Tag Archives: government procurement

Excerpts from report on GovIT: Recipe for rip-offs – time for a new approach

By Tony Collins

Today’s comprehensive report on the government’s use of IT is replete with strong and important messages, particularly on the domination of government IT by a small number of large suppliers, so-called systems integrators.

That said, Techmarketview, which tracks developments in the IT supplier market, has today attacked the report of the Public Administration Select Committee.  Techmarketview’s analyst Georgina O’Toole concedes she has not looked carefully at the full report but says she is irritated by the summary’s sensationalism.

It may be worth remembering that Parliamentary committees compete with each other for media attention. A bland report will be pointless: it won’t be read. Today’s report of the PASC, though, seeks more often than not to give the balacing view whenever it says something tendentious.  

For ease of explanation the Committee’s report “Recipe for rip-offs – time for a new approach” refers to government as if it were a single entity.

But government is, to some extent, at war with itself. The Cabinet Office is trying to have more influence over departments, in encouraging them to use SMEs,  adopt agile methods, simplify working practices and cut costs; and while the Cabinet Office has a mandate from David Cameron to enforce its wishes, in practice departments are giving strong reasons for not acting:

-long-term contracts are already in force

– EC procurement rules mean that SMEs cannot be preferred over other suppliers

– SMEs give insufficient financial assurances and could go bust at any time

– there are not enough internal staff and skills to manage a plethora of smaller companies

– existing (large) suppliers employ hundreds of SME as subcontractors.

There’s a particularly telling passage in the PASC report. It gave details of an exchange between the Department of Work and Pensions and Erudine, an SME. The Committee was given details of the exchange during a private session.

Erudine had given the department a way of migrating a legacy system onto a more modern, cheaper platform, which could generate potential savings of around £4m a year.

A senior DWP IT official rejected the proposal and suggested that the department was maintaining an interest in SMEs for political reasons – the government’s wish for 25% of contracts to be given to SMEs. This was part of what the DWP official said to Erudine:

“.. we have as you know an ‘interest’ in having SMEs present and working in the department for good political reasons. So you have other value to us … purely political.

“You guys need to be realistic. I will be very candid with you […] it is a huge amount of bother to deal with smaller organisations. Huge. And we wouldn’t necessarily do that because it doesn’t make our lives simpler.”

The Department declined to comment on the exchange and said the views expressed did not represent its own. It told the Committee that in 2009/10 SMEs made up 29.3% of their supplier base, either as a prime contractor or a subcontractor.

The Committee welcomed this assurance from the Department but added:

“… this account does suggest that attitudes at official level risk undermining ministers’ ambitions to increase the number of SMEs Government contracts with directly”.

These are other extracts from the PASC report:

Overcharging by large suppliers – an obscene waste of public money?

They [SMEs] also alleged that a lack of benchmarking data enabled large systems integrators (SIs) to charge between seven  to ten  times more than their standard commercial costs.

**

Having described the situation as an “oligopoly” it is clear the Government is not happy with the current arrangements. Whether or not this constitutes a cartel in legal terms, it has led to the perverse situation in which the governments have wasted an obscene amount of public money.

The Government should urgently commission an independent, external investigation to determine whether there is substance to these serious allegations of anti-competitive behaviour and collusion. The Government should also provide a trusted and independent escalation route to enable SMEs confidentially to raise allegations of malpractice.

Vested interests suppress innovation?

We received suggestions from some SMEs that the major systems integrators used legacy systems as leverage to maintain their dominance. Some SMEs reported that there were solutions that could easily transfer data from old platforms, but that a combination of risk aversion and vested interests prevented these solutions being adopted

Large IT contractors are “not performing well”

The Government’s analysis has shown that its large IT contractors are not performing well. A Cabinet Office review in September 2010 of the performance of the 14 largest IT suppliers found that none of them were performing to a “good” or “excellent” level, with average performance being a middling “satisfactory with some strengths”. Some were performing significantly worse.

Openness would help to cut costs

Making detailed information on IT expenditure publicly available for scrutiny would enhance the Government’s ability to generate savings, by allowing external challenge of its spending decisions.

The Government has already taken steps to provide more information about IT projects and expenditure in general, especially through the work of the Transparency Board and its publication of contracts on Contract Finder. To realise the full benefits of transparency, this is not sufficient. More information should be made public by default.

It should publish as much information as possible about how it runs its IT to enable effective benchmarking and to allow external experts to suggest different and more economical and effective ways of running its systems

Will government objectives be achieved?

We received numerous reports from SMEs about poor treatment by both Government departments and large companies who sub-contract government work to SMEs. There is a strong suspicion that the Government will be diverted from its stated policy and that its objective will not be achieved.

The drawbacks of using SMEs as subcontractors to large suppliers

“… subcontracting could lead to the Government paying a high price as it had to cover the margin of both the sub and prime contractor.

**

SMEs approached us informally to express concerns based on their own experiences of subcontracting. We heard of cases where systems integrators [large IT suppliers] had involved SMEs in the bidding process so they could demonstrate innovation, only for the SME to be dropped after award of contract.

In some of these cases SMEs felt that they have provided innovative ideas which had then been exploited by the larger systems integrators. We were also told by SMEs that by subcontracting with an SI they were barred from approaching government directly with ideas that might allow it to radically transform its services and reduce costs. This was because systems integrators did not want the Government to be provided with ideas that could result in them losing business, or having to reduce costs.

