Tag Archives: government IT

Today’s report on the NPfIT: the good news

By Tony Collins

Conservative MP Richard Bacon says there is some good news from the “fiasco” that is the NHS National Programme for IT.

He says: “The National Programme for IT in the NHS, the largest civilian IT programme in the world, has failed in its main purpose.   After many years of thinking big but achieving little, the Department of Health has been forced to admit that the central aim of a detailed electronic care record for every patient in England will remain a pipe dream.

“The Department is unable to show what has been achieved for the £2.7bn spent so far on care records systems, while its attempts to renegotiate contracts have resulted in huge reductions in what suppliers are required to deliver without an equivalent cut in prices.

“Meanwhile, many Trusts could face unquantifiable future bills for the upkeep of interim systems which were never deemed adequate for the original contracts and which were only installed because suppliers were unable to meet their original obligations.

“The only good news from this fiasco is that every move of the Department of Health in this area will now be subject to the closest scrutiny from the Cabinet Office”.

Bacon was commenting on today’s report of the Public Accounts Committee on NPfIT detailed care records systems.

Fujitsu denies Whitehall claim over NHS IT work

By Tony Collins

The Department of Health has suggested in a memo to MPs that Fujitsu, after having its NPfIT contract terminated, sought to improve its financial position by doubling service charges and threatening to turn off systems if it was not paid.

Fujitsu has denied the accusations, describing them as “wholly untrue”. It says that “as a trusted supplier of services to many Government departments Fujitsu would never countenance adopting such a position”.

The Department of Health’s claim was in the context of its legal action with Fujitsu after the supplier’s NPfIT contract was terminated in 2008.

In a memo published today in a report of the Public Accounts Committee on the NPfIT detailed care records systems, the DH responds to a question by MP Richard Bacon on what the maximum costs would be if contracts with the two remaining local service providers CSC and BT were to be cancelled.

The DH sets out some of the possible costs including those associated with providing ongoing services after the contract is terminated. Says the DH memo:

“It is likely that suppliers will seek to increase these ongoing costs in an attempt to improve their financial position (Fujitsu, for example, doubled the service charges claiming they would turn the systems off unless we paid).”

But the DH provides no evidence of its claim, and the Committee in its report today casts doubt on the credibility of some DH statements related to the NPfIT.

In a statement Fujitsu said:

“If the suggestion is that that Fujitsu threatened to  turn off its systems unless the Department of Health agreed to a doubling of charges that is wholly untrue. As a trusted supplier of services to many Government departments Fujitsu would never countenance adopting such a position.

“After Fujitsu’s contract terminated Fujitsu continued to provide significant services ( Care Records and PACS / RIS) to a large number of Trusts whilst a replacement temporary contract was negotiated.

“The temporary contract was required to cover the period up to transfer of the services to alternative suppliers. Fujitsu supported this activity for six weeks after termination at its own risk, without a contract and any security of payment.

“Had Fujitsu not done so this the risks to the NHS would have been significant. Far from taking advantage, Fujitsu acted very responsibly and properly in safeguarding the ongoing provision of services to end users.

“Fujitsu’s charges for continuing to provide services were based upon the charging principles set out in it original contract. This was confirmed by the Department’s own audit.”

DH puts case against cancelling NPfIT contracts

BT slammed over NHS value for money claim.

DH puts case against cancelling NPfIT contracts

By Tony Collins

The Department of Health has put a detailed case to MPs for not cancelling £4bn worth of NPfIT contracts with local service providers CSC and BT.

Among the points the DH makes is that “the NHS cannot continue without replacing the systems now covered by these contracts” – which refers to the NPfIT contracts with BT and CSC.

The DH also says that CSC and BT “have been clear that they are not willing simply to talk away”. Legal advice to the DH is of a “significant” risk that BT and CSC may, if their contracts are ended, work with Fujitsu in a unified legal action against the Department. Fujitsu and the DH are in a protracted legal dispute after the Department terminated Fujitsu’s NPfIT contract in 2008.

The Department’s memo to the Public Accounts Committee is published today in the PAC’s report entitled “The  National Programme for IT in the NHS: an update on the delivery of detailed care records systems”.

The report is highly critical of all the main parties to the NPfIT including:

– CSC which the report says has delivered only 10 of 166 of its ‘Lorenzo’ systems in the North, Midland and East. The PAC report calls on the Government to give “serious consideration to whether CSC has proved itself fit to tender for other Government work”.

– BT, the other main supplier to the NPfIT, which has “proved unable to deliver against its original contract”, says the report.

– Sir David Nicholson, the Chief Executive of the NHS who is senior responsible owner of the NPfIT, who is criticised by name. It’s rare for the committee’s MPs to personalise their criticism. It says there has been “weak programme management”  and adds: “We are concerned that, given his significant other responsibilities, David Nicholson has not fully discharged his responsibilities as the Senior Responsible Owner for this project. This has resulted in poor accountability for project performance…”

– The Department of Health and NHS Connecting for Health which cannot be trusted to give reliable or complete information on the NPfIT, even to government auditors.  The report says: “Basic information provided by the Department to the National Audit Office was late, inconsistent and contradictory… This occurred despite the fact that Connecting for Health, the NHS organisation responsible for managing the Programme nationally, has 1,300 staff and has spent £820m on central programme management.”

– The Department of Health over its poor ability to re-negotiate contracts with BT and CSC. The report says that the Department ended up “clearly overpaying BT to implement systems …BT is paid £9m to implement [RiO] systems at each NHS site, even though the same systems have been purchased for under £2m by NHS organisations outside the Programme.”  This “casts the Department’s negotiating capability in a very poor light”. The report adds: “We are worried that the Department will fare no better in its current negotiations with CSC …”

– The Department of Health for leaving NHS trusts in a mist of uncertainties. Trusts with NPfIT systems will not know the costs of supporting them after the BT and CSC contracts expire in 2014/15. It’s also uncertain how individual trusts will manage CSC and BT NPfIT contracts when the supplier agreements are held by the Secretary of State for Health.

– The Department of Health for leaving CSC in a controlling position to supply trusts with upgraded interim iSoft systems that were not part of the original contract. Says the PAC report: “It is important that CSC, particularly given its proposed purchase of iSoft, does not acquire an effective monopoly in the provision of care records systems in the North, Eastern and Midland clusters.

“This could result in the Lorenzo system effectively being dropped as the system of choice and many Trusts being left with little choice but to continue with out-dated interim systems that could be very expensive to maintain and to upgrade, or to accept a system of CSC’s choice.

“CSC should not be given minimum quantity guarantees or a licence to sell a product other than that procured and selected by the Programme within the Local Service Provider contract.”

But in its memo to the Committee the Department is unrepentant. Indeed the self-justifying detail and tone of the DH memos, which include selective, apparently corroborating quotations from a KPMG consultancy report that the Department has never published, suggest that, while the NPfIT has changed, the zeal with which DH officials defend the scheme, whatever its problems, has changed little since the programme was announced in 2002.

The DH’s case for not cancelling the contracts with CSC and BT was prompted by a written question from Richard Bacon, a Conservative MP and long-standing member of the Public Accounts Committee who has taken a close interest in the NPfIT.

Bacon asked:

What are the maximum payments to which NPFIT would be exposed for contract cancellation of the detailed care records systems, for each of the LSP providers [CSC and BT]?

The DH said that if the contracts were cancelled for convenience the maximum payments could be [DH italics] in excess of the currently anticipated costs to complete the BT and CSC contracts. If the DH were to cancel contracts for acute hospitals only, the maximum payments may reduce by 50%, said the DH.

The DH adds:

“These costs do not include the deployment or operational costs of any new systems that the NHS would need to procure. The NHS cannot continue without replacing the systems now covered by these contracts.”

Cancellation costs 

Cancellation costs could involve, said the DH:

– Contractual costs: The minimum amount the supplier is allowed to receive under the contract.

– Damages This would include covering some of the suppliers’ unrecovered costs to date and pre-accrued claims at the point of termination

– The costs of providing the ongoing services after termination. It is likely that suppliers will seek to increase these ongoing costs in an attempt to improve their financial position. The Department claims that Fujitsu increased its service charges and claimed it would turn systems off if outstanding sums were not paid.

– Costs of replacing systems, plus support and development of live services.

– Legal and professional fees for terminating, transferring work and investigating the facts around termination.

But the DH makes no mention that the Department would have a strong negotiating position if contracts were terminated because any dispute could cause the Cabinet Office to lose confidence in that supplier, which may affect the ability of the company to win further government work.

Would any major supplier want to fall out with government as a whole, rather than just one department?

Coalition changes mean that government considers itself as a single customer when reviewing the reputation and credibility of individual suppliers.

MPs don’t trust the DH’s information

Many of the points made by the DH in 15 pages of memos appear to have been largely discounted by the committee, partly because MPs did not trust what the Department said.

Comment

The Department of Health has a history of quoting selectively from consultancy and legal reports to support the argument it is making.  This is what tabloids do at times. Indeed the DH  never publishes the consultancy and legal reports it quotes from, so should we trust its arguments that point to keeping the NPfIT contracts with CSC and BT?

There may be good arguments for cancelling the contracts that have not, and are unlikely to be, mentioned by the DH.

Some benefits of cancelling NPfIT contracts

Cancelling could end the uncertainties for trusts that would otherwise be pressured to take NPfIT systems. It could also end the uncertainties for trusts that have yet to buy NPfIT systems and may face punishing costs to keep them running, and in step  with changes within the NHS, after the contracts with BT and CSC expire in 2014-2015.

If Campaign4Change were advising the coalition we would suggest it commission a genuinely independent review of the pros and cons of cancelling the NPfIT contracts.  The review  should not be commissioned by the DH or Connecting for Health because their lawyers and consultants will tend to tell the department what they think it  wants to hear.

One of the messages that comes loud and clear from today’s report of the Public Accounts Committee is that the DH cannot be trusted to make the right decisions on behalf of taxpayers and the NHS. The DH cannot even be trusted to tell the truth to judge from the PAC report.

The Cabinet Office needs to take control of major DH IT spending. Perhaps the sooner the better.

Public Accounts Committee report on NPfIT detailed care records systems.

NHS must consider scrapping NPfIT – MPs.

A standard cloud-based ERP for central govt?

By Tony Collins

 The Cabinet Office has published “Government Shared Services: A Strategic Vision – July 2011″ which suggests a  “cloud- based ERP standard platform which Departments could buy into and from”.

The idea is part of the coalition’s plans to standardise IT systems within government. Standardising could save money – but, as the Public Administration Select Committee warned last week, not if standardising means giving even more control of government IT to a few large, monopolistic suppliers.

The Cabinet Office says that a number of Departments are due to upgrade their supporting IT systems for back office corporate services in the coming years.

 “A co-ordinated management approach by Government will lower the cost of reinvestment whilst enabling a rationalisation of the current landscape,” says the Cabinet Office.

“For example, a number of large Departments who have implemented and operate an Enterprise Resource Platform (ERP) solution need to plan for the expiration of support to the current instance by 2013.

 “This presents an opportunity for UK Government to source a “vertical” solution for a “cloud based” ERP standard platform which Departments could buy into and from.”

On Shared Services, the plan is to 

“reform how Central Government procures and manages consolidated back office corporate services – by establishing an equitable market of a small number of accredited Independent Shared Service Centres and enabling Departments and their ALBs [arm’s-length bodies] to choose between these – in order to drive up quality and reduce costs of these services, in support of Governments cost reduction targets.”

The Cabinet office says that approved shared services centres will “provide outcome based services, using standardised simplified processes, with the expectation to regularly publish performance data against established benchmarks”.

They will be able to make use of different business models – such as mutualisation – to “leverage capability and the financial investment needed to deliver this service and may operate virtually or from a small number of fully integrated delivery centres”.

Government shared services – a strategic vision. July 2011

MPs to report on £11bn NHS IT scheme on Wednesday

The House of Commons’ Public Accounts Committee will publish a report on the NHS’s National Programme for IT detailed care records systems on Wedneday 3 August.

The report is likely to be critical of Sir David Nicholson, the Senior Responsible Owner of the NPfIT who told the committee’s MPs that 80% of the total programme has been delivered.

MPs believe that the programme has been a failure, with poor value for money for the systems delivered so far, which have cost about £6bn.

Sir David Nicholson has been overall senior responsible owner of the NPfIT since 2006. He was not responsible for initiating the programme, which happened under the Blair government in 2002, but he accepted responsibility for making the NPfIT a success. He turned down a call by academics for an independent review of the NPfIT.

Detailed care records systems are only part of the NPfIT – but they were the main reason for the programme’s introduction. Staff at the National Audit Office, which has investigated aspects of the NPfIT three times, say they are not convinced that the national programme is under control.

Excerpts from report on GovIT: Recipe for rip-offs – time for a new approach

By Tony Collins

Today’s comprehensive report on the government’s use of IT is replete with strong and important messages, particularly on the domination of government IT by a small number of large suppliers, so-called systems integrators.

That said, Techmarketview, which tracks developments in the IT supplier market, has today attacked the report of the Public Administration Select Committee.  Techmarketview’s analyst Georgina O’Toole concedes she has not looked carefully at the full report but says she is irritated by the summary’s sensationalism.

It may be worth remembering that Parliamentary committees compete with each other for media attention. A bland report will be pointless: it won’t be read. Today’s report of the PASC, though, seeks more often than not to give the balacing view whenever it says something tendentious.  

For ease of explanation the Committee’s report “Recipe for rip-offs – time for a new approach” refers to government as if it were a single entity.

But government is, to some extent, at war with itself. The Cabinet Office is trying to have more influence over departments, in encouraging them to use SMEs,  adopt agile methods, simplify working practices and cut costs; and while the Cabinet Office has a mandate from David Cameron to enforce its wishes, in practice departments are giving strong reasons for not acting:

-long-term contracts are already in force

– EC procurement rules mean that SMEs cannot be preferred over other suppliers

– SMEs give insufficient financial assurances and could go bust at any time

– there are not enough internal staff and skills to manage a plethora of smaller companies

– existing (large) suppliers employ hundreds of SME as subcontractors.

There’s a particularly telling passage in the PASC report. It gave details of an exchange between the Department of Work and Pensions and Erudine, an SME. The Committee was given details of the exchange during a private session.

Erudine had given the department a way of migrating a legacy system onto a more modern, cheaper platform, which could generate potential savings of around £4m a year.

A senior DWP IT official rejected the proposal and suggested that the department was maintaining an interest in SMEs for political reasons – the government’s wish for 25% of contracts to be given to SMEs. This was part of what the DWP official said to Erudine:

“.. we have as you know an ‘interest’ in having SMEs present and working in the department for good political reasons. So you have other value to us … purely political.

“You guys need to be realistic. I will be very candid with you […] it is a huge amount of bother to deal with smaller organisations. Huge. And we wouldn’t necessarily do that because it doesn’t make our lives simpler.”

The Department declined to comment on the exchange and said the views expressed did not represent its own. It told the Committee that in 2009/10 SMEs made up 29.3% of their supplier base, either as a prime contractor or a subcontractor.

The Committee welcomed this assurance from the Department but added:

“… this account does suggest that attitudes at official level risk undermining ministers’ ambitions to increase the number of SMEs Government contracts with directly”.

These are other extracts from the PASC report:

Overcharging by large suppliers – an obscene waste of public money?

They [SMEs] also alleged that a lack of benchmarking data enabled large systems integrators (SIs) to charge between seven  to ten  times more than their standard commercial costs.

**

Having described the situation as an “oligopoly” it is clear the Government is not happy with the current arrangements. Whether or not this constitutes a cartel in legal terms, it has led to the perverse situation in which the governments have wasted an obscene amount of public money.

The Government should urgently commission an independent, external investigation to determine whether there is substance to these serious allegations of anti-competitive behaviour and collusion. The Government should also provide a trusted and independent escalation route to enable SMEs confidentially to raise allegations of malpractice.

Vested interests suppress innovation?

We received suggestions from some SMEs that the major systems integrators used legacy systems as leverage to maintain their dominance. Some SMEs reported that there were solutions that could easily transfer data from old platforms, but that a combination of risk aversion and vested interests prevented these solutions being adopted

Large IT contractors are “not performing well”

The Government’s analysis has shown that its large IT contractors are not performing well. A Cabinet Office review in September 2010 of the performance of the 14 largest IT suppliers found that none of them were performing to a “good” or “excellent” level, with average performance being a middling “satisfactory with some strengths”. Some were performing significantly worse.

Openness would help to cut costs

Making detailed information on IT expenditure publicly available for scrutiny would enhance the Government’s ability to generate savings, by allowing external challenge of its spending decisions.

The Government has already taken steps to provide more information about IT projects and expenditure in general, especially through the work of the Transparency Board and its publication of contracts on Contract Finder. To realise the full benefits of transparency, this is not sufficient. More information should be made public by default.

It should publish as much information as possible about how it runs its IT to enable effective benchmarking and to allow external experts to suggest different and more economical and effective ways of running its systems

Will government objectives be achieved?

We received numerous reports from SMEs about poor treatment by both Government departments and large companies who sub-contract government work to SMEs. There is a strong suspicion that the Government will be diverted from its stated policy and that its objective will not be achieved.

The drawbacks of using SMEs as subcontractors to large suppliers

“… subcontracting could lead to the Government paying a high price as it had to cover the margin of both the sub and prime contractor.

**

SMEs approached us informally to express concerns based on their own experiences of subcontracting. We heard of cases where systems integrators [large IT suppliers] had involved SMEs in the bidding process so they could demonstrate innovation, only for the SME to be dropped after award of contract.

In some of these cases SMEs felt that they have provided innovative ideas which had then been exploited by the larger systems integrators. We were also told by SMEs that by subcontracting with an SI they were barred from approaching government directly with ideas that might allow it to radically transform its services and reduce costs. This was because systems integrators did not want the Government to be provided with ideas that could result in them losing business, or having to reduce costs.

“… When we put these [SME] concerns to the Government we were told that their contracting arrangements did not stop subcontractors speaking directly to Departments…However, during our private seminar with SMEs, we were told that this did not reflect their experