Tag Archives: npfit

Advanced health technology on a £1.5m yearly budget

By Tony Collins

[This is the final part of a 3-part series on how Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust’s IM&T team achieves much on a small budget]

Trafford General Hospital bought its main systems outside of the £11.4bn the National Programme for IT [NPfIT]. The hospital, though, is one of the most technologically-advanced in the UK.

Part one of our series on Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust covered the clinical support for IM&T, integrated systems, and the openness that’s required of the trust’s suppliers.

Part two covered the trust’s  control of its data, how NPfIT could ever have worked, how patients benefit from the IM&T,  why doctors keep their smartcards on them at all times, links between hospital and GP systems, the real-time view of free beds, why duplicated patient records are rare, board support for  integrated electronic patient record systems, and some of the remaining challenges.

Some of  Trafford’s further challenges include:

–           Securing the agreement of all GPs in the area to share a synopsis of their records. About half have agreed so far.

–           Scanning in all paper notes to the EPR. At present about 50% of patient notes have been scanned and are available to clinical staff as “PDF” files, normally with chapter headings. They include diagrams, charts and handwritten text.

–           Dealing with any uncertainties that arise when the Trust is acquired – in all probability by Central Manchester Foundation Trust .

–           Maximising the IM&T opportunities that the acquisition will bring both Trusts in terms of modernising systems and extending the concept of the shared electronic patient record across a wide area of Manchester.

Costs

Trafford has 14 people working on IM&T and IT infrastructure related matters who handle support, infrastructure and integration. The total yearly cost, including salaries, is about £1.5m in capital and revenue which covers the spend with all of Trafford’s  IM&T suppliers.

This compares with costs of between £23m and £31m for each NPfIT installation at acute trusts in London and the South – and these sums do not include the costs of running a hospital’s IM&T and associated infrastructure. Neither do the NPfIT costs include the salaries for an acute hospital’s IT and IM&T staff.

Steve Parsons, Head of IM&T, says of his hospital’s technology: “This is bargain stuff”.

If Trafford can do so much for so little, can centrally-bought NPfIT systems costing many times more – for less – still be justified? The Department of Health argues that NPfIT systems offer more than non-NPfIT. But how much more could Trafford offer its clinical staff, in terms of proven technologies and integration?

Asked where he’d put Trafford in a league table of UK hospitals with systems that clinicians need and want to use, Peter Large, Director of Planning, pauses and says with a slight smile: “Let’s be modest – in the top 10%.”

He’s probably not joking.

**

•           Since writing this article Parsons and his team have been short-listed by the eHealth Insider Awards for the trust’s electronic whiteboard project, in the category of “innovation in healthcare interoperability”.

Part one: How does this IM&T team achieve so much for so little money?

Part two: How does this IM&T team achieve so much for so little money? (2)

How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money? (2)

By Tony Collins

One reason doctors and nurses hold the tech team at Trafford General Hospital in high regard is the quiet professionalism of Steve Parsons who’s a civil engineer and Head of IM&T at Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust in Manchester.

Civil engineering is a  world where openness  is allied to safety. Parsons  designed buildings and pumping stations in the water industry where managers don’t tolerate unnecessary secrecy from their suppliers. From there he became involved in managing IT-led change and came to Trafford General Hospital in 2000.

“It’s having an analytical questioning mind, not just accepting what people say. I will ask all the questions that can make me seem a pain. You want to know why it [a supplier’s software] is going to work,” he says.

“If they don’t give me the confidence that their product is going to work under certain conditions I will not want it. I will not take a black box without knowing what is going to happen with it. I am not having that dependency. I want to strip it down to its basics. It has to be practical. Where else is it working? What is the underlying database?”

Patient data and suppliers 

He says that hospital data belongs to the hospital, not the supplier. “There are people working in the health service who will say: ‘we are the system supplier. It is our data.’ But ours is patient data. This is client’s data, not the supplier’s.”

To an outsider – one who doesn’t work in the NHS – the most surprising thing about seeing the IM&T engine rooms at Trafford General is the complexity and the different ways each ward works. These complexities have to be managed to give doctors and nurses a seamless view of what is happening with each patient.

Could the NPfIT ever have worked?

It’s remarkable, given these complexities, that anyone thought a national system – the National Programme for IT in the NHS –  could ever have worked. It’s hard enough to integrate IM&T within a single hospital let alone on a regional or national scale.

