Category Archives: Campaign4Change

Barnet’s inner circle ratifies Capita deal – now the challenge begins

By Tony Collins

Conservative-led Barnet Borough Council’s inner circle of “cabinet” members  agreed  unanimously last night to confirm Capita as the supplier for a 10-year £320m back-office services contract, subject to financial reports.

The deal was agreed despite widespread opposition, without a vote of the full council, and without a political consensus.  A report published by Cornwall Council’s Support Services Single Issue Panel has said that a political consensus is critical to the success of partnership deals.

Capita promises to save £120m over the 10 years, and make an £8m investment in new technology. Up to 200 jobs could go. Capita will run:

  • Estates
  • Finance and Payroll
  • Human Resources
  • IT Infrastructure and Support
  • Corporate Procurement
  • Revenues and Benefits
  • Commercial Services.

About 100 people gathered outside the Town Hall in The Burroughs, Hendon, to voice their opposition to the contract.

Standing on chairs and holding banners, members of Barnet Alliance for Public Services called on the cabinet members to listen to residents’ concerns.

Councillors vacated the room and continued their meeting next door. Speaking at the meeting, Labour councillor Alison Moore said: “This is an end to democracy as we know it… There is no such thing as guaranteed savings.”

Council leader Richard Cornelius said:

“I look forward to getting the savings we desperately need. This is not a gamble. This is not a quick fix – we have been talking about this for a long time. If we were to reject these proposals we would have to find savings elsewhere, which would be very unpleasant.”

Cornelius said the combination of a saving to the taxpayer of a million pounds a month and an £8m investment in technology by Capita made it a “very, very good deal for the Barnet taxpayer”.

The council will set up a monitoring committee in the next couple of months to scrutinise the contract.

Capita’s New Support and Customer Services Organisation deal will be the first of two major contracts awarded under the Barnet council’s One Barnet outsourcing programme. Capita’s contract is due to start in April 2013.

Comment:

Barnet’s cabinet has made an important and controversial decision about the council’s future without a vote of the full council, which is a snub to local democracy.

Somerset County Council’s joint venture with IBM has failed in part because the staff were opposed to it,  the promises were over-optimistic, the finances were on fragile foundations, and the political leadership changed.

In Barnet the opposition to the deal with Capita is more pronounced than at Somerset, particularly among staff. Can the contract survive so much animus, and will opposition to Barnet’s cabinet grow now that local democracy has been flouted in such a macho way?

Cornwall is putting its joint venture decision to a vote of the full council, on 11 December. Whatever the outcome one thing is clear. Cornwall Council’s approach to local democracy puts Barnet to shame.

Barnet approves outsourcing plan

Political consensus key to success in outsourcing

Capita contract approved despite protests

Resident seeks judicial review 

Barnet’s fire-sale

A day Capita will rue?

Parts of report on Cornwall’s planned BT joint venture are missing

By Tony Collins

Cornwall Council’s officers have written a 134-page report on the options available to councillors for confronting budget cuts.

It will help councillors  decide at a full council meeting on 11 December whether to ask officers to conclude a joint venture with BT.

The report “Partnership for Support Services – Options Appraisal” is clearly a well-meant attempt to convince councillors that the best option is a deal with BT. The current plan is for BT to set up a subsidiary it would own completely, that would deliver ICT and other services back to the council and parts of the local NHS. BT has no plans for the council to be represented on the subsidiary’s board.

The new report is strong on the benefits of a joint venture with BT, such as guaranteed jobs and savings. Absent, though, are  important parts on costs, risks and local authority experiences on joint ventures and private sector partnerships. 

Secret risks

The report says that the “risks inherent in SP 1 [the joint venture with BT] has been submitted to the Council” by legal firm Eversheds.  A final version of the Eversheds report will be signed off by council officers before any invitation to tender is issued to BT. But there’s no indication that this report on risks will be shown to all councillors.

Secret appendix 

The council’s own procurement costs relating to the proposed joint venture, and further projected costs, are escalating.

In July 2011 the costs to Cornwall’s taxpayers of planning the joint venture  were estimated at £375,000. That figure rose to £650,000, then to £800,000, then £1.8m and now stands at  £2.1m.

“The current forecast estimate of the costs of the procurement process now stands at £2.1m. This is funded from the corporate improvement budget,” says the new report.

There are further costs arising from the partnership, says the report. One example is the pension fund for the transfer of staff which will cost about £10m over 10 years.  “There will also need to be additional budget to create a robust client team [to manage the BT contract],” says the report. This would cost between £400,000 and £700,000 a year.

“Both of these additional costs have been taken into account in the option analysis contained in appendix 2.”

But appendix 2 is missing in the public version of the report.

Also missing  

The report suggests that strategic partnerships are “nothing new”. It adds:

“BT – and other councils (sic) – have been involved in them for more than 10 years. Similarly the outsourcing market is mature and well understood. The UK local government IT and Business Process Outsourcing market is the biggest outsourcing market in the world and there are over 100 deals in operation. Risks are sometimes managed well and sometimes managed badly. The risks have been mitigated by using expert advisors and the Council has senior officers who understand this territory well.”

But the report does not mention that some councils in the mature local authority market have, after poor experiences, outcast joint ventures and one-size-fits-all outsourcing deals. Neither does it mention that the Cabinet Office disapproves of partnerships that lock public sector organisations into one major supplier.

These are some of the partnerships not mentioned in Cornwall’s report:

Suffolk County Council signed a £330m joint venture deal with BT in 2004. By late 2010 the cost had risen 26% to £417m.  A BT spokesman told  the Guardian that the additional costs were due to “…additional services contracted by the council”.  Suffolk has decided not to renew the BT contract. It will instead outsource to separate specialist firms. Assistant director director strategic finance Aidan Dunn said in a council report that “efficiencies can be achieved by dealing with individual suppliers who are experts in specific areas of back office service provision, rather than contracting with back office generalists”.