“… When we put these [SME] concerns to the Government we were told that their contracting arrangements did not stop subcontractors speaking directly to Departments…However, during our private seminar with SMEs, we were told that this did not reflect their experiences. SMEs reported that they were instructed to approach the systems integrator first in order to obtain permission to talk to a Department and that some Departments refused to deal with them directly.

**

We take seriously the concerns expressed by many SMEs that by speaking openly to the Government about innovative ideas they risk losing future business particularly if they are already in a sub-contracting relationship with a systems integator.

Government should deal directly with SMEs

The Government should reiterate its willingness to speak to SMEs directly, and commit to meeting SMEs in private where this is requested. We recommend that the Government establish a permanent mechanism that enables SMEs to bring innovative ideas directly to government in confidence, thereby minimising the risk of losing business with prime contractors.

Is government policy shutting out SMEs even more?

“…the Government has been moving to act as a single buyer to obtain economies of scale… This approach can be counter-productive. The effect of demand aggregation can be to aggregate supply, further concentrating contracts in the hands of a few large systems integrators.

Departments are following instructions from the Cabinet Office Efficiency and Reform Group to switch away from their existing direct SME contracting arrangements in favour of centralised procurement models. This would mean that SMEs would become tier 2 suppliers behind selected large suppliers, preventing SMEs from contracting directly with departments. The Cabinet Office has confirmed that:

Spend is being channelled into three current channels: a) existing framework contracts where spot buying is undertaken centrally (this is known as Home Office Cix), b) department-specific arrangements based on their unique needs (such as FCO’s arrangements with Hays) and c) an existing contract with Capita, owned and managed by DWP and available to all government departments.

It is unclear to us how narrowing the supply channels will create a more open and competitive market. The nature of this supply-side aggregation of SMEs under large contracts appears to be in direct contradiction of the policy articulated by the Minister when he indicated his desire to encourage Departments to secure more direct contracting with SMEs.

“… the Government’s plan to act as a single buyer appears to be leading to a consolidation towards a few large suppliers. This could act against its intention to reduce the size of contracts and increase the number of SMEs that it contracts with directly. We are particularly concerned with plans to move SME suppliers to an “arm’s length” relationship with Government. The Government needs to explain how it will reconcile its intentions to act as a single buyer, secure value for money and reduce contract size to create more opportunities for SMEs.

Procurement barriers for SMEs

The way procurement currently operates favours large companies that can afford to commit the staff and resources to navigate the convoluted processes. It also encourages the Government to confine discussions to as few potential contractors as possible.

If the Government is serious about increasing the amount of work it awards to SMEs it must simplify the existing processes

**

We recommend that the Government investigate the practices which seem unintentionally to disadvantage SMEs. When contracts and pre-qualifying questions are drawn up thought must be given to what impact they could have on the eligibility and ability of SMEs to apply for work, and whether separate provision should be made for SMEs. We believe it would be preferable if the default procurement and contractual approach were designed for SMEs, with more detailed and bespoke negotiation being required only for more complex and large scale procurements.

Have Departments the people and skills to handle more SMEs?

Increasing the use of SMEs will place extra pressure on departments. The management of smaller organisations is currently outsourced to the large systems integrators.

For example the Aspire framework provides HMRC with access to over 200 IT suppliers. Mr Pavitt, HMRC Chief Information Officer said that:

“managing those individually would be quite a heavy bandwidth for a Government department”.

It is not clear that Departments are willing to take on the additional work that contracting directly with SMEs implies even where this could yield significant savings…

Ministers need to ensure their officials have the skills, capacity and above all the willingness to deliver on ministerial commitments to SMEs.

On agile methods:

“… greater use of agile development is likely to necessitate behaviour changes within Government. As agile methodology requires increased participation from the business to provide feedback on different iterations of the solution, departments will need to release their staff, particularly senior staff with overall responsibility of the project, to allow them to participate in these exercises.

Agile development is a powerful tool to enhance the effectiveness and improve the outcomes of Government change programmes. We welcome the Government’s enthusiasm and willingness to experiment with this method. The Government should be careful not to dismiss the very real barriers in the existing system that could prevent the wider use of agile development.

We therefore invite the Government to outline in its response how it will adapt its existing programme model to enable agile development to work as envisaged and how new flagship programmes will utilise improved approaches to help ensure their successful delivery….

The Government will have to bear in mind the need to facilitate agile development as it renegotiates the EU procurement directive and revises the associated guidance.

Need for more people with the right skills to manage suppliers

Managing suppliers is as important as deciding who to contract with in the first place. To be able to perform both of these functions government needs the capacity to act as an intelligent customer. This involves having a small group within government with the skills to both procure and manage a contract in partnership with its suppliers.

Currently the Government seems unable to strike the right balance between allowing contractors enough freedom to operate and ensuring there are appropriate controls and monitoring in-house.

The Government needs to develop the skills necessary to fill this gap. This should involve recruiting more IT professionals with experience of the SME sector to help deliver the objective of greater SME involvement.

When disaster strikes is anyone responsible?

We are concerned that despite the catalogue of costly project failures rarely does anyone – suppliers, officials or ministers – seem to be held to account. It is therefore important that, when SROs do move on they should remain accountable for those decisions taken on their watch, and that Ministers should be held accountable when this does not happen.

Open source and open standards

Recent initiatives such as the Skunkworks team, dotgovlabs, data.gov.uk, and the Alphagov project suggest that the Government is moving in this direction

Government should omit references to proprietary products and formats in procurement notices, stipulating business requirements based on open standards. The Government should also ensure that new projects, programmes and contracts, and where possible existing projects and contracts, mandate open public data and open interfaces to access such data by default..

Report’s conclusion

“… The last 10 years have seen several failed attempts at reform. The current Government seems determined to succeed where others have failed and we are greatly encouraged by its progress to date.

“Numerous challenges remain and fundamentally transforming how Government uses IT will require departments to engage more directly with innovative firms, to integrate technology into policy-making and reform how they develop their systems.

“The fundamental requirement is that Government needs the right skills, knowledge and capacity in-house to deliver these changes. Without the ability to engage with IT suppliers as an intelligent customer – able to secure the most efficient deal and benchmark its costs – and to understand the role technology can play in the delivery of public services, Government is doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past.”

Links:

Jerry Fishenden, adviser to the PASC, gives his view of the report.

Today’s Public Administration Committee report: Recipe for rip-offs – time for a new approach

Government reliance on large IT suppliers is recipe for rip-offs.

Government IT rip-offs – surely time for a new approach – my view of the report

Techmarketview on the report

Good analysis of PASC report – Centre for Technology Policy Research.

MP responds to our campaign on £265m extra spend on Siemens passport IT contract

By Tony Collins

Richard Bacon, a Conservative MP on the Public Accounts Committee, has written to the head of the National Audit Office to ask that he consider an inquiry into £265m of extra payments to Siemens on a passport IT contract.

It comes after the Home Office declined to explain why a contract with Siemens that was expected to cost £80m to £100m ended up costing £265m.

On Monday this week Home Office spokesman Andrew Bell politely declined to answer any of Campaign4Change’s questions on the Siemens contract.

As a result we forwarded to Bacon emails of our questions to the Home Office and its answers.    

Now Bacon has written to Amyas Morse, head of the National Audit Office, drawing his attention to our email exchange with the Home Office.

Says Bacon in his note to Morse:

“I wondered if the NAO might consider looking at the Siemens contract for the IT infrastructure for the passport service?  The Home Office appears to see relatively little need to justify the fact that an £80-100 million contract with Siemens actually cost £365 million.”

Bacon also pointed out to Morse that CSC has replaced Siemens on the passport IT contract. CSC is a main supplier on the NHS National Programme for IT, NPfIT.  In a report due to be published shortly by the Public Accounts Committee, CSC’s work on the NPfIT is likely to be heavily criticised.

Unless the NAO investigates the passport contracts Parliament will have no certain way of knowing whether the CSC passport IT contract, like the Siemens deal, is deviating from the original expected costs, scope or timetable.

Officials are keeping Gateway reviews secret – though these could give MPs an insight into progress of the CSC passport contract.  

My questions to the Home Office, and its reply, are here.

MPs to publish report on Govt IT rip-offs – “time for a new approach”

By Tony Collins

On Thursday the Public Administration Select Committee will publish “Government and IT— a recipe for rip-offs: time for a new approach”.

The report is the culmination of months of investigation by the Committee and its advisers into the way government buys and uses IT.

The Committee’s witnesses included representatives of SMEs who suggested that government IT is dominated by a few large suppliers that charge too much and suppress innovation.

One of the SME representatives, Martin Rice, said the IT industry should apologise.  He told the Committee: “I think the IT industry should  publicly apologise to the citizen for the rip-offs of the last 10 or 20 years.”

He added:
“We are reinventing the wheel and it should not be allowed.  As a taxpayer, I am very angry about this … A lot of these problems have been solved; they are not being brought to the Government because of the oligarchy.  It is not in a profitable interest to bring you these paradigms.  That is why I feel the oligarchy has to stop…”
In written evidence Rice said that prime contractors, being the gatekeepers for some projects, “can and do prevent deployment of innovation that can make subsequent change requests cheap or quick to do as they threaten their lucrative revenue streams”.
Lawyer Susan Atkinson was among those who argued in their written evidence that agile methods can be usefully adopted by departments.

Siemens given extra £265m on passport contract

By Tony Collins

Changing the culture of the Home Office will be quite a challenge – but not an impossible one.

The immigration minister Damian Green has revealed in a Parliamentary reply that Siemens received at least £265m more than expected on a contract to build and run passport IT systems.

The extra money to Siemens was funded by the fees charged to passport applicants. The Home Office requires that the Identity and Passport Service covers its costs from passport fees – which have more than trebled since the start of the contract.

In September 1999, the fee payable by a member of the public making a postal application for a standard 10-year passport was:

– £21 for a standard passport

– £31 for passports issued over-the-counter.

Today a passport costs:

– £77.50 for a standard passport

– £129.50 for one over-the-counter.

Campaign4Change asked the Home Office for an explanation of the extra payments to Siemens. Its spokesman gave only a general account which answered none of our specific questions.  

When we expressed gratitude to Andrew Bell in the Home Office’s press office for his quick response to our questions and pointed out that he hadn’t answered any of them he replied: “We have nothing to add”.

What’s clear is that the Home Office may be under new coalition management but its culture of non-accountability and secrecy haven’t changed.

It’s also clear that, with Gateway reviews remaining secret, Parliament has no certain way of knowing when any large IT-enabled change contract is deviating substantially from the contract in time, scope or costs.