Parsons and Peter Large, Director of Planning at Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust,  consider it lucky that Trafford went live with the Graphnet patient record technology as early as 2003, several months before the tenders for the NPfIT systems were awarded.

It meant that, while some in the NHS were waiting in eager anticipation for NPfIT systems that never arrived, Trafford’s technical staff were learning in precise terms what clinicians wanted and converting this knowledge into working systems. At no point did the promised national systems offer more than Trafford’s.

How patients benefit from Trafford’s IM&T   

In a room close to each ward is a 46” screen known as the “whiteboard” which shows lists of every patient, whether in a bed or visiting outpatients. Allied to the patient’s name are relevant details including colour-coded alerts to warn if a VTE [thrombosis] check hasn’t yet been done, an observation is overdue or an x-ray has not been assessed. In A&E the icon turns red if a patient has waited for three hours, and purple if more than four hours.

Also on the whiteboards, breaches of Department of Health guidelines on waiting times are shown clearly for each patient. The screen also shows which doctor is responsible for any breaches of waiting times.

If nothing else, these system alerts and icons – which include ticking clocks – show how technology can make treatment and care safer for patients.

Why doctors keep their smartcards at all times 

Clinical staff must use smartcards to access the system, and they are unlikely to forget them because they also allow access to the car park.

In trials of NPfIT systems, some doctors were reluctant to use smartcards because of the time taken to log on each time they returned to the computer. At Trafford log-on takes a few seconds, and Imprivata’s single sign-on means that holders of smartcards do not have to remember different passwords. Take out the smartcard and the screen goes blank.

Says Parsons: “We are dependent on EPR now. A year ago one or two consultants refused to look at the EPR. Their secretaries had to print off the last letter from outpatients because they would rather not look at it on a screen. That’s changed.”

Patients give their details only once 

In parts of the NHS patients give their name and address every time they visit a different part of the hospital. At Trafford General Hospital a new patient has a file created at, say, A&E. It is then available to all parts of the hospital, ready for staff to order electronically a blood test or x-ray, or book an appointment.

Links to GPs 

Through Sunquest’s Anglia order communications system and using the HL7 messaging standard, GPs can from their desks order hospital blood tests and x-rays, and get the results in their inboxes. The orders and test results are recorded in the hospital’s Graphnet EPR.

If the local GP has authorised it – and so far about half in Trafford’s catchment area have – A&E doctors will soon be able to see a synopsis of the GP-held patient record which would show any treatments outside the Manchester area as well as medications and significant medical events. The synopsis comes into a hospital server that is controlled by GPs, using their local Emis or Vision systems. In return, GPs have access to their own patients within the hospital-based EPR where they can see all the records related to a patient’s episodes of treatment .

Real-time view of free beds

On the whiteboard, staff can see when beds are due to become vacant, doctors having given the system an estimated time and date of departure for each inpatient. If a doctor fails to give an estimate the system shows an alert.

Says Laura Slatcher who is an assistant to Parsons, “Doctors are restricted with what they can do with the patient’s record  – cannot make referrals, cannot update whiteboards – unless the estimated discharge date is kept up to date. Doctors will complain that they cannot get on because clerks or nurses haven’t kept this administrative information up to date.”

The estimated discharge date is also useful to ensure that the system has alerted district nurses if the patient, after leaving hospital, needs physiotherapy, dietary monitoring or help from social services.

Bed management is a module now removed from the “Lorenzo” system as part of the Department of Health’s plans to cut the costs of NPfIT contracts.

Duplicated patient records are rare

Parsons and his team have done much to tackle the bane of hospital administration: duplicate patient records. Says Parsons: “We have a central patient index which is updated nightly from all GP practices. If you say your name we check date of birth and previous addresses, maybe from the GP – you may still get two people with the same name living in the same house.

“Once we have updated John Jone to John Jones, the central system will update all other related systems to the new spelling. One single ID for everyone avoids having duplicates which could end up with patients having the wrong records. That’s critical to get right.”

Medical Director Dr. Simon Musgrave says: “Duplicates are a fairly rare event now.”

Staff in A&E can create duplicates very easily from patient provided information but “we have systems in place to track those in the following 24 hours and merge them back to the correct record”, says Parsons.

The hospital’s old iSoft patient administration system had 150,000 duplicate files in a database of 460,000 patients. That was typical for an acute hospital says Parsons.