He added: “Our analysis suggests that it is not necessary to have one large contract, but that our requirements would best be serviced via three separate contracts: finance and HR, ICT and services to schools.”

Somerset County Council’s loss-making joint venture is in dispute with its main supplier IBM. Council leader Ken Maddock said the joint venture was “failing to be flexible enough in the changing financial landscape”.  He did not blame the workforce but the “contract, the complications, the failed technology, the missed opportunities, the lack of promised savings”.

Birmingham City Council is, in effect, locked into a “Services Birmingham” contract with Capita that began in 2006 and lasts for another nine years. The contract has been largely successful but the relationship is deteriorating in some areas, according to a report which was published this week.  The two sides have many problems to overcome.

Essex County Council has taken civil legal dispute advice over its deal with BT. The European Services Strategy Unit quotes the Financial Times as saying that a 10-year contract began 2002 but in January 2009 Essex Council served BT with a notice of material breach of contract. A spokeswoman for the council said: “We decided it wasn’t value for money and we weren’t getting the level of service we required, so we decided to terminate the contract.”

Analysis of other parts of latest Cornwall report

The options appraisal report says it was produced in a tight timeframe which has limited its usefulness to councillors. But who has imposed a tight timeframe? Councillors have not imposed any specific time limit. It could be that some council officers have. But aren’t artificial time limits usually the prerogative of double-glazing salesmen who offer 60% off if you sign straight away? Cornwall’s report says:

“… it is recognised that the necessity for the Chief Executive to fulfil the mandate of Council in such a tight timeframe means that it has been difficult in terms of ensuring full Member engagement…

” … As stated, the timeframe has been particularly challenging and the report would have benefited from more discussions with and input from Members but it is hoped that the Council has sufficient analysis and background information to make a decision on the best way forward.”

Health partners

The report says of the council’s three proposed health partners that “all are keen to promote closer integration, improve services and deliver savings through the SP 1 [BT joint venture] proposal”.

This isn’t quite what “all” the health partners said.

Kevin Baber, chief executive of Peninsula Community Health in St Austell said the only realistic option was a BT joint venture (though the authority has begun telehealth talks outside the partnership). The other two health authorities were not so definite in their support for a BT joint venture – and one of them  wished expressly not to influence Cornwall Council’s debate.

Lezli Boswell, Chief Executive of Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust, said:

“It would not be appropriate for me to comment on the Options Appraisal as [the trust] has not been involved in the preparations process and also would not want to appear to be influencing the Council’s debate…”

Phil Confue, chief executive of Cornwall Partnership NHS Foundation Trust, said that the option for a BT joint venture appeared to offer to a real opportunity  to deliver value for money. But he made no commitment to the partnership even if Cornwall votes in favour of a deal with BT.  He said the trust did not want, as an NHS body, to lobby the council over its decision.

“The decision whether to pursue the Strategic Partnership will be made by
our Trust Board of Directors, once the Council has made its decision on the 11 December 2012.”

As the Cornwall options appraisal report concedes, health trusts have the option of outsourcing services to Shared Business Services, a successful shared services organisation run by Steria.

Comment:

Most of the councils that went into joint ventures with high hopes amid promises of large savings have become disillusioned. Such deals are characterised by an anxiety for a deal to be signed as soon as possible, followed by rising costs, lack of flexibility, high prices when there is a need for major legislative and organisational change, and the discovery that ending a contract early carries risks of disruption to services, high re-transitional expenses, legal action and sunk costs.

Some may wonder if the unforeseen rising costs of procurement – they have increased five-fold – may be a sign of what could happen with costs after a contract is in place.

Given the lessons from the growing number of joint venture failures, one would have thought that council officers would be suspicious of supplier promises.  Not at Cornwall. The officer-enthusiasts for the BT deal don’t mention any of the joint venture contracts that have failed. Indeed those officers prefer the claims of suppliers that failures are in the eyes of trouble-makers, media scaremongers and union activists.

Why does so much enthusiasm at the start of contracts dissipate once realities set in? Could it be that the best marketing people are the easiest to sell to? Do the officials that want success so much overlook or minimise the risks and past poor experiences of others?

Links to Cornwall Council’s options appraisal and agenda for 11 December council meeting on the blog of campaigner Cornwall councillor Andrew Wallis.

Cornwall’s joint venture procurement costs escalate

Lessons from Birmingham Council’s joint venture with Capita

By Tony Collins

A report on Service Birmingham – Capita’s joint venture with Birmingham City Council – shows that the deal has been largely successful so far but that trust and relationships may be breaking down in some areas.

The “High-Level” review of Service Birmingham by the Best Practice Group could be read in two ways: as a qualified endorsement of the deal so far, or as a warning that a deteriorating relationship in some areas could end up, in years to come, as a legal dispute.

The report’s authors suggest that the council and Capita have little choice but to make improvements given that the contract lasts another nine years. They say:

“Given the fact that the commercial partnership has a further nine years to operate, there is an inherent risk that unless a core focus for both parties is re-established, the commercial trust between BCC [Birmingham City Council and SB [Service Birmingham] will continue to deteriorate.

“Neither party will benefit from the relationship if this situation is permitted to manifest itself.”

In another part of its report the Best Practice Group says:

“BCC and SB seemed to overcome early challenges in their relationship by having a ‘great common cause’. The Council entered into this relationship in 2006 because it had the foresight to realise it had to fundamentally transform how it operated in order to improve social outcomes for its population…

“Now the transformation has largely been successful and the initiatives are almost complete, the level of innovation seems to have stalled and the relationship has deteriorated. Somewhere in the fire-fighting, both BCC and SB have lost sight of the next ‘great common cause’ – the fact that the Council needs to further reduce the cost of ICT service delivery by £20m per annum. This will require some significant ‘outside the box’ thinking about how to achieve from both BCC and SB.”

Below are verbatim extracts from the Best Practice Group’s report which highlight some of the lessons arising from of the joint venture so far. The sub-headings (in italics) are mine.

Extracts from Best Practice Group’s report:

Service Birmingham charges a fee even when the council implements services outside the joint venture – poor value and reputedly poor practice?

“SB has an on-going contractual duty to ensure it provides independently benchmarked best value in the services it delivers to BCC [Birmingham City Council]. As part of these arrangements, BCC can request specific third party services (outside SB’s own delivery capability) with SB applying a fee for ‘contract management’.

“However, these situations vary considerably, raising the question of how to maximise value. The contract management fee would be considered high value when BCC gives SB a service outcome it wants to achieve, and SB researches the market, provides options and recommendations to BCC, sources the best value vendor, and ensures the solution is implemented and the business outcomes achieved.

“In other situations, BCC already knows the outcome to be achieved, how to achieve it and who the best value vendor is, and can implement the solution itself. However, the same contract management percentage still applies to these cases. This causes resentment for the service area involved because they cannot see how SB has added to the process, and in real terms, is perceived by BCC as very poor value. Although the sums involved are minimal compared with the relationship’s overall cost, it is highly visible as an area of poor value and reputedly bad practice, and needs to be realigned.”

Service Birmingham needs to make a significant return for its shareholders

“Given the relationship challenges between BCC and SB, there are a couple of fundamental points to address, namely that: (a) certain individuals within the Council need to understand that SB is not a social enterprise, a public sector mutual, or a charity, and needs to make a significant return on its capital for its shareholders, and (b) SB needs to understand that the Council is in a significantly deteriorating financial position due to Government cutbacks.”

SB drops its prices when challenged

“There have been statements made by a number of the officers in the Council that SB drops its prices when challenged, especially when the Council has investigated alternative industry offerings. SB have suggested that it is only when the challenge arises that initial data is clarified and therefore, more focused pricing can be provided.”

A hardened commercial stance in some circumstances?

“… these obvious and immediate savings are now being met with a hardened commercial stance for anything that falls outside of the core deliverables by SB.”

The cloud imposes hidden costs for SB

“Regardless of whether a scale of mark-up can be achieved, one issue that is clear from the interviews undertaken is that SB/BCC needs to educate the BCC service areas at all levels around what the contract management mark-up actually buys for the Council from SB. At present, for example, there is a lack of understanding within BCC service areas that having ‘cloud’ delivered solutions within the overall portfolio does still incur hidden costs for SB in supporting the overall infrastructure and managing the intermediate fault–reporting service.”

Staff survey on SB – mixed results

“With regards to the survey, 63% stated that they talk ‘positively’ about SB to their colleagues. Slightly less, 59%, believe SB understands the requirements and support needed to deliver the Council’s services. However, when asked if they would naturally think to contact SB for help and advice in situations where they were thinking about undertaking new ICT related work, only 33% of the Council respondents said that they would…

“When asked the direct question of how satisfied they were overall with the service delivered by SB, only 15% of the respondents felt that the service was less than satisfactory. However, only 10% believed that it was excellent with 39% rating it as satisfactory and 36% rating the service received as good.”

Project concerns

“There is a feeling which was voiced by several interviewees from the Council that project implementation often runs behind schedule and ultimately it is the ‘loudest project to shout’ which will then have the scarce resources allocated to it at the cost of other projects.”

Lack of commercial trust

“…there are elements of the KPI [key performance indicator] reporting received from SB that BCC need clarity on . This, coupled with the general lack of commercial trust between the parties and the fact that BCC have shown that SB have reported some data incorrectly (after discussion around interpretation), means that the KPIs are not fully aligned to the business outcomes BCC now needs to achieve in the current financial climate.”

Seeds of a possible legal dispute in future years between the two sides?

“One point that should be highlighted is that we believe there is a misalignment between both parties view of what partnership working actually entails. From the perspective of some service areas within BCC, they view certain individuals within SB as uncooperative. In a similar vein, there are certain individuals within SB who view specific BCC staff also as uncooperative. It should be noted that these individuals within both BCC and SB are in the minority.

“However, such un-cooperation is manifesting itself into a perception of a lack of commercial trust in both camps. Some BCC individuals are not really taking into account, or understanding, that SB is a commercial organisation that has a majority shareholding by a publically listed company. Its commercial shareholders need to see financial returns from SB that increase annually…

“In the early stages, the working relationship was put firmly on the rails by having a ‘great common cause’. The transformation requirements of BCC were so fundamental, it seems many differences of opinion were set aside and both parties worked very hard to overcome the obstacles in ensuring the transformation was successful. Largely, that was achieved. Now that the original transformation process has almost all been completed, the parties working relationship seems to have deteriorated in certain instances. This pattern of behaviour is normal in most strategic vendor relationships.”

SB more expensive than the average in certain areas?

“SB appear to be significantly more expensive than average in the areas of voice, data and converged service provision (KPI-17). The most significant of the three costs provided is the provision of Data services where SB are the worst value of all of the respondents in the SOCITM survey with a cost of £227 per data outlet (capital + support) compared to a median of £118. At the time of writing this report, no clarification had been provided as to the reasons for the significant difference between the SB provided cost and the survey median. When KPI-17 is reviewed as a cost per user, SB fairs much better across the service types. It has a cost of £321 per user compared to a median of £290 per user. However if you consider that this £31 per user per year, it actually represents over £600k per annum above average.”

Council concerns over SAP work going abroad

“Different parties within BCC perceived that in the interest of cost savings, SB was passing some work on SAP projects to an off-shore organisation, rather than using the UK workforce. It should be noted that the contract allows for the off-shoring of SAP work, but only where such work does not adversely impact jobs in the UK.

“A high level review of the SAP project work has identified that SAP work has only been off-shored when the UK workforce does not have the required expertise. In addition, we requested specific evidence from individuals to support their view that work was being off-shored that could have been undertaken by the UK workforce, but this could not be provided.”

The Council was paying for unused phone lines

“… Ultimately, the Council kept receiving invoices from the line provider for what were essentially unused telephone lines. The process ceased promptly after BCC and SB addressed the escalation of the issue.”