In 2009 the Home Office replaced Siemens with CSC as the main passport IT supplier contract. Have extra payments been made to CSC under its £385m 10-year passport contract? Parliament has no idea, and neither do we.

Damian Green reveals extra payments to Siemens

This was Damian Green’s reply to a question by SNP MP Dr Eilidh Whiteford.

Dr Whiteford: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what the original estimate, at current prices, was for the cost to the public purse of the Siemens IT system for the Passport Agency; what the final cost, at current prices, was at the time of completion; and whether additional costs have been incurred since completion.

Damian Green: At the time of contract award, the anticipated contract value was between £80 to £100m over a 10-year period. The contract duration extended to 11 years at a total cost of approximately £365m.”

Green added: “The increase in costs over the term of the Siemens contract can be attributed to numerous factors including additional demand for passports, enhancements of the IT infrastructure and business processes to accommodate changes in policy, response to changes in security threats and customer service improvements.”

How well did Siemens perform on its £365m passport contract?

Siemens had mixed success on its passport contract. It helped introduce the new  Passport Application Support System [PASS] in 1999 which failed badly, in part because of errors in scanning forms; and nobody realised until too late that extra processing time on applications was slowing down the issuing of passports.

The result was that  hundreds of passport applicants had to cancel their holidays or change their travel dates. A national roll-out of PASS was delayed, and the new work processes and system eventually stabilised.

When the contract finished in 2009, CSC was appointed to build and run new IT systems under a £385m 10-year contract which included replacing  the PASS. An  upgrade of PASS in 2007 destabilised the system temporarily.

The incident made staff at the Identity and Passport Service realise that they could not  subject the PASS system to further major changes without risking disruption to internal operations.

A year earlier,  in 2006, the Identity and Passport Service had a failure with its introduction of an electronic passport application system EPA2. To its credit the Service later published the lessons from the project. This decision on openness came from managers at the passport service,  rather than from within the Home Office HQ.

Home Office culture of secrecy remains

To see if anything has changed on openness and accountability since the last administration we asked the Home Office the following:

a)       Does the Home Office consider the contract with Siemens to have been value for money?

b)       Has, or will, the Home Office publish any information on the contract to justify or explain the extra spend, such as Gateway reviews?

c)       Any comment please on a suggestion that Parliament should be kept informed of such increases.

d)       Are there any plans to explain or tell Parliament about any increases in the cost of the [replacement] contract with CSC?

This was the reply of the Home Office’s spokesman Andrew Bell:

“The parliamentary answer – enclosed below – covers some of this.

“In addition, to note that Siemens contract was for developing and maintaining the IT infrastructure for IPS  [Identity and Passport Service] to issue passports. It also included support for processing applications such as the scanning of the documents required for passports.

“The Identity and Passport Service awarded this new contract for providing this service to Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) in October 2009.”

**

Campaign4Change has given details of the Home Office’s replies to us to a campaigning MP.

We are grateful to publicservice.co.uk for its article which drew our attention to Damian Green’s reply.

Link:

MP asks NAO to consider an inquiry after our article on the Siemens passport contract.

Did officials tell MPs the whole truth on NPfIT payments to CSC?

By Tony Collins

Conservative MP Richard Bacon wrote to the NHS Chief Executive Sir David Nicholson yesterday warning that a failure to disclose information to the Public Accounts Committee was a “very serious matter”.

Bacon, a long-standing member of the Public Accounts Committee, wrote to Nicholson about advance payments to CSC under the NHS National Programme for IT.

The MP is concerned that the Department of Health did not mention a £200m advance payment to CSC at a hearing of the Public Accounts Committee on the NPfIT detailed care records systems on 23 May 2011; and the payment wasn’t mentioned in the Department’s subsequent memo to the committee.

Said Bacon in his letter:

“I understand that the advance payment of £200m to CSC was made in April 2011 but the Department of Health’s memo of 7 June 2011 doesn’t mention it. 

“The failure to disclose to the PAC an advance payment of £200m is a very serious matter.  The fact that the payment appears to have happened after 31 March 2011 is scarcely the point.

“What is going on? … 

CSC declared the £200m advance payment in regulatory announcement

CSC has told regulatory authorities in the US that on 1 April 2011, pursuant to the NPfIT contract, the “NHS made an advance payment to the Company of £200 million ($320 million) related to the forecasted charges expected by the Company during fiscal year 2012”.

The payment was reported by E-health Insider last month.

It appears that the Department decided to give the committee details of advance payments to CSC up until 31 March 2011. The undisclosed £200m payment to CSC was made the next day, 1 April.

As the Department of Health wrote to the committee on 7 June there is no clear reason for its choice of 31 March as the cut-off date for informing MPs of advance payments to CSC.

It would not be the first time the Department has withheld the latest information on the NPfIT from what it regards as outsiders, such as Parliament and the media.

When the National Audit Office was investigating the NPfIT several years ago it was not told of the latest Ipsos MORI survey on NHS perceptions of the National Programme.

The Department instead gave the NAO an older and more positive Ipsos MORI survey. The NAO confirmed to me it had not seen the latest survey [which had some negative findings on the NPfIT].  

Today some in the Cabinet Office are exasperated at the disdain with which some officials at the Department of Health – not all – treat outside supervisory organisations such as the NAO, the Public Accounts Committee and the Cabinet Office.

It appears that some in the Department regard these organisations as necessary by-products of democracy that must be tolerated but not encouraged.

Comment:

Major change is unlikely to happen in Whitehall or at least within the Department of Health and NHS Connecting for Health if officials are allowed, with ease, to dismiss their scrutineers with a wave of their hand.

The culture of allowing the DH to withhold the truth about the NPfIT needs tackling. All credit to Bacon and the Cabinet Office for trying to do just that. It’s likely that Katie Davis, the interim health CIO, will also seek to make the DH less introspective and defensive, at least in terms of the NPfIT and health informatics generally.   

**

Bacon’s letter to Sir David Nicholson

This is Bacon’s letter dated 14 July2011 to Nicholson, copied to the head of the National Audit Office Amyas Morse, the chair of the Public Accounts Committee Margaret Hodge, and the Cabinet Office. 

Dear Sir David

NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR IT IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE

I do not seem to have received a reply to my email of 27 June below.

Making advance payments of any kind at all is wholly at variance with the Department of Health’s long-stated boast that the NPfIT contracts “only pay for delivery”, but let us leave aside this basic point for the moment.

I understand that the advance payment of £200 million to CSC was made in April 2011 but the Department of Health’s memo of 7 June 2011 doesn’t mention it.  The failure to disclose to the PAC an advanced payment of £200 million is a very serious matter.  The fact that the payment appears to have happened after 31 March 2011 is scarcely the point.

What is going on?  Please reply to my email below with its various questions without further delay.

Yours sincerely

Richard Bacon MP for South Norfolk, Member of the Public Accounts Committee

Bacon’s earlier letter to Nicholson, dated 27 June 2011

Dear Sir David

NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR IT IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE

I am writing following the hearing of the Public Accounts Committee on Monday 23 May 2011, to follow up on two important issues that were raised during your evidence:

1.       ADVANCE PAYMENTS TO SUPPLIERS

In your supplementary memorandum to the PAC following the hearing you gave a total of advance payments made up to 31 March 2011, in respect of all contracts over the whole period of the Programme, of £2,532m of which suppliers have retained £1,328m. You also identified a further £119 million of advance payments to be earned or refunded.  Since the memorandum was received by the PAC, it has been reported that the NHS made an advance payment of £200 million to CSC in April 2011. http://www.ehi.co.uk/news/acute-care/6971/nhs-made-£200m-april-advance-to-csc

I should be most grateful if you would let me know the answers to the following questions:

1.       Is this report accurate?

2.       Why was this payment was not reported to the PAC, either during the hearing or in the subsequent memorandum?

3.       What was the justification for this payment and what value does it represent to the NHS?

4.       What will happen in respect of this payment if a new memorandum of understanding is not in fact signed with CSC?

5.       I would also be grateful if you would comment on the CSC filing with the US Security and Exchange Commission, which states that in the opinion of the company, if the NHS were to terminate the current contract “for convenience” it would owe fees totalling less than the $1 billion asset value CSC now has on its books for the contract.   How is this consistent with the claim at the PAC  hearing by Ms Connelly that the cost of terminating the CSC deal could “potentially leave us exposed to a higher cost than if we completed as it stands today”?

2. THE COST OF DEPLOYING CERNER MILLENNIUM AT NORTH BRISTOL

Second, I would be grateful if you could comment on the cost of deploying Cerner Millennium at North Bristol, reported in your memorandum as £21 million, including service for 56 months, and on the current expected go-live date.  Specifically:

6.       Can you explain why the delivery date agreed with BT at the contract “reset” was 4th June 2011?

7.       Why it was then revised to 2nd July 2011?

8.       And why it now appears that there is no agreed delivery date at all?

9.       Can you also give your best comparison of the cost of deploying the Cerner Millennium system at North Bristol, with the cost to University Hospitals Bristol of deploying the System C Healthcare Medway system outside the National Programme?  It would appear from media reports that this latter contract includes deployment of functionality including PAS, Accident and Emergency, maternity, theatres, clinical data collection, and a data warehouse and reporting system, as well as integration of third party and current Trust applications.  According to the National Audit Office, the average cost for each new site under the BT South contract is £28.3 million, but the cost of the Medway system to UHB has been reported as £8.2 million over seven years. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/healthcare-network/2011/may/19/university-hospitals-bristol-foundation-trust-awards-e-patient-contract)   What is the justification for this apparent difference?

10.   As the Senior Responsible Owner for the National Programme, can you give your explicit undertaking that the North Bristol contract represents value for money for taxpayers?

I look forward to receiving your reply.

With many thanks

Yours sincerely

Richard Bacon

Firecontrol shows how much Major Projects Authority is needed

When an investigative team from BBC File on 4 went to a business estate near Taunton, they saw an empty “hi-tech fortress” that looked like a NASA control room.

Nobody was working there. Nearly an entire wall of the control room was fitted with 50-inch monitors – 20 of them. They were blank.

That centre – and a further eight purpose-built buildings like it – remain empty because control room software has yet to be installed.

The £469m wasted on the centres and the failed IT project to support them – together called Firecontrol – was the subject yesterday of a hearing of the Public Accounts Committee.

Mistaken recommendation

At the hearing Sir Bob Kerslake, Permanent Secretary, Department for Communities and Local Government, said that officials made a “mistaken” recommendation to go-ahead of a new IT and control centres for fire services.  

Kerslake accepted points made the Committee’s chair Margaret Hodge that officials recommended the go-ahead of the Firecontrol IT project without reliable figures on likely costs, savings or benefits

No finalised business case or project plan 

Also absent when the IT procurement went ahead was a finalised project plan or business case, MPs heard yesterday. The full business case for Firecontrol wasn’t published until June 2007, three years after the start of the IT project. A revised business case was published in 2009, the year before the project was cancelled. 

Rush to buy new systems – as with the NHS IT scheme

The Committee was told that procurement of new systems was underway by May 2004, amid a deep level of ignorance, because officials were in a rush.

It was a similar story on the NPfIT: officials were in a hurry to complete the procurement of new systems. And as with the NPfIT, there was no local buy-in. “Firecontrol was flawed from the outset because it did not have the support of the majority of those essential to its success – its users,” said the NAO.

Local fire services were under no statutory duty to use the regional control centres. As with the NPfIT, central government officials thought they could persuade local services to use the centres. They failed.

Firecontrol has lost a minimum of £469m, according to the NAO. The Department cancelled the scheme in December 2010 because of continued uncertainties. The coalition has approved a new project due to cost about £84m – which prompted MPs to ask yesterday why the original scheme could not have been done much cheaper.

What about the officials who made the flawed recommendation to go ahead?

Margaret Hodge, chair of the committee, asked Kerslake why his department did not seek a “ministerial direction” before embarking on a project that was so flawed. Ministerial directions are issued by departments’ most senior civil servants when they disagree with their minister’s decision so strongly that they refuse to be accountable for it.

Kerslake replied that no ministerial direction was issued because it was officials who were recommending the project’s go-ahead.

Said Kerslake: 

“I don’t think it came to that [Ministerial Direction] because the view of officials was to recommend, with some of issues identified as concerns, that the scheme went ahead. This was not a case where a Direction would have applied because the recommendation from officials, as I understand it, was to go ahead with the scheme.”

MPs heard that Kerslake was a non-executive director at the department when the decision was taken to go ahead with Firecontrol. Didn’t he object to the scheme’s approval?

Kerslake said he raised concerns to the board about the large scale of the investment compared to the problem. “The concern I had at the time, whether fire and rescue services were willing to take on this technology, were all points that were discussed. The view of the officials on balance at the time was that the benefits of doing the scheme outweighed the risks and costs.”

Kerslake said that as a non-executive he was on the board in an advisory role.

Conservative MP Richard Bacon, a long-standing member of the committee, asked Kerslake if his scepticism as a non-executive was recorded.

“It was clearly part of the discussion. I have not gone back and checked every note of the meetings.”

Comment:

MP Richard Bacon suggested yesterday that the only accountability for the failure of the project was Sir Robert Kerslake’s having an uncomfortable two hours before the Public Accounts Committee.

As for his officials, the only accountability for the waste of £469m was to sit in seats behind him, periodically passing him notes. An observer at the hearing said public seats in the committee room “seemed to be packed full of advisers passing notes to the four people hauled before the committee”.

It’s a civil service tradition that officials are not generally held responsible for recommendations because the final decision on major projects is taken by the department’s minister; yet ministers will tend to know only what they are told by department’s civil servants. 

If the officials are incompetent in drawing up their recommendations, they may be incompetent in the briefings they give their ministers.

Even so it would be a brave minister who rejected the recommendation of permanent and supposedly expert staff.

That’s why the coalition’s setting up of the Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority is such a good move: it will challenge departmental complacency and over-confidence in its own abilities and decisions. 

Cabinet Office Francis Maude announced on 31 March 2011 that “from today all major projects will be scrutinised by the new Major Projects Authority”. 

Most importantly it has powers from the Prime Minister to oversee and direct the effective management of all large-scale projects. Though there are still uncertainties among Cabinet Office officials about the extent to which the Major Projects Authority can intervene in major projects, it has an enforceable mandate from Cameron to scrutinise proposals for major projects; and the Authority is run by the redoubtable Australian David Pitchford who reports to the Cabinet Office’s Chief Operating Officer Ian Watmore whose brief includes making efficiency savings.

With the Major Projects Authority central government has the chance to stop flawed projects such as Firecontrol going ahead. Yesterday’s PAC hearing showed how badly the Authority is needed as an independent challenge. The existence of the Authority is one of the most important developments in government IT for decades – provided it makes effective use of the PM’s mandate. 

Firecontrol chiefs list reasons for project’s collapse.

What the FireControl disaster and NPfIT have in common

By Tony Collins

From today’s National Audit Office report on FireControl project which wasted at least £469m:

“FiReControl was flawed from the outset because it did not have the support of the majority of those essential to its success – its users”

Were the Fire and Rescue Service’s FireControl project and the National Programme for IT in the NHS launched to discover all that can go wrong with a large IT-based project?

One could be forgiven for thinking so. The two projects were conceived in the early part of the new millennium as national, centralised schemes which, in the main, did not have any support from the people who would be using them.

The schemes were launched by civil servants and ministers with good intentions and little or no experience in the many IT-related project disasters that went before.

The projects that had failed since the late 1970s and early 1980s went wrong for similar reasons. As early as 1984 the Public Accounts Committee met to question civil servants on the common factors in a succession of “administrative computing” failures.

Since then every department has come to its IT-based projects and programmes with little understanding – and very little interest – in the lessons from history; and it’s said that those who don’t learn from history are destined to repeat past mistakes.

The FireControl system, which is the subject of an NAO report today, and the NPfIT, had something striking in common: the fact that the system users were the ones with the control of money and decisions on how they spent it – and they did not want technology imposed on them by civil servants in London. That was clear from the start. But it did not stop either the NPfIT or FireControl going ahead.

Indeed a Gateway Review by the Office of Government Commerce in April 2004, after the FireControl project had been approved, found that the “extraordinarily fast pace” of the project was introducing new risks to its delivery, and was escalating the risks already identified. The review concluded that the project was in poor condition overall and at significant risk of failing to deliver.

That review was, at the time, as with similar reviews on the NPfIT, kept secret, so those outside the project, including MPs and the media, were unable to challenge the projects with a credibility that could have influenced decisions on the future of the schemes.

New gateway reviews are still kept secret today, despite the coalition’s promise of openness and transparency.

The good thing about the FireControl project and the NPfIT is that the Cabinet Office has taken control. A Cabinet Office Major Projects Review Group in in July 2010 concluded that negotiations should begin to terminate the FireControl contract – and indeed a settlement with the supplier EADS was reached successfully and amicably in December 2010. The Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority is now  reviewing the future of CSC’s £2.9bn worth of NPfIT contracts.

The bad thing is that the FireControl scheme has wasted at least £469m, according to today’s report of the National Audit Office. The NPfIT may have lost a great deal more.

NAO’s conclusion on FireControl

This was the NAO’s conclusion on the FireControl project. Much the same could be said of the NPfIT:

“This is an example of bad value for money. FiReControl will have wasted a minimum of £469m, through its failure to provide any enhancement to the capacity of the control centres of Fire and Rescue Services after seven years.

“At root, this outcome has been reached because the Department, without sufficient mandatory powers, decided to try to centrally impose a national control system on unwilling locally accountable bodies, which prize their distinctiveness from each other and their freedom to choose their own equipment.

“At the same time, it tried to rush through key elements of project initiation and ended up with an inadequate IT contract, under-appreciating its complexity and risk, and then mismanaged problems with the IT contractor’s performance and delivery.”

 Links:

FireControl project a comprehensive failure.

The failure of the FireControl project – NAO report.

MP questions why IT costs at two nearby hospital trusts are vastly different for similar systems

By Tony Collins

A Conservative MP has asked the NHS Chief Executive Sir David Nicholson to explain why an NHS trust is deploying a centrally-chosen Cerner patient record system at more than twice the cost of a similar but non-NPfIT system at a nearby Foundation trust.

University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust is deploying the Medway system from System C  (now owned by McKesson] at a reported cost of £8.2m over seven years. The acute trust is one of the largest in the country.

With support for less than five years, the nearby North Bristol NHS trust is taking the Cerner Millennium patient record system under the NPfIT at a cost of £21m from BT – and the go-live date in June has slipped to July.

Now Richard Bacon, a member of the Public Accounts Committee, has written to Sir David Nicholson asking for an explanation of why the two trusts are paying vastly different amounts for systems that do similar things. Bacon has also asked Nicholson whether he believes the higher sum is value for money.

The average cost of BT Cerner go-lives under  the NPfIT is £28.3m according to the National Audit Office.

Bacon’s letter is part of evidence which suggests that continuing NPfIT contracts is costing hundreds of millions of pounds more than necessary.

The coalition government, despite its plan to cut public sector IT costs, may spend a further £3bn to 4.bn with the NPfIT’s two major suppliers, BT and CSC, though the Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority is reviewing CSC’s £2.9bn worth of contracts.

Bacon’s letter also questions advance payments to CSC, and whether a recent hearing of the Public Accounts Committee was told the full truth.

An unwavering defender of the NPfIT, Nicholson is likely to defend the cost of the North Bristol implementation, and the advance payments to CSC. On costs, he will argue that North Bristol’s systems have better resilience than at non-NPfIT sites.

If that were true – and there is no evidence it is – the extra costs of having a “hot”, or real-time standby data centre, may not justify a doubling of a rival’s prices. 

This is Bacon’s letter to Sir David Nicholson:

Chief Executive, National Health Service, Department of Health, Richmond House, London SW1A 2NS

27 June 2011

Dear Sir David

NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR IT IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE

I am writing following the hearing of the Public Accounts Committee on Monday 23 May 2011, to follow up on two important issues that were raised during your evidence:

ADVANCE PAYMENTS TO SUPPLIERS

In your supplementary memorandum to the PAC following the hearing you gave a total of advance payments made up to 31 March 2011, in respect of all contracts over the whole period of the Programme, of £2,532m of which suppliers have retained £1,328m. You also identified a further £119 million of advance payments to be earned or refunded.  Since the memorandum was received by the PAC, it has been reported that the NHS made an advance payment of £200 million to CSC in April 2011.

I should be most grateful if you would let me know the answers to the following questions:

Is this report accurate?

Why was this payment was not reported to the PAC, either during the hearing or in the subsequent memorandum?

What was the justification for this payment and what value does it represent to the NHS?

What will happen in respect of this payment if a new memorandum of understanding is not in fact signed with CSC?

I would also be grateful if you would comment on the CSC filing with the US Security and Exchange Commission, which states that in the opinion of the company, if the NHS were to terminate the current contract “for convenience” it would owe fees totalling less than the $1 billion asset value CSC now has on its books for the contract.  

