that shows how much the Border Force has been able to meet the promises in the 2007 business case for the e-borders programme:  

1. Improved security by supporting the security and intelligence agencies to track and analyse the activities of terrorists and other national security targets across the border. Delivered? Partially.

2. Increased ability to identify and arrest those of interest to the police. Delivered? Yes.

3. Improved effectiveness and efficiency of border control activity by providing a risk assessment of passengers, facilitating expedited processing of passengers at the border and providing a platform for automated clearance services. Delivered? No.

4. Benefits will accrue from process cost savings as a result of the phasing
out of landing cards and the ability to access electronic movement
records when determining applications for extensions of stay. Delivered? No.

5. Enable the identification of those involved in excise duty avoidance and
impact on the market penetration of smuggled goods. Delivered? Partially.

6. Enable HMRC and DWP to establish the length of time spent in the
UK by an individual permitting easy identification of benefit claimants
living outside the UK and those falsely claiming non domicile status for
income tax purposes. Delivered? No.

7. Benefits to ports and carriers such as:
• reductions in removal and detention costs of those refused entry
(subject to implementation of an authority to carry scheme);
• more effective use of detention space at ports, provided free of
rent to control agencies; and
• remove requirement to procure and administer landing cards.

Delivered? No.

8. The ability to count all foreign national passengers into and out of the
UK enabling the provision of accurate statistical data to support the
provision of services. Delivered? No.

**

The Home Office is now writing a further business case for a new e-Borders programme, and will appoint a new IT supplier. Are its business case  authors expecting their work to be published under fiction or non-fiction? History, it seems, will provide the answer.

[The Home Office said its e-Borders technology was the most advanced in Europe – which says much for the 2004 IBM Semaphore system.]

John Vine’s report.

JohnVine “surprised” by findings

Croydon trust plans “high-risk” Cerner go-live in secret

By Tony Collins

NHS trusts have gone live with Cerner Millennium with mixed success. Eight trust implementations went seriously awry. A list is at the end of this post.

The flawed go-lives have meant that hospital managers have lost track, cumulatively, of thousands of patients and found that treatments,  including those for cancer, were delayed or care pathways interrupted. At times medical notes have not been available, or clinicians have been given the wrong notes.

In July 2008 E-Health Insider reported that the deployment of a national programme care records system at Milton Keynes Hospital NHS Foundation Trust “developed into an untenable situation which resulted in near melt down of the organisation”.

One of the lessons from the problematic go-lives is that trusts, when they have reported on the difficulties later, have said they underestimated the risks.

In particular they regarded the patient records system as mainly administrative with no risks to the health and care of patients.  Yet it is possible for incidents arising from flawed patient record implementations to be judged “clinical”.

Is Croydon Health Services NHS Trust, which includes the former Mayday hospital, about to repeat this same mistake – of regarding the risks as non-clinical?

The Trust is due to go live this weekend with the start of one of the largest patient record go-lives in the UK.  The deployment is being run under the NPfIT, which, in the capital, is now called the London Programme for IT. The plans are to install Millennium at Croydon University Hospital (formerly Mayday) and at some community sites.

The Trust says its preparations are designed to ensure a safe and effective deployment that will replace systems that are more than 20 years old and lack “many of the functions one expects in the modern healthcare digital age”.

But the signs are, from the trust’s board papers, that the risks of a flawed implementation are being seen largely as financial and administrative. For patients it appears that the worst that is envisaged is a “poor experience”.  

Have the risks to patients been properly flagged to the board’s directors?

I looked through Croydon’s most recently published board papers to see how well the trust’s directors have been kept informed of the risks of the go-live and could see almost no mention of Cerner – except a risk that income to the Trust could be affected if it is unable to produce timely reports. There is no specific mention of risks to patients.

Given the history of failed implementations of Cerner Millennium under the NPfIT, I asked  Croydon Health NHS Trust what directors have been told about the risks.

This was the trust’s reply:

“CRS Millennium has featured regularly on the Corporate Risk Register presented to each Part 1 Board meeting.

“In addition, implementation has received detailed confidential consideration at Part 2 of Board meetings, (which is why you won’t find it in our public board papers).”

I then put it to the trust that I was not sure why, in a new era of openness and transparency in the NHS,  that board discussions should be in private on a matter that could affect large numbers of patients to judge from past implementations at other trusts. The spokesperson – the interim stakeholder relations manager – made no further comment.

Richard Granger,  when head of the NPfIT, was quoted as saying he was ashamed of some of the Cerner deployments . Granger quit the programme in January 2008 – and since then several more Cerner deployments at trusts have gone badly wrong, at North Bristol NHS Trust, for example.

After the NPfIT go-live of Cerner at the Nuffield Orthopaedic Centre, the National Audit Office, at the request of a member of the Public Accounts Committee Conservative MP Richard Bacon, investigated and produced a public report on the lessons learned.

The Nuffield go-live was in December 2005. Since then managers at all trusts that have gone live with Cerner have claimed they have learned those lessons.

Comment:

It’s true that Croydon Trust’s risk register has shown “red” for the Cerner implementation. It is indeed deemed “high risk”. But how many of its board directors will understand the nature and substance of the risks to patients from a graphic?

It’s easy for the trust to say that board directors have been informed through confidential discussions but how would anyone outside the trust be able to judge whether that’s true?

Trust boards can never be held fully accountable after a patient record go-live goes wrong. They hold their own investigations or sometimes commission inquiries by consultants known to them, and the final reports usually indicate that no patients have been harmed.  Even after a trust has lost track of thousands of patient appointments for more than a year, it has later reported that in the end all was well.

As trust boards are not voted in and out by the public they have a special duty to ensure they are fully informed on things that can go wrong. Is Croydon Health’s board fully informed on the risks of the Cerner go-live? I doubt it.  

Some flawed NHS patient record go-lives:

Barts and The London

Royal Free Hampstead

Weston Area Health Trust

Milton Keynes Hospital NHS Trust

Worthing and Southlands

Barnet and Chase Farm Hospitals NHS Trust

Nuffield Orthopaedic

North Bristol.

St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust

Lorenzo:

University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust

Birmingham Women’s Foundation Trust

NHS Bury

MPs dig hard for truth on Universal Credit IT

By Tony Collins

“Just answer the question … please!”

Rarely has any chair of the Public Accounts Committee pleaded so frequently with a permanent secretary not go round the houses when answering questions.

Margaret Hodge’s irritation was obvious on Tuesday [9 September] at a hearing of the Committee into a National Audit Office report on the Universal Credit IT-based programme: Universal Credit: early progress.

Before the Committee was Robert Devereux, the top civil servant at the Department for Work and Pensions. Beside him was UC’s latest project director Howard Shiplee who successfully led and managed construction contracts, budgets and timelines for all permanent and temporary venues for the Olympics. He has a CBE for services to construction.

It’s unclear how much experience Shiplee has had with IT-based projects and dealing with IT suppliers, though given his success as a big projects leader and construction expert,  IT leadership experience may be unnecessary.

There were signs from the hearing that Universal Credit project is following the events that have typically preceded IT-related disasters in government, especially in the way facts were interpreted in opposing and irreconcilable ways by the project’s defenders on one side and the “independents” on the other.

The “independents”, whose criticisms of the project have been withering, include a director at the National Audit Office Max Tse who led the NAO’s inquiry into the UC programme, and Dr Norma Wood, who has held several relevant positions in recent months, first as review team leader for a UC review in February, then as Transformation Director for the UC programme “re-set” in May 2013 and then as Interim Director General for the Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority. She is a consultant, not a civil servant. She appeared before the PAC on Wednesday.

Another “independent” is the auditor and consultancy PWC which reported to the government on financial mismanagement on the UC project. The NAO revealed the existence of the PWC report, which Hodge said was even more damming the NAO’s. [see separate blog post.]

A possible outcome of deeply conflicting views on the success or otherwise of a big and controversial project is that truth remains beyond anyone’s grasp within the life of the project and emerges only within the scheme’s post mortem audit report.

At Tuesday’s PAC hearing, the evidence given by Devereux and Shiplee on one hand, and Wood on the other was at times conflicting.

Wood’s evidence

Wood said that one of the lessons from the Universal Credit programme so far was that it was not conceived as a business transformation but was “very IT driven”. Of the £303m that has been spent on IT so far a sizeable part will need to be written off, beyond the £34m write-off so far.

Conservative MP Richard Bacon asked her how much could eventually be written off on the IT spend. “I think it will be substantial. I could not give you a figure,” she said.

When Bacon asked if it could be more than £140m she replied: “It will be at least that I would think.”

Her answer implied that the DWP will need to write off a large part of the £162m it currently estimates its IT assets are worth, after the £303m IT spend. Hodge said the write-off could be in excess of £200m – but this was later denied by Devereux, who also denied the write-off would be at least £140m.

Wood revealed that the figure for the write-off so far was derived from information given by suppliers, after the DWP asked them to judge how much of their equipment and software would be of use.

Conservative MP Stephen Barclay asked Wood whether suppliers were assessing the usability of their own work.

“Yes they were,” replied Wood.

Barclay: “So they were marking their own homework?”

“Yes they were.”

“Does that not carry a conflict of interest?”

“Yes it does.”

“Does it concern you?”

“It did,” replied Wood. “Therefore in the review we recommended an independent investigation.”

Barclay: “Building on Mr Bacon’s point, it is highly likely that with the initial write-off, if they have been marking their homework, comes a risk that the eventual figure is going to be bigger?”

“That’s true.”

Barclay’s questioning will indicate to some that the DWP and its IT suppliers were so close it could have been difficult for the department’s officials to be objective about what they were being told.

Steady-state solution

Wood spoke of how DWP and the Major Projects Authority had designed a “steady-state solution” which was a simplified version of UC , from which a more comprehensive system could be developed.

Said Wood: “There is a steady-state solution … with business requirements, that was handed over to the SRO [senior responsible owner] on 17 May, so there is a complete design and there is a multidisciplinary team working that design through to the next level.”

She said the steady-state solution is twin-tracked. “There is a piece that designs the interactive activity with the user and with the agents, and there is a part that uses existing systems, such as the payment system and the customer information system, but there are some 32 legacy systems in between, the utility of which we did not know at the time we completed the reset on 17 May.”

The interactive part is managed by a multi-disciplinary team that involves the GDS [Government Digital Service] and used agile, with waterfall for legacy systems.

“So yes, there is a design, and it is a very good design.”

On the use of agile she said the important thing is to apply rigour and discipline as you go through those methodologies. “It is not an issue of methodology; it is an issue of the rigour and discipline that is applied to those approaches.”

Pathfinder

Instead of a national roll-out starting in October, which was the original plan, the DWP is running “pathfinder” projects which accept only simplified claims and use limited IT without full anti-fraud measures.

Wood said: “It [the pathfinder scheme] is not hopeless. As it was currently configured there was a limit to the volume of payments it could handle because of the manual interfaces required – the manual support it required. So there is a very limited number of cases it could handle …”

Bacon asked if she would describe the pathfinder as so substantially de-scoped it was not fit for purpose.

“At the time we did the review [earlier this year] that was our conclusion.”

“ Is it correct that the pathfinder technology platform will not support UC in the future – that it is not scalable?” asked Bacon

“Unless it can handle all the functionality we have just described I fail to see how it can be scalable,” replied Wood.

Lessons

Liberal Democrat MP Ian Swales said: “We have exactly the same names of suppliers failing to deliver on government contracts time after time. Poor specifications, very vague penalties involved, and a sense that they have a vested interest, almost, in failure and we are again sat around this table discussing the same sort of thing. What can be learned?

Wood replied that there are some important lessons. “One is that this is not just a procurement exercise; this is actually a contract management exercise. It is really important that one understands what the business needs to deliver. That is why I stress that this was constituted not as a business transformation programme, but as an IT programme. It is important that the business drives the IT requirements and manages the contracts accordingly.”

Is 2017 feasible?

Wood: “It is feasible to deliver the whole thing by 2017.”

Bacon pointed out that there is no approval for further spending on UC until November 2013 and only then if criteria is met. He asked Wood on what basis approval for more spending would be given. Wood said it will be based on whether the project is affordable, value for money, deliverable within timescales, and has the appropriate management place.

DWP’s evidence

Hodge complained repeatedly that the civil servants before her were not answering questions directly – perhaps a sign of how hard it can be to establish the truth when an IT-based project goes awry.

“I would be really grateful if you would answer the question,” asked Hodge when questioning Devereux about whether Universal Credit had a proper business plan, a strategy.

At another point Devereux said: “Let me try and answer these questions which have been bandied around.”

Hodge: “You do go round the houses. Just answer them directly.”

Later in the hearing:

Hodge: “What you are so good at is giving us a whole load of stuff that is completely irrelevant to what we are trying to get at. Just answer the question.”

And another occasion…

Hodge: “No just answer the question … please.”

And again …

Hodge: “What would be utterly delightful is if you simply answered the questions. Just answer the questions.”

Again …

Hodge: “I just don’t get where this is going. I am honestly trying to be fair to you today. Ask the question again Meg [Meg Hillier MP] and then see if we can get an answer.” [Hillier’s question was about why the DWP has treated Universal Credit as an IT project instead of what it actually is, a business transformation programme which changes the way people work and act rather than introduces new technology. Devereux gave no clear answer.]

An exchange about the UC’s pathfinder projects characterised the relationship between Hodge and Devereux. Critics of the pathfinders say they are pointless because the claimants are atypical, much of the claims process relies on manual work, the technology is largely without any agreed anti-fraud measures, and it cannot yet handle everyday circumstances.

Supporters of the pathfinders, particularly Devereux, say they are a useful step in assessing the behaviour of people when making claims and testing the interfaces between new technology and the DWP’s legacy systems.

Hodge: “You are not answering any of the questions Mr Devereux. I don’t mind a little bit of history and a little bit of what you want to say but answer the questions. Do you think the pilot was fit for purpose – yes or no?”

Devereux: “The pathfinder is testing useful things that we have fixed.”

Hodge: “Was it fit for purpose?”

Devereux: “It has been useful.”

“Was it fit for purpose?”

“What purpose did you have in mind?”

“No – you.”

“Ok well, for my purpose it has worked fine thank you. “

“To do what?”

“To make sure I can construct some brand new software to connect it to a –“

“On which you spent £300m …”

“To connect it to a very complicated legacy estate and then demonstrate all of those things – let me give you one example; we will not get anywhere otherwise. I have sat in front of this Committee and we have talked about the Work Programme. You have grilled me on the—

“Please don’t talk about the Work programme.”

“In that conversation—

“Please talk about the pathfinder…”

And subsequently …

“Can I really plead with you, if you can answer questions without going off on a sideline it would be really really helpful – really really helpful.”

MPs kept uninformed

Stephen Barclay put it to Devereux and Shiplee that the DWP was aware of serious UC problems in July 2013 but the public, media and Parliament were being given the impression all was well. Said Barclay: “In July you realised there were problems. In September [2013] your Department’s press office was telling Computer Weekly:

‘The IT is mostly built. It is on time and within budget.’

Barclay said in July 2013 Shiplee was asked by the chair of work and pensions select committee[Dame Anne Begg]: “So rumours that there is a large chunk of the IT that simply do not work and has been dumped are not true?”

“No,” replied Shiplee.

Barclay told Devereux and Shiplee: “Parliament seems to be getting told two different things.” He referred to the DWP’s “culture of denial”.

IT supplier reassurances

Shiplee said he has spent 12 of the 16 weeks since he started reviewing the UC project in great detail with IT suppliers.

“That is something that hasn’t been done to this level before. I have spent with experts from within DWP and with external experts and we have reviewed in detail what has been produced, what works, where it has got to. There are a number of points to make –

Barclay: “Could you clarify you wrote to the chair of the DWP committee to clarify that answer if you have done further work …”

Shiplee: “I have not concluded the work. I believe that from that work already, it is my view, supported by reports, that there is substantial utility in what has been produced… The use of agile is by itself very iterative and therefore to a certain extent it is potentially high risk.

“I wanted to look at how we could de-risk this, this utilisation of agile, and one of the ways to do that is to look at what we have already spent a great deal of money on, and whether it was usable and would actually serve to de-risk the programme…

“What I have discovered is that the Pathfinder does not represent the amount of development work that has been undertaken by suppliers. It [Pathfinder] has been heavily de-tuned from where they have actually got to.”

Why?

“Mainly around security, said Shiplee. “This is a unique piece of work. It [the DWP] is the only bank anywhere – effectively a bank – in which customers do not put money it. They simply take money out. It is therefore attractive from all sort of fraud point of view and therefore security is very important. The key element of security is personal identification. Nobody has yet found a way to do that effectively and totally online.”

Hodge: “Are you telling us that the technology developed so far is capable of being scaled up for a national roll-out?”

Shiplee: “On the basis of what I have been told and what I have seen so far, I believe it has been demonstrated that the suppliers have got the capability to scale this up. They have, for example, dealt with couples [Pathfinder system deals now only with single people.]

“The suppliers have explained where they have got to. It is very interesting. Some of the challenges we are facing now the suppliers have already faced in the past and have resolved those issues. I am trying to make sure that we use all of this to the best good and we don’t have to relearn every lesson again.”

Replaced project leaders

Devereux told of how he had replaced project leaders who , he suggested, were not solving problems but pushing ahead regardless, and were not good listeners.

“People I put in place here had experience and confidence. The challenge they had was very large and there came a point in my judgment they were no longer on top of it. There were cumulative issues to be resolved.

“When the cumulative bow wave of things that had not been resolved was being called out as not resolvable by just pushing on through, that is the point at which we decided to change, because it was also then that the point the Chair made about a good news culture within the programme was crystallising. Those two things cannot work.

“I need people who will drive things through. Howard is very good at driving things through, but the person that drives things through and does not listen to anyone at all is not going to help me at all.”

Comment

Last week James Naughtie on BBC’s R4 Today programme, R2’s Jeremy Vine, journalists at the BBC World Service and at other news services asked me whether Universal Credit was another government IT disaster. I said in essence that it was a good idea badly executed. The IT project has been dogged by an over-ambitious timetable, poor control and validation of supplier payments and a good news culture that to some extent still exists.

In past government IT disasters such as the NPfIT, C-NOMIS and the Rural Payments Agency’s Single Payment Scheme, ministers were not given bad news until it could be hidden no longer. Senior officials gave ministers only good news because that’s what they wanted to hear.

Deniability

Civil servants, perhaps, wanted to give ministers credible “deniability”. The less ministers knew of serious problems the more credibly they could deny in public the existence of them.

Thank goodness, then, for the scrutiny of the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee on Universal Credit. Some important truths have now come to the surface. With the NAO and the Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority rightly breathing down its neck, the DWP is doing all it can to put the project back on track. But the DWP is still marred by a good news culture. Even after the NAO and PWC reports the DWP’s press office is still talking of the Universal Credit project as a success.

A DWP spokesperson told the Guardian this week:

“The IT for universal credit is up and running well in the early rollout of the new benefit.”

And Iain Duncan Smith and his senior officials appear to be dismissing the NAO’s report as historic – which it is to some extent – but much of it is also forward-looking.

Duncan Smith, Devereux and Shiplee are all very positive about the future of the project. But would it be better if they were genuinely sceptical, as would be a private sector board that was confronting a big and challenging IT-enabled change project?

Politics and IT don’t go well together and never have. There is every chance Universal Credit will follow what has happened with the last huge benefit computerisation project, Operational Strategy in the 1980s. It eventually worked but in a much more fragmented way than expected. It was several years late, cost several times the original estimate, and did not make the savings predicted. The likely fate of Universal Credit IT?

Learn from failure: the key lesson that Universal Credit should take from agile [Institute for Government]