Stagnating innovation could widen the divide between the two sides

“It is clear that both parties will continue to feel significant frustration until they can resolve how to share the innovation process, provide resources to help the generation of sound business cases and provide formalised and comprehensive feedback to allow for the implementation of suggestions. These suggestions need to become acceptable to the Council as realistic deliverable solutions. If this does not happen, then innovation between the partners will continue to stagnate, driving a widening divide between the organisations.”

KPIs not always useful?

In the case of the BCC and SB agreement, despite an abundance of KPIs being in place, the Council perceives the contract could be better aligned in order to maximise the behaviours from SB that it needs.

Comment:

The report gives the impression that those running the joint venture must overcome the many problems because the contract still has nine years left to run. Both sides, it seems, are locked into the relationship. In some areas it works. In others it doesn’t.

Capita, clearly, has been trying hard to make the relationship work. Some within the council have too. Some are not so enthusiastic and have been “making noise” according to the report’s authors. Do those making a noise have a point, or are they simply making trouble against the joint venture? The report suggests removing those making a noise. But will that remove some of those who are providing an independent challenge?

So far the relationship has been largely successful; and the survey of staff is generally positive. But there are signs of serious trouble. Innovation is stagnating, the council’s finances are deteriorating and Capita needs to make a profit from the venture. Are these fundamental incompatibilities? Will the relationship really last another nine years, especially if there is more political change within the council?

High-Level Review of Service Birmingham

The “best implementation of Cerner Millennium yet”?

By Tony Collins

Edward Donald, the chief executive of Reading-based Royal Berkshire NHS Foundation Trust, is reported in the trust’s latest published board papers as saying that a Cerner go-live has been relatively successful.

“The Chief Executive emphasised that, despite these challenges, the ‘go-live’ at the Trust had been more successful than in other Cerner Millennium sites.”

A similar, stronger message appeared was in a separate board paper which was released under FOI.  Royal Berkshire’s EPR [electronic patient record] Executive Governance Committee minutes said:

“… the Committee noted that the Trust’s launch had been considered to be the best implementation of Cerner Millennium yet and that despite staff misgivings, the project was progressing well. This positive message should also be disseminated…”

Royal Berkshire went live in June 2012 with an implementation of Cerner outside the NPfIT.  In mid-2009, the trust signed with University of Pittsburgh Medical Centre to deliver Millennium.

Not everything has gone well – which raises questions, if this was the best Cerner implementation yet,  of what others were like.

Donald said there had been an inevitable impact with:

– patients attending for clinics that did not exist

– patients receiving multiple requests to attend clinics

– patients not receiving follow-up appointments.

Personal letter to patients

Donald told the trust’s board that patients affected would receive a personal letter.  He also said that it was becoming clear that the level of administrative support required to underpin the new system was “high”.

The level of additional support for go-live, and then on an ongoing basis was being quantified. There were 24 additional staff in post. Donald said that he would be discussing this further with the managing director of Cerner “with a view to being reimbursed for this additional cost”.

Was the trust was aware of the additional costs before buying the system? To this question Donald advised the board that the business cases submitted to the board had assumed that administrative costs following implementation would be lower. Donald undertook to distribute a briefing note to the board on the additional short and long term administrative costs to support Cerner Millennium.

[The trust’s Board papers say that Berkshire’s Cerner Millennium system is costing about £30m, which would make it one of the most expensive EPR implementations in the NHS. The papers show that Berkshire’s EPR is funded through loans.]

Had the additional administrative costs had been included in the revised financial forecast for the trust? The Director of Finance advised the board that this was not the case. “However, the additional costs had been included as a potential risk to the achievement of the forecast position,” said the trust’s minutes.

The board noted that the impact of the implementation of the Cerner Millennium system on the ability to deliver performance standards had been considerable.

“In particular, it had been necessary to undertake high volumes of manual data validation to assure accurate reporting. Given this, Monitor had agreed to accept the final validated performance of the Trust at the end of each quarter as the basis for the Trust’s governance rating.”

Cancer waiting times

On some cancer waiting times the EPR system “has had a significant impact on the ability to manage the referral process”,  said the trust’s papers. In addition, there was a backlog of work to be cleared and the production of summary information in key clinical areas.

Patient complaints

The latest information from the trust on its Cerner system is from a freedom of information request submitted by the Health Service Journal which reported last week:

“The Royal Berkshire Foundation Trust’s nursing director has suggested that a high level of complaints about staff is in part down to the implementation of the Cerner Millennium electronic patient record system.”

EPR a “long journey”

In September the head of health informatics at Royal Berkshire was reported as informing a meeting of the trust’s Council of Governors that staff can now start to think of the benefits of the Cerner implementation. She added:

“It’s very important to remember that implementing [Cerner] Millennium is just the start of the process. It will take many years. We’ve got a very long journey until we’ve got the electronic record.”

In response to the getreading.co.uk article Cerner spokesman Simon Hill said:

“The Royal Berkshire NHS Foundation Trust and Cerner have embarked upon a trust-wide change management programme.  The cornerstone of these changes require the installation of Cerner Millennium, the new information system, which gives clinicians real-time access to high quality patient information.

“As with all significant change management programmes, there will be challenges; the Trust and Cerner are working hard to ensure that any disruption is kept to an absolute minimum.

“By improving clinicians’ access to real-time high quality information, the Trust will be able to continue to improve its services to local people throughout the region.”

Comment:

Royal Berkshire NHS Foundation Trust is one of the largest general hospital foundation trusts in Engand. It employs about 4,800 staff and provides acute medical and surgical services to Reading, Wokingham and West Berkshire.

It’s inevitable that in such a large trust the widespread implementation of an all-encompassing system such as Cerner will hit some patients. Some Cerner implementations go well and bring important benefits to hospitals and their patients. Some implementations go badly. One question the NHS doesn’t ask, but perhaps should, is: what level of problems is acceptable with a new electronic patient record system?