How is this consistent with the claim at the PAC  hearing by Ms Connelly that the cost of terminating the CSC deal could “potentially leave us exposed to a higher cost than if we completed as it stands today”?

2. THE COST OF DEPLOYING CERNER MILLENNIUM AT NORTH BRISTOL

Second, I would be grateful if you could comment on the cost of deploying Cerner Millennium at North Bristol, reported in your memorandum as £21 million, including service for 56 months, and on the current expected go-live date.  Specifically:

Can you explain why the delivery date agreed with BT at the contract “reset” was 4th June 2011?

Why it was then revised to 2nd July 2011?

And why it now appears that there is no agreed delivery date at all?

Can you also give your best comparison of the cost of deploying the Cerner Millennium system at North Bristol, with the cost to University Hospitals Bristol of deploying the System C Healthcare Medway system outside the National Programme?  It would appear from media reports that this latter contract includes deployment of functionality including PAS, Accident and Emergency, maternity, theatres, clinical data collection, and a data warehouse and reporting system, as well as integration of third party and current Trust applications.  According to the National Audit Office, the average cost for each new site under the BT South contract is £28.3 million, but the cost of the Medway system to UHB has been reported as £8.2 million over seven years. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/healthcare-network/2011/may/19/university-hospitals-bristol-foundation-trust-awards-e-patient-contract)   What is the justification for this apparent difference?

As the Senior Responsible Owner for the National Programme, can you give your explicit undertaking that the North Bristol contract represents value for money for taxpayers?

I look forward to receiving your reply.

With many thanks

Yours sincerely

Richard Bacon

MP for South Norfolk, Member of the Public Accounts Committee

Cabinet Office takes on open-source specialist

By Tony Collins

“Let’s not waste this great opportunity to make British government IT the most effective and least expensive service per head in Western Europe.”

 An open source advocate and critic of the high costs of government IT, Liam Maxwell, is joining the Cabinet Office for 11 months  to provide expertise on how civil servants can use innovative new technology to deliver better, cheaper solutions.

His secondment from Eton College where he is ICT head underlines the determination of Francis Maude, the Cabinet Office minister, to continue bringing in strong people to oversee major changes in the way government works.

What remains unclear, however, is how much influence the Cabinet Office will have on autonomous government departments and their permanent secretaries.

Although David Cameron has given his personal backing to the changes being sought by the Cabinet Office, the PM has  little or no direct control over what departments do or don’t do.

Simon Dickson at Puffbox points out that Liam Maxwell has said all the right things in the past. Maxwell co-wrote a 2008 paper for the Tories on ‘Open Source, Open Standards: Reforming IT procurement in Government’, and also a 2010 paper Better for Less‘ for the Network for the Post-Bureaucratic Age, which said:

“British Government IT is too expensive. Worse, it has been designed badly and built to last. IT must work together across government and deliver a meaningful return on investment. Government must stop believing it is special and use commodity IT services much more widely.

“As we saw with the Open Source policy, the wish is there. However, the one common thread of successive technology leadership in government is a failure to execute policy.

“There is at last a ministerial team in place that “gets it”. The austerity measures that all have to face should act as a powerful dynamic for change. Let’s not waste this great opportunity to make British government IT the most effective and least expensive service per head in Western Europe.” 

In a statement, the Cabinet office said that Maxwell will help to develop ideas for how technology can:

– increase the drive towards open standards and open source software

– help SMEs to enter the government marketplace

– maintain a horizon scan of future technologies and methods

– develop new, more flexible ways of delivery in government

Ian Watmore, the Government’s Chief Operating Officer said: “Liam’s insight and knowledge will make him a valuable source to the team over the coming year. He has a strong track record of delivering success in government ICT and he also brings significant experience of turning the theory into practice.”

Dickson said that Maxwell was a Windsor and Maidenhead councillor who drove the debate a year or so ago on councils switching to Open Document Format, part of OpenOffice.

The Guardian said Maxwell has been an adviser to the  Conservative party on government ICT.  At the Cabinet Office he will advise the Efficiency and Reform Group and Ian Watmore. He will begin the job in September and is taking a sabbatical from Eton.

Katie Davis for new Health CIO?

The Cabinet Office’s Katie Davis, who takes over next month, on an interim basis, from Health CIO Christine Connelly,  is ex-Accenture.

But that shouldn’t be held against her.  Accenture left the NPfIT in 2006 with its reputation untarnished.

A profile of Davis appeared in The Telegraph in 2007. The newspaper described her as a yank at the court of King Tony, set on excellence in IT.

Though it could be assumed that Davis has a “big company” approach, and so would welcome the continued dominance of the NPfIT, she told The Telegraph she found her time at Accenture highly satisfying but after a while she stopped having fun.

“The overheads of working for a huge corporation had slightly impaired my ability to deliver. By overheads, I mean travel and the demands of process. My needs and those of the corporation did not overlap so well.”

She also said she worked in the NHS.

“I had worked with the NHS before, and was seconded to work with some of the cleverest and most committed people I’d ever been in a working environment with. It opened my eyes to the challenges and the excitement of working in the public sector.”

Davis has the advantage of having started her career as an engineer (electrical). Which makes it sound as if she’s more practical and realistic than visionary and idealistic. She may make an excellent (permanent) Health CIO.

Telegraph profile of Katie Davis.