Trafford dispensed with its patient administration system –  it doesn’t have one, having replaced it with the Graphnet’s EPR and Ultragenda from iSoft [now owned by CSC].

EPR goes beyond Trafford

Many doctors are sceptical of the need to make electronic patient records available across England, which was one of the main – and ultimately unsuccessful – aims of the NPfIT. The sceptics say it is very rare for patients to need treatment outside their locality.

Trafford has 250,000 patients in its catchment area but its EPR has 1.4 million records which includes most people in Manchester.

Board support

Trafford adopted the Department of Health’s pre-NPfIT strategy in the late 1990s which called for hospitals to install, incrementally, six levels of EPR – electronic patient records. Level one was a patient administration system and departmental systems. The highest, level six, was a full multi-media EPR online.

Says Parsons: “I have been fortunate of having the support of the Trust Board throughout the 10-year period of staying on a strategy that said: ‘we will continue to build that six-level EPR and all that went with it until an equivalent and better came from the National Programme for IM&T  through Connecting for Health’.”

Reporting, accountability and safety 

Trafford publishes hundreds of reports to operational managers: how long patients have been in their bed or how have they waited, how many patients have had certain types of forms filled in such as VTE forms. Every morning emails to consultants tell them the number of patients they had admitted the day before and how many have not had, say, thrombosis assessments.

Standard reports from some suppliers to the NHS may be too limited for Trafford’s demands, says Parsons. “Some of the questions we are asking require difficult algorithms. On bed occupancy for example doctors get credits for the numbers of patients they are caring for. The standard unit for care is one day or night in hospital.  If somebody is in for six hours, if you work in units of one day, nobody gets credits for that. We want to break IM&T down to parts of days and look at trends.”

Challenges remaining

Ensuring patient safety during the transition from paper to computer needs careful management.

Says Musgrave, Trafford General’s Medical Director: “When you ask for an x-ray [on paper] you fill out a form, get the x-ray done, and the x-ray report is written on a piece of paper which comes back to you so your secretary gets a bit of paper that says “cancer” on it. That’s the end point, the safe point, and you do something about it.

“If you order it on a computer and you do not have a paper record, you have to have some other different system for making it safe.  How do you know the x-ray has been ordered, has been done, and been reported? And what is the report? There is no back-stop there unless you invent one via the computer.”

“Will we ever do entirely without paper?” asks Parsons. “Hmm.”

Part one – How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money?

Final part – How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money?

How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money?

By Tony Collins

Laura Slatcher dreams of forms – reducing the number of them.

She works with a small IM&T team at Trafford General Hospital that is trying to standardise and reduce the number of paper forms doctors and nurses use in the care and treatment of patients.

As is typical for a hospital of its size there are up to 70 – mostly different – paper forms on every ward. Slatcher is working with clinicians to define ways of switching from paper to electronic records – which they are doing with alacrity.

“We have to standardise here,” says Steve Parsons, Head of IM&T at Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust in Manchester. “The doctors and nurses welcome that. They want to work better and more efficiently because they are under pressure themselves to do that.”

Clinical support 

Trafford General bought its main systems outside of the £11.4bn the National Programme for IT [NPfIT]. The hospital, though, is one of the most technologically-advanced in the UK says Peter Large, Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust’s Director of Planning.

There has been no risky “Big Bang” implementation of a Whitehall-bought patient administration system. Rather, Parsons’s approach has been step by step progress over 10 years: implementing systems, learning from what went well and not so well, and integrating hardware and software from a range of suppliers. This strategy could help to explain why the clinical staff we spoke to at Trafford hold the small IM&T team in high regard.

In 2000 the hospital had rudimentary technology – isolated systems in some departments. Now the IM&T team is able to give clinicians what they have asked for; and at Trafford it’s the doctors and nurses who say what they want. Systems are not imposed on them. Here the technologists are in the background, not centre-stage as in the NPfIT.

Trafford and the NPfIT

Says Large: “We found ourselves in the position of being ahead of the game. When we were asked to commit to the National Programme we held back because we needed to know we would be committing to a better solution than was already available to us.”

Parsons adds: “Some trusts didn’t really have anything at all so were desperate to be in the first wave. From their perspective the national programme was a brilliant step forward. But the right products never arrived.”

Integrated systems

One reason for Trafford’s success is the integration of the hospital main and departmental systems. Before electronic patient records, patients could come into hospital without their paper notes being available. Now doctors across the hospital’s departments and clinics can access at the hospital’s XML-based electronic patient records at any time, day or night – and from home if they have remote access.