It appears from some EPR implementations in the NHS that there is no such thing as a low point. No level of disruption or damage to healthcare is deemed unacceptable.

Berkshire’s chief executive Edward Donald speaks the truth when he says that the trust’s implementation of Cerner was more successful than at other NHS sites. This is despite patients at his trust attending for clinics that did not exist, receiving multiple requests to attend clinics and not receiving follow-up appointments.

Do all such problems matter? To patients yes. To the NHS perhaps not. It would appear that the NHS is geared to care in only a perfunctory way about patient record IT implementations that worsen the care and treatment for patients. The promise of better patient care in the long-term seems to justify any problems in the meantime.

If problematic IT, data quality, or poor practice in data collection, affect the safety and health of patients – which became a potential issue at Imperial Healthcare NHS Trust – how much does anybody in the NHS really care?

The unfortunate truth is that inherent secrecy within the NHS means that the full impact on patients and details of an unsuccessful EPR implementation can remain hidden.

It is a mark of complacency of the Department of Health and the NHS that the board of the Royal Berkshire NHS Foundation Trust learned that it had met all its Care Quality Commission quality registration standards and would achieve an amber-green governance rating for the quarter. This was an improvement on the amber-red rating for the previous quarter.

In the same minutes the board noted that the trust had “failed to achieve the targets in respect of cancer 62 day waits for first treatment and cancer two week from referral to first seen for all urgent cancers”. Even so this would result in an amber-green governance risk rating.

One wonders whether NHS trusts can receive good ratings for their performance, whatever the actual performance.

The worrying thing for those who use the NHS is that, as far as new IT is concerned, it is like flying in a plane that has not been certified as safe – indeed a plane for which there has been no statutory requirement for safety tests. And if the plane crashes it’ll be easy for its operators and supplier to deny any responsibility. They can argue that their safety and risk ratings were at “green” or “amber-green”.

The lack of interest in the NHS over the adverse effect on patients of patient record implementations means that trusts can continue to go ahead with high-risk EPR go-lives without independent challenge.

Unless there is a political intervention, trusts in England will continue to repeat the cycle in a number of Cerner implementations:

– go-live

– chaos

– a trust admission that potential problems, costs and risks were underestimated

– a public apology to patients

– a trust promise that the problems have been fixed

– trust board papers that show the problems haven’t been fixed or new ones have arisen

– ongoing difficulties producing statutory and regulatory reports

– provision in trust accounts for unforeseen costs

– continuing questions about the impact of the new system on patients

– a drying-up of information from the trust on the full consequences of the EPR implementation, other than public announcements on its successful aspects.

As a commentator on E-Health Insider said: “When will this nonsense stop?”

Success in outsourcing needs political stability says councillors’ panel

By Tony Collins

A group of councillors has found, after investigating several large local authority outsourcing contracts, that political stability may be a critical factor in successful deals.

Cornwall Council’s “Support Services Single Issue Panel” investigated outsourcing deals that involved Birmingham City Council (Capita), Liverpool City Council (BT),  Taunton Deane Borough Council (IBM), Suffolk County Council (BT) and South Tyneside Council (BT).

The panel is not,  in principle, against outsourcing. It found that,

“Information from other authorities has highlighted the importance of political stability for a project which will extend for many years. This has been the single most important lesson that they have learnt.”

In those councils that have an inherently stable majority of one particular
party, outsourcing has not necessarily been a problem. “Likewise it has not been an issue for those councils who have achieved a cross-party consensus, even where there has been a change of administration,” says Cornwall’s panel of councillors. But …

“For those councils who do not have a cross-party approach the process of going into a strategic partnership has caused significant problems; in some  cases a polarised membership which has also impacted on their staff…”

The finding indicates that the risks of a large-scale failure of outsourcing contracts at Cornwall and Barnet councils – where political dissent has been marked – could be greater than its officials realise.

Cornwall may outsource a range of services, including IT, to BT in a contract that is likely to be worth at least £200m, and possibly hundreds of millions of pounds more,  over 10 years.

Barnet has chosen Capita as its preferred outsourcing supplier as part of its “One Barnet” transformation programme. The plan includes outsourcing IT.

A need for cross-party support

The findings of Cornwall’s Single Issue Panel also suggest that the initial major decision to outsource may need a cross-party consensus to succeed..

“What has proved both corrosive and destructive is where a major decision has been made without the support of a substantial majority of members,” says Cornwall’s panel.

Cornwall Council is putting the major decision of its outsourcing deal with BT to the full council. A yes or no decision is expected in December.

But Barnet is going ahead with its major decision to award a large outsourcing contract to Capita without a vote of the full council, although dissent over the plans are widespread. An inner circle of councillors, the “Cabinet”, is expected to approve a deal with Capita 0n 6 December.

This is part of what Cornwall’s panel says on the importance of political stability to successful outsourcing deals:

“Throughout the investigatory work of the Panel the importance of political leadership has been consistently stressed.

“It has been regarded by most authorities as the single biggest activity to get right and failure of this function will at best lead to problems and at worst to failure of the partnership.

“The form of the leadership is in itself not important and both cross-party support and a stable base from one political party have both been effective…

Comment:

BT in Cornwall and Capita in Barnet have made promises of large savings which, understandably, makes some councillors and officers want to sign large, long-term outsourcing deals.

If suppliers provide money upfront for transformation projects this eases, or even releases, the burden on councillors and officers to make big cuts.

But how will BT at Cornwall and Capita at Barnet pay for savings, and for new investment in changes, if they fail to attract new business?

This was among the findings of Cornwall’s investigating panel of councillors:

“Members of the SIP [Single Issue Panel] have supported the investigation of ways in which jobs in Cornwall Council could be retained by trading shared services.

“All other authorities that have started with a similar ambition have failed to deliver that aspiration. In one case the business model was substantially reliant on trading and growth and has been in place since 2006.

“No significant trading has taken place and this is a similar story in all other authorities that the SIP has been in contact with.”

This finding shows how the promises of suppliers to attract new business can prove over-optimistic; but at least all of Cornwall’s councillors will have a chance to vote on a deal. Barnet is not giving its full council the same opportunity.

If Barnet’s officers and ruling members read Cornwall’s Single Issue Panel report they will be aware of evidence that it can be corrosive and destructive for a council to make a major decision without the support of a substantial majority of members.

If Barnet’s inner circle then goes ahead with making a major decision in the face of widespread and strong dissent among some staff and councillors, could its decision amount of maladministration if the subsequent deal turns sour?

One concern is that the suppliers may put up money in advance and charge for this – with interest – in the latter part of the contract, as in discredited PFI deals.

Today’s councillors and officers would have money for investment in the early stages of the contract. But they may leave future generations of councillors and officers with a legacy of large payments. The full facts should be known before any deal is signed.

Another concern is that the suppliers may rely on major legislative and organisational change – both of which are inevitable – to provide much of their profit.

If a future council does not want to pay the suppliers’ invoices for changes a dispute may arise, for which the suppliers will be much better prepared than the councils.

A further concern is that the savings promised by suppliers may be smaller than the savings the councils could make on their own,  with suppliers acting as consultants, for the costs of technology fall annually – as do some cloud services as competition increases. Again the facts should be known before any long-term deal with a single supplier signed.

It may also be important for officers at Cornwall and Barnet to be aware that Suffolk County Council has decided after its outsourcing deal with BT that it is better to outsource to multiple “expert” suppliers than a single one.

In Barnet the public needs to be able to hold those responsible for a major decision to account, if all goes wrong. The problem is that the individuals on any minority group that is responsible for a outsourcing decision today are unlikely to be in post when any dispute arises.

Links:

Councillor Andrew Wallis – The Single Issue Panel Releases its Third Report on the Support Services Proposals

Capita preferred bidder at Barnet

The Barnet Eye

Shared services disaster

Are HMRC’s IT costs under firm control?

By Tony Collins

 The costs of IT outsourcing at HMRC have soared despite a well-written contract that promised large savings. When, as Inland Revenue, the department first outsourced IT in 1994, annual IT costs were around £100m.  Now it has emerged that HMRC’s  annual IT spending was running at more than  £1bn between April 2011 and March 2012.  Only some of the 10-fold increase is explained by new work.

Are there lessons for Barnet, Cornwall and other public authorities as they ponder large-scale outsourcing, given that HMRC did almost everything right and still faces a costly contractual lock-in to major IT suppliers until 2017 – a 13-year outsourcing contract?

HMRC has made some extraordinary payments to its outsourcing suppliers since 2011  – more than mid-way through a 13-year contract.

HMRC figures collated by former Inland Revenue IT employee and now payroll specialist Matt Boyle of Research4paye show that HMRC paid its “Aspire” IT partners £964.2m in a single year, between April 2011 and March 2012.

HMRC paid a further £42.6m of invoices from Serco for one year of website development and support. These figures do not include all of HMRC’s IT costs between April 2011 and March 2012, such as invoices from Accenture for maintenance fees and for work relating to Customs.

IT costs soar

1994. £100 annual IT costs. Inland Revenue first outsources its 2,000-strong IT department to EDS. The annual cost of the 10-year contract is about £100m a year according to the National Audit Office.

2004.  £250m annual IT costs. The end of the EDS contract. HMRC’s annual IT costs have risen to about £250m a year (National Audit Office figure).

2004. £280m annual IT costs. Capgemini wins from EDS a new 10-year HMRC outsourcing deal called Aspire (Acquiring Strategic Partners for the Inland Revenue). Capgemini’s main subcontractors are Fujitsu and Accenture. Capgemini’s bid is for £2.8bn, an average of £280m a year.

2005. £539m annual IT cost.  Inland Revenue merges with Customs and Excise to form HMRC which takes on £1bn Fujitsu IT contract from Customs. The first year of the Aspire contract costs £539m, nearly double the expected amount. The NAO blames most of the increase on new work.

2007. In return for promised savings of £70m a year from 2010/11, HMRC extends Capgemini’s contract by three years to 2017. There’s an option to extend for a further five years.

2010. £700m annual IT costs. Under FOI, HMRC releases a statement saying that the Aspire annual contract costs are running at about £700m.

2011/12. £964.2m annual IT cost. HMRC’s list of invoices from its Aspire suppliers for one year between April 2011 and March 2012 add up to £964.2m. A further £42.6m is invoiced by Serco for website development and support.  This puts HMRC’s IT annual outsourcing costs at 10 times higher than they were when Inland Revenue let its first outsourcing deal in 1994. Some of today’s HMRC systems pre-date 1994 [BROCS/CODA].

Aspire – a good contract?

It appears that HMRC did everything right in its Aspire contract. Indeed the National Audit Office has found little to criticise. Aspire is committed to “open book”, so Capgemini, Fujitsu and Accenture must account for their costs and profit margins.

The contract has some innovations. The suppliers’ margin is retained by HMRC until trials are successfully passed. Even then 50% of the margin is retained until the final Post Implementation Trial about six months after implementation.

Charges under Aspire are split into two categories: “S” and “P”.  The former is mainly a commodity pricing arrangement with unit prices being charged for all service elements at a commodity level (e.g. per Workstation, volumes of printed output etc). The charge to HMRC will vary by volume of demand for each service line.

The ‘’P’’ series charge lines are charged on a man-day basis. Application development and delivery is charged mainly on what HMRC calls an “output basis utilising function points“.

Where IT spending goes

There are more than 800 invoices from Aspire covering the year from April 2011 to March 2012. Some of the invoices are, individually, for tens of millions of pounds and cover a single month’s work.

The invoices cover services such as data centre output, data centre operations, systems software maintenance, software coding changes, licences, IT hardware and data storage.

For some of the Aspire invoices HMRC gives a brief explanation such as £57.6m – “June monthly payment for development and support”. But some of the biggest invoices have little explanation:

May 2011:  invoice for £24.7m – IT Software. A further invoice of £61.7m – “data output prod”.

June 2011: invoice for £55.8m – “data output prod”. A further invoice £56.8m – “data output prod”.

On top of these payments HMRC paid about 24 invoices of management fees in the year. Typical monthly invoice amounts for Aspire management fees ranged from about £390,000 to £2.9m.

There are dozens of Aspire invoices in the year for IT software changes to support day-to-day HMRC’s business. Quite a few of those invoices for software changes are each for tens of thousands of pounds but more than 30 invoices for IT changes in the year 2011/12 each bill more than £100,000. The biggest single invoice in the same year for software changes to support day-to-day HMRC business is  £469, 964 in December 2011.

Transparency

Matt Boyle collated the figures on HMRC’s IT spending from spreadsheets published by HMRC . All credit to Francis Maude, the Cabinet Office minister, for making government departments publish details of their invoices over £25,000.

And credit is due to Matt Boyle for collating and totalling HMRC’s IT-related invoices. Boyle says he is surprised at the high costs of Aspire. He is also surprised that the contract excludes web development and support.

Comment:

HMRC appears to have done nearly everything right and still its IT outsourcing costs are soaring, apparently uncontrollably.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the department and taxpayers would have been much better off if Inland Revenue had not outsourced and instead spent the millions it pays annually on, say,  management fees, to building up an in-house IT force and expertise.

Central government seems now to shun big outsourcing deals but local authorities including Barnet and Cornwall are at the stage Inland Revenue was in 1994: they are considering saving money by outsourcing major IT and other services to one main supplier.

If they learn from HMRC’s experiences – and the sums it has had to pay to outsourcing partners – it may take a little of the sting out of HMRC’s enforced prodigality.

[It may also be worth mentioning that some including Boyle ask how it is possible to credibly justify a spend of £46m in one year on a website.]

IBM is “surprised” by SAP project lawsuit

By Tony Collins

US-based Avantor Performance Materials manufactures chemicals and raw materials used in laboratories for research, pharmaceutical production and medical lab testing. Its electronics products are used in the manufacturing of semiconductors and flat panel displays.

The company has issued a press release saying it has filed a lawsuit against IBM in connection with a failed SAP software implementation.

Its complaint was filed on 8 November in New Jersey. Avantor says it retained IBM to upgrade the company’s global computer systems to an SAP platform. Avantor claims that IBM misrepresented the capabilities of its proprietary software solution.

“IBM representatives assured us that its Express Life Sciences Solution, a pre-packaged software solution, was suitable to run Avantor’s core business processes,” says John Steitz, President and CEO of Avantor. “In fact, the solution—and the service and support offered by IBM throughout the implementation—proved to be woefully misaligned with the unique needs of our company and our customers.”  IBM’s Express Life Sciences Solution runs on SAP.

“Over the past approximately seven months, Avantor has undergone an aggressive, company-wide initiative to recover from the failed SAP implementation, and Avantor is now largely operating at pre-SAP implementation service levels,” says the company which is seeking damages of tens of millions of dollars.

IBM told Reuters the accusations were blown out of proportion and that it was surprised by the move.

“We believe the allegations in the complaint are exaggerated and misguided and are surprised that Avantor chose to file suit,” said IBM which added that it had “met its contractual obligations and delivered a solution that Avantor continued to use in its operations.”

The writ is reported to claim that the SAP implementation caused a “near standstill” of Avantor’s business.  Avantor in 2010 chose to replace its ERP (enterprise resource planning) platform with SAP.  A global SAP roll-out was planned as part of a rebranding and growth strategy.

Avantor says the implementation failed to provide crucial functionality that Avantor needed to run its core business processes. In the writ Avantor also criticised some of IBM’s consultants.

After go-live a number of errors are said to have emerged, ranging from failure to track or process orders correctly to directing “that dangerous chemicals be stored in inappropriate locations”.  The company paid IBM $13m. It claimed that IBM was seeking more to remedy issues around the software implementation.

Computerworld reports an allegation by Avantor that IBM failed to tell Avantor about risks to the project and hurried towards a go-live date.

Computerworld says the lawsuit alleges that IBM conducted inadequate and truncated testing and recommended that Avantor proceed with the go-live as scheduled – even though Avantor had emphasised that meeting a projected go-live date was less important than having a fully functional System that would not disrupt Avantor’s ability to service its customers.

The resulting system did not process orders properly, lost some altogether, and did not generate paperwork for customs officials, the writ is reported to state.

IBM and Avantor met one of Avantor’s biggest customers, which expressed a concern that its EDI (electronic data interchange) with Avantor for product ordering wouldn’t work after the changeover, according to the suit. The EDI interface failed on go-live, the lawsuit is reported to say.

Avantor was told to cancel every pending order and reset the entire system in the light of pervasive warehouse problems. This was necessary to discover the root cause of the problem, IDG reports the lawsuit as saying.

IBM said it disagreed with the claims and will defend itself against them vigorously. Avantor’s lawsuit is said to accept that IBM made efforts to right the project’s course following a June meeting with Avantor’s then-CEO, Rajiv Gupta.

IBM “began to acknowledge the severity of the situation” and replaced many of the original consultants, according to the ;lawsuit. These workers did extensive redesign and programming.

Is Universal Credit behind schedule and over budget?

By Tony Collins

The Independent on Sunday claimed yesterday that the Universal Credit programme is a year behind schedule, software issues could push that back further, and the budget has been exceeded by £100m.

It says the launch of Universal Credit, which is scheduled for next October, “ will now be limited to small regional projects”.

There is little in the article to support its claims. But the Department of Work and Pensions has provided no evidence to indicate that the claims are wrong.

“A reorganisation of the complex IT system, following the departure this month of key senior civil servants in charge of universal credit, could mean an overrun of £500m by next spring,” says the paper. “Six pilot projects that are testing direct payment of benefits to tenants in housing associations have reported errors including the wrong amount of money being sent on the wrong date.”

One project involving just 400 claimants initially proved chaotic, says the paper. It quotes a government adviser on information technology as saying that work and pensions secretary Iain Duncan Smith,  like other ministers before him, has been “hypnotised by promises of what an online system can deliver”. Warnings were given to him more than a year ago. “They were ignored.”

The paper also suggests the Department for Work and Pensions is hiding £300m of rising costs by reallocating them to child support payments.

Comment:

Pilot projects are supposed to highlight things that need rectifying; and the DWP has long planned only a limited go-live next October. But the DWP’s repeated claim that key executives are leaving the programme because UC is moving from design to delivery and implementation is wearing thin. The DWP is hiding its internal reports which could reveal the programme’s uncertainties, challenges and assumptions.

This is a pity because there are parts of UC that appear to be going well and others that are not. It is difficult to obtain an overview.

In some ways UC is following the usual train tracks of a conventional government IT disaster:

– Defensive, secretive programme leaders saying, disingenuously, that their programme is the most scrutinised in history.

– The programme’s benefits are always referred to in the future tense.

– Well-meaning realists who point out the problems, uncertainties, and assumptions are derided as defeatists.

Iain Duncan Smith appears to be isolating himself by telling Parliament that all is going well. Tradition on IT disasters dictates that those responsible for a project hear only what they want to hear; they filter facts according to their internal mind map, and they don’t wish to have around them any executive whose version of the truth is off-message. As in Barnet Council’s outsourcing plans, the official programme consists of what is going well and the risks that are being satisfactorily mitigated. Nothing is going badly. But in the case of UC few are convinced, not even the DWP’s permanent secretary Robert Devereux.

Some third-party software specialists say that HM Revenue and Customs is trying to cope with difficult if not impossible deadlines on implementing Real-Time Information, on which the success of UC depends.

They say that HMRC has been making shortcuts with scoping and definition of requirements.  Certainly HMRC has found that national insurance numbers are not useful unique identifiers for employee records because many people don’t have them or have meaningless duplicates such as AB123456. This puts employers under pressure to come up with consistently unique identifiers for staff, for the benefit of HMRC’s RTI systems.

It could end up with employers being blamed, at least in part, for HMRC’s many duplicate records. Indeed employers could be among the scapegoats for any failure of Universal Credit.

If the DWP wanted to separate itself from the IT disasters of previous governments it would publish the facts on UC, the pilot projects and RTI. It’s only when the problems are admitted that they can be tackled.

RTI is a good idea: it could cut HMRC’s administration costs in the longer run; and UC is a good idea if properly implemented, so long as the disabled are not penalised because of it. UC may greatly simplify the benefits systems in the long run.

But while the DWP and Duncan Smith have a bunker mentality people will continue to think they have much to hide. And they probably do.

PS: There are allegations from within the UC teams that there is charging by some contractors for man-days not fully worked, and that over-charging is not difficult because of the thousands of man-days being worked and invoiced. There are also claims that the main UC systems have gone through several versions – version eight at last count – but none has yet been shown to the main groups of business users. Clearly these allegations need investigating.

Another Universal Credit leader replaced

By Tony Collins

Earlier this week it emerged that Malcolm Whitehouse, Programme Director, Universal Credit, Department for Work and Pensions, has stepped down from the role.

Now  Government Computing reports that Steve Dover, Corporate Director, Universal Credit Programme Business, is being  replaced on the UC programme by two directors whose roles are new. Dover’s future role within DWP has not yet been announced.

The overall head of Universal Credit, Terry Moran, who is COO and second permanent secretary, DWP  – and the senior responsible owner of UC (person in charge of making sure UC’s benefits are realised)  – is on sick leave.

Comment:

It’s regarded as good practice on successful programmes to have a continuity of leadership.  The DWP says changes at the top are because the programme is moving from design to delivery and implementation, which is puzzling.

Whitehouse is being replaced by DWP benefits director Hilary Reynolds. Dover is being replaced by Janice Hartley and Sue Moore who have been appointed to director posts for the delivery of Universal Credit, reporting to Hilary Reynolds as Programme Director. The roles are new, not direct replacements for Steve Dover’s job.

The DWP’s organisation chart shows that Dover reported to Whitehouse, and Whitehouse to Moran.

The DWP says it is aiming to bring in new people with different skill sets. But how does disrupting continuity at the top of UC help a programme that, according to work and pensions secretary of state Iain Duncan Smith, is already so successful?

Universal Credit departures continue.

Director of Universal Credit steps down.

Director of Universal Credit programme steps down

By Tony Collins

Malcolm Whitehouse, the programme director and man in charge of Universal Credit, has stepped down from the role.

Computer Weekly says he’s been replaced by the benefits director at the Department for Work and Pensions Hilary Reynolds who will remain in his position in the short-term to help manage the leadership transition. His next position is yet to be announced.

Reynolds reports directly to Terry Moran, the senior responsible owner for Universal Credit and second permanent secretary at the DWP.

Computer Weekly reports on speculation that up to five senior figures will depart from the Universal Credit programme.

A DWP press office spokeswoman said Whitehouse’s departure was part of the programme’s move from design phase to implementation. She said the department was aiming to bring in new people with different skill sets.

“With the early roll-out of Universal Credit starting in less than six months’ time, the programme is moving from system design to delivery. To reflect this, there have been some staff changes as we shift the focus onto implementation.”

The Public Accounts Committee and the Public Administration Committee, in their separate reports on the lessons from IT disasters in government, have urged permanent secretaries to keep key people in post from project design to delivery of benefits.

Whitehouse has worked at the DWP for nine years, having taken the role as programme director in July 2011. This summer he gave a positive report on the progress of Universal Credit to the House of Commons’ Work and Pensions Committee.

Thank you to David Moss for alerting me to Whitehouse’s stepping down.

How’s the Universal Credit programme going?

Malcolm Whitehouse steps down.