Doctors can view x-rays and assessments of them from the patient record; and from system alerts and patient tracking, operational managers can see how well individual doctors and nurses are coping with the numbers of patients on their daily lists.

No black-box technology

The hospital’s three main systems are an electronic patient record from Graphnet, software to schedule and manage appointments from Ultragenda, owned by iSoft (now acquired by CSC), and the “Ensemble” integration engine from InterSystems.

What sets these and the hospital’s other systems apart is that they are not black boxes, impenetrable to Trafford’s technologists. Parsons insists that Trafford’s suppliers make their software transparent so that it can be understood by the hospital’s IM&T staff and integrated with other systems, at database “field” level if necessary. That way Parsons can produce any report clinicians need and usually in real-time.

When a supplier keeps its software opaque for reasons of proprietary and commercial confidentiality, Parsons is restricted in the type of medical and administrative reports he can ask the company to supply – and may have to wait hours or a day to get them. He wants none of that.

It’s this level of control that Parsons believes he has a right to expect – and he seems a little surprised that CIOs don’t always require openness from their software suppliers.

How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money? (2)

How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money [final part]

CSC optimistic on new NPfIT deal – officials less so

By Tony Collins

CSC is due to meet officials from the Cabinet Office next month to discuss a possible new deal over the company’s £3bn worth of NHS IT contracts. Proposals from the Cabinet Office’s Efficiency and Reform Group have gone to the Department of Health and Downing Street for approval.

Nobody seems to know yet what the ERG has proposed but CSC remains confident that a new NPfIT deal will be signed that is good for the supplier’s finances and for the NHS.  Not all Whitehall officials share CSC’s confidence, however.

A new deal may be signed – but perhaps without the exclusive arrangements in the original contracts and the NHS commitments to place a minimum amount of business with the company.

CSC ambivalent on prospects of new NHS IT deal

By Tony Collins

CSC is not quite as confident as it was on new NPfIT contracts

CSC is meeting UK Government officials next month to discuss the company’s £3bn worth of NHS IT contracts. It follows a review of the NPfIT contracts by the Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority.

It’s likely officials will discuss a major revision of CSC’s contracts – and possibly an end to them. The Cabinet Office minister Francis Maude is thought to favour termination but the Health Secretary Andrew Lansley, on the advice of NHS Chief Executive Sir David Nicholson, wants to keep CSC in a revised NPfIT.

Recommendations from the Cabinet Office have gone to David Cameron for a decision.

In a conference call yesterday on the company’s first quarter results CSC’s executives said the outcome of the NHS contracts represented an “elevated” risk factor.  But they said CSC is still on target for signing a new deal.

Mike Laphen, CSC’s Chief Executive, said his company has included in its forecasts about $250m [£155m] of NHS turnover until the end of its financial year in April 2012. Any delay in reaching a new deal in September could affect the $250m forecast said Laphen.

He said: “Right now we are assuming that we are still on target with the MoU [Memorandum of Understanding between CSC and the Department of Health]. We are absolutely staffed up ready to execute. We’ve got the products in the delivery pipeline and we believe we have the demand…”

On its NHS work CSC continues to “execute and deliver against our current commitments across primary and secondary care”. CSC’s iSoft “Lorenzo” remains in production routinely supporting daily operations at three early adopter sites.

“We are progressing delivery modules… including emergency care and outpatient prescribing which are anticipated to be installed at the University Hospitals Morecambe Bay once an agreement is reached with the authority,” said a CSC spokesman.

The company told analysts that for its 2012 financial year “there are still a number of large balls still in the air” which include the NHS contract, integration of iSoft and US government spending. “Our business is sound and we have one of the strongest balance sheets in our industry,” said the company.

UK IT market analysts Techmarketview said CSC’s management team “isn’t quite as confident of a positive outcome [on talks over NHS contracts] as it was a few months ago – and rightly so.”

CSC also noted there had been a “significant shift in the market”  from outsourcing to cloud, though with cloud many companies are still deciding “what they’re going to do, or not do”.

MP contacts No 10 and Cabinet Office on CSC’s NHS IT contracts.

BT slammed over NPfIT value-for-money claim.

Was NPfIT really a programme?

Trust forced to buy NPfIT software or face fine

NPfIT has proved unworkable – BCS

MP contacts Cabinet Office and No. 10 on future of NPfIT

By Tony Collins

A Conservative MP has sent detailed suggestions to the Cabinet Office and No.10 on what should happen with the NHS contracts, mainly CSC’s.

Richard Bacon, a member of the Public Accounts Committee, has proved to be an important influence in the Parliamentary debate over the future of the NPfIT. He has now sent to the Cabinet Office and Downing Street a recommendation that CSC’s NPfIT contracts should be cancelled and trusts left to buy systems of choice with a small amount of central subsidy.

His email reveals that NHS Connecting for Health, which is a part of the Department of Health that is responsible for delivering the NPfIT, is rehiring contractors and that the arbitration proceedings between the DH and Fujitsu over the supplier’s £700m legal claim are scheduled to continue until the end of next year. He also says that the DH failed to minute all meetings correctly, which could put the Department at a disadvantage in any legal action against CSC.

It’s possible that Bacon’s suggestions on CSC’s contracts will be considered by David Cameron who may be asked to intervene in any disagreement between the Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority and the Department of Health.

The DH’s position is clear. The Health Secretary  Andrew Lansley and the NHS’s Chief Executive Sir David Nicholson are on record as expressing support for continuing CSC’s NHS IT contracts, although in a revised form.

The Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority under David Pitchford appears not to share the DH’s equanimity over CSC’s contracts. The recommendations of the Major Projects Authority have now gone to Downing Street.

Into the melting pot will go Bacon’s email to Pitchford, copied to No. 10, which is as follows:

Subject: Dealing with NHS IT’s Local Service Providers

“… As discussed, here are some comments on a possible way forward in dealing with Local Service Providers within the National Programme for IT in the NHS.

The LSP contracts have failed to deliver.  Fujitsu has been terminated.   The CSC contract needs to be terminated.  The BT contract has been renegotiated by reducing its delivery requirement by over 50% in return for a reduction in price of less than 10% (though it’s probably not worth terminating this now).

This would leave half of London acute Trusts, all but 11 Trusts in the South, and all Trusts in the North, Midlands and East outside of the Programme.

The simple answer is to have systems of choice for Trusts with small amounts of central subsidy.  Trusts would select and procure whatever system they wanted.  The NHS would make a contribution of, say, £2 million for every acute Trust purchasing a system within, say, 4 years (total cost for 166 Trusts is £332 million).  In return, the Trusts would allow regular reviews of progress and lessons-learned.  This is what the NHS did with primary care over ten years ago and it resulted in virtually all GP Practices computerising over that period.

GETTING OUT OF THE CONTRACTS

All Local Service Providers clearly failed to do what they promised:

All acute Trusts were to have Patient Administration Systems in place by 2006.

All clinical systems were to have been completed at all Trusts by 2010.

Lorenzo was supposed to ship in 2004.

The interim systems were not supposed to happen at all.

The problem is that in a legal dispute over something this complex, lawyers will be able to claim mitigating circumstances of every type and the NHS is likely to end up paying severance, even when terminating for clear non-delivery.  Problems for the NHS include:

CONTRACTS:  The contracts and deliveries are very complex.  It is easy to drown in the detail –  i.e. we couldn’t deliver ‘x’ because of ‘y’.  One could be arguing for ever.

MANAGEMENT:  CfH managed badly.  Records of Correspondence are poor.  Many meetings were not minuted correctly.  Governance was unclear.

PEOPLE:  Lots of different NHS people and contractors worked on the programme and many have since left.  The NHS made CfH fire the majority of its contractors in April 2010.  CfH has been reduced to writing to ex-employees and contractors and asking them if they will come in for interview.

CHANGE:  The NHS has been in constant change with the introduction of major initiatives such as 18 week wait and the current restructuring.  The LSPs will claim ‘moving targets’.

In truth, the LSPs have been paid a lot and delivered little.  The factors above are convenient mitigation for them, but made no difference to whether or not they delivered.  iSoft (now CSC) is supposed to have delivered Lorenzo in every year for the last decade and even claimed to have done so in annual reports when it was a public company.  However, in 2006 a joint report by CSC and Accenture stated that there was “no believable plan” for delivery and in 2011 we still only have one large acute Trust using it.

The Fujitsu case is in arbitration and this is due to run until the end of 2012.  At the end of that period, the waters will have been so muddied that – although they didn’t deliver – it will be obvious that there were many “mitigating” circumstances and the final compromise will end up with the NHS paying half of what Fujitsu is demanding – say £300 million, plus enormous legal fees.

The same scenario will apply to CSC if the NHS tries to terminate them.  CSC’s defence is very well organised.  Morally, the NHS is completely in the right – i.e. there has not been “delivery” – but no matter how clear cut the moral case, it will not be so clear cut legally speaking; the contracts won’t really help the NHS “win” convincingly because it is so complex.  We shouldn’t spend more than a year and a lot more taxpayers’ money fannying around with this.  It will just end up with arbitration followed by some sort of 50 per cent deal plus £100 million to the lawyers. The only way of avoiding this is getting the right people in a room and applying a big stick.  In my view, the only way to terminate is to use the line from the PAC report  i.e. :

You haven’t delivered.  We know that this is so complex and badly documented that we could end up paying you for that non-delivery.  We want to can the arbitration, and save the legal fees and settle.  We are prepared to pay something.  But be aware that the outcome of this settlement and how you behave will have a direct impact on all other business you do now or in the future with the UK government.

The Cabinet Office’s emphasis on a Whole-of-Relationship-with-the-Crown approach to suppliers is vital here.

Avoid being over a barrel by including as part of the settlement a two or three year contract to CSC for the ongoing maintenance of the interim systems already installed (at Acute Trusts and also the others), so that the NHS does not end up in the position that the South ended up in when Fujitsu was terminated (i.e. paying hundreds of millions to maintain a handful of systems). This will give Trusts the time to make and implement alternative plans.

You could take the same approach in order to can the Fujitsu arbitration.”

Will CSC’s £3bn NHS IT contracts be cancelled?

Will CSC’s £3bn NHS IT contract be cancelled?

By Tony Collins

Several people have asked us whether the Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority will cancel  CSC’s NPfIT contract or whether draft memorandum of understanding between the Department of Health and the supplier will be finalised and signed.

The position is that a deal with CSC has not yet been agreed – and it’s not clear when it will be. Recommendations from the Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority have gone to David Cameron, according to yesterday’s Observer.

We’ve also been asked whether the The Major Projects Authority has any authority over CSC’s NPfIT contracts.

In January Downing Street  gave the Cabinet Office a mandate to “intervene” in projects that are poor value for money, have hit delays or are failing. If there’s a dispute between the Major Projects Authority and a department, the Cabinet Office can ask David Cameron for a decision.  So if the Major Projects Authority wants to cancel the CSC NPfIT contract it can – up to a point.

If the DH doesn’t agree, and it probably wouldn’t, it would be up to Cameron, who would probably back the Cabinet Office’s decision. It would then be the DH that dealt with the consequences.

The Major Projects Authority is under a clear-thinking Australian David Pitchford who is understands what goes wrong with big IT projects and why. He reports to Ian Watmore who also has a good understanding.

These are some of the reasons Pitchford gives for failing government IT-based projects:

1.Political pressure
2. No business case
3. No agreed budget
4. 80% of projects launched before 1,2 & 3 have been resolved
5. Sole solution approach
6. No timescale
7. No defined benefits

Most of these apply to the NPfIT.

One view about what should happen is that at least the part of the CSC contract that relates to acute hospitals should be cancelled, and the NHS should be under no further contractual obligation to buy from CSC – that was always an artificial device. CSC should be under no further obligation to deliver to the NHS.

CSC’s obligation has been a means of Whitehall, through CSC, maintaining some control over trusts and justifying a large central team. End that obligation and you don’t need a large central team. Last week’s Public Accounts Committee report on the NPfIT detailed care records systems said that NHS CfH has 1,300 people.

Whatever happens CSC will maintain a strong  presence in the NHS, at least through its purchase of iSoft. Many trusts with iSoft systems are likely to replace them with iSoft – CSC – products. Patient administration systems are huge investments and changing them can be risky.

EC procurement rules mean that trusts will need to go open tender when their existing contracts expire but some will find ways of awarding new contracts to existing suppliers, if that’s their wish.

So CSC’s future in the NHS is assured, whatever happens with its NPfIT contracts.

Today’s report on the NPfIT: the good news

By Tony Collins

Conservative MP Richard Bacon says there is some good news from the “fiasco” that is the NHS National Programme for IT.

He says: “The National Programme for IT in the NHS, the largest civilian IT programme in the world, has failed in its main purpose.   After many years of thinking big but achieving little, the Department of Health has been forced to admit that the central aim of a detailed electronic care record for every patient in England will remain a pipe dream.

“The Department is unable to show what has been achieved for the £2.7bn spent so far on care records systems, while its attempts to renegotiate contracts have resulted in huge reductions in what suppliers are required to deliver without an equivalent cut in prices.

“Meanwhile, many Trusts could face unquantifiable future bills for the upkeep of interim systems which were never deemed adequate for the original contracts and which were only installed because suppliers were unable to meet their original obligations.

“The only good news from this fiasco is that every move of the Department of Health in this area will now be subject to the closest scrutiny from the Cabinet Office”.

Bacon was commenting on today’s report of the Public Accounts Committee on NPfIT detailed care records systems.

DH puts case against cancelling NPfIT contracts

By Tony Collins

The Department of Health has put a detailed case to MPs for not cancelling £4bn worth of NPfIT contracts with local service providers CSC and BT.

Among the points the DH makes is that “the NHS cannot continue without replacing the systems now covered by these contracts” – which refers to the NPfIT contracts with BT and CSC.

The DH also says that CSC and BT “have been clear that they are not willing simply to talk away”. Legal advice to the DH is of a “significant” risk that BT and CSC may, if their contracts are ended, work with Fujitsu in a unified legal action against the Department. Fujitsu and the DH are in a protracted legal dispute after the Department terminated Fujitsu’s NPfIT contract in 2008.

The Department’s memo to the Public Accounts Committee is published today in the PAC’s report entitled “The  National Programme for IT in the NHS: an update on the delivery of detailed care records systems”.

The report is highly critical of all the main parties to the NPfIT including:

– CSC which the report says has delivered only 10 of 166 of its ‘Lorenzo’ systems in the North, Midland and East. The PAC report calls on the Government to give “serious consideration to whether CSC has proved itself fit to tender for other Government work”.

– BT, the other main supplier to the NPfIT, which has “proved unable to deliver against its original contract”, says the report.

– Sir David Nicholson, the Chief Executive of the NHS who is senior responsible owner of the NPfIT, who is criticised by name. It’s rare for the committee’s MPs to personalise their criticism. It says there has been “weak programme management”  and adds: “We are concerned that, given his significant other responsibilities, David Nicholson has not fully discharged his responsibilities as the Senior Responsible Owner for this project. This has resulted in poor accountability for project performance…”

– The Department of Health and NHS Connecting for Health which cannot be trusted to give reliable or complete information on the NPfIT, even to government auditors.  The report says: “Basic information provided by the Department to the National Audit Office was late, inconsistent and contradictory… This occurred despite the fact that Connecting for Health, the NHS organisation responsible for managing the Programme nationally, has 1,300 staff and has spent £820m on central programme management.”

– The Department of Health over its poor ability to re-negotiate contracts with BT and CSC. The report says that the Department ended up “clearly overpaying BT to implement systems …BT is paid £9m to implement [RiO] systems at each NHS site, even though the same systems have been purchased for under £2m by NHS organisations outside the Programme.”  This “casts the Department’s negotiating capability in a very poor light”. The report adds: “We are worried that the Department will fare no better in its current negotiations with CSC …”

– The Department of Health for leaving NHS trusts in a mist of uncertainties. Trusts with NPfIT systems will not know the costs of supporting them after the BT and CSC contracts expire in 2014/15. It’s also uncertain how individual trusts will manage CSC and BT NPfIT contracts when the supplier agreements are held by the Secretary of State for Health.

– The Department of Health for leaving CSC in a controlling position to supply trusts with upgraded interim iSoft systems that were not part of the original contract. Says the PAC report: “It is important that CSC, particularly given its proposed purchase of iSoft, does not acquire an effective monopoly in the provision of care records systems in the North, Eastern and Midland clusters.

“This could result in the Lorenzo system effectively being dropped as the system of choice and many Trusts being left with little choice but to continue with out-dated interim systems that could be very expensive to maintain and to upgrade, or to accept a system of CSC’s choice.

“CSC should not be given minimum quantity guarantees or a licence to sell a product other than that procured and selected by the Programme within the Local Service Provider contract.”

But in its memo to the Committee the Department is unrepentant. Indeed the self-justifying detail and tone of the DH memos, which include selective, apparently corroborating quotations from a KPMG consultancy report that the Department has never published, suggest that, while the NPfIT has changed, the zeal with which DH officials defend the scheme, whatever its problems, has changed little since the programme was announced in 2002.

The DH’s case for not cancelling the contracts with CSC and BT was prompted by a written question from Richard Bacon, a Conservative MP and long-standing member of the Public Accounts Committee who has taken a close interest in the NPfIT.

Bacon asked:

What are the maximum payments to which NPFIT would be exposed for contract cancellation of the detailed care records systems, for each of the LSP providers [CSC and BT]?

The DH said that if the contracts were cancelled for convenience the maximum payments could be [DH italics] in excess of the currently anticipated costs to complete the BT and CSC contracts. If the DH were to cancel contracts for acute hospitals only, the maximum payments may reduce by 50%, said the DH.

The DH adds:

“These costs do not include the deployment or operational costs of any new systems that the NHS would need to procure. The NHS cannot continue without replacing the systems now covered by these contracts.”

Cancellation costs 

Cancellation costs could involve, said the DH:

– Contractual costs: The minimum amount the supplier is allowed to receive under the contract.

– Damages This would include covering some of the suppliers’ unrecovered costs to date and pre-accrued claims at the point of termination

– The costs of providing the ongoing services after termination. It is likely that suppliers will seek to increase these ongoing costs in an attempt to improve their financial position. The Department claims that Fujitsu increased its service charges and claimed it would turn systems off if outstanding sums were not paid.

– Costs of replacing systems, plus support and development of live services.

– Legal and professional fees for terminating, transferring work and investigating the facts around termination.

But the DH makes no mention that the Department would have a strong negotiating position if contracts were terminated because any dispute could cause the Cabinet Office to lose confidence in that supplier, which may affect the ability of the company to win further government work.

Would any major supplier want to fall out with government as a whole, rather than just one department?

Coalition changes mean that government considers itself as a single customer when reviewing the reputation and credibility of individual suppliers.

MPs don’t trust the DH’s information

Many of the points made by the DH in 15 pages of memos appear to have been largely discounted by the committee, partly because MPs did not trust what the Department said.

Comment

The Department of Health has a history of quoting selectively from consultancy and legal reports to support the argument it is making.  This is what tabloids do at times. Indeed the DH  never publishes the consultancy and legal reports it quotes from, so should we trust its arguments that point to keeping the NPfIT contracts with CSC and BT?

There may be good arguments for cancelling the contracts that have not, and are unlikely to be, mentioned by the DH.

Some benefits of cancelling NPfIT contracts

Cancelling could end the uncertainties for trusts that would otherwise be pressured to take NPfIT systems. It could also end the uncertainties for trusts that have yet to buy NPfIT systems and may face punishing costs to keep them running, and in step  with changes within the NHS, after the contracts with BT and CSC expire in 2014-2015.

If Campaign4Change were advising the coalition we would suggest it commission a genuinely independent review of the pros and cons of cancelling the NPfIT contracts.  The review  should not be commissioned by the DH or Connecting for Health because their lawyers and consultants will tend to tell the department what they think it  wants to hear.

One of the messages that comes loud and clear from today’s report of the Public Accounts Committee is that the DH cannot be trusted to make the right decisions on behalf of taxpayers and the NHS. The DH cannot even be trusted to tell the truth to judge from the PAC report.

The Cabinet Office needs to take control of major DH IT spending. Perhaps the sooner the better.

Public Accounts Committee report on NPfIT detailed care records systems.

NHS must consider scrapping NPfIT – MPs.

MPs to report on £11bn NHS IT scheme on Wednesday

The House of Commons’ Public Accounts Committee will publish a report on the NHS’s National Programme for IT detailed care records systems on Wedneday 3 August.

The report is likely to be critical of Sir David Nicholson, the Senior Responsible Owner of the NPfIT who told the committee’s MPs that 80% of the total programme has been delivered.

MPs believe that the programme has been a failure, with poor value for money for the systems delivered so far, which have cost about £6bn.

Sir David Nicholson has been overall senior responsible owner of the NPfIT since 2006. He was not responsible for initiating the programme, which happened under the Blair government in 2002, but he accepted responsibility for making the NPfIT a success. He turned down a call by academics for an independent review of the NPfIT.

Detailed care records systems are only part of the NPfIT – but they were the main reason for the programme’s introduction. Staff at the National Audit Office, which has investigated aspects of the NPfIT three times, say they are not convinced that the national programme is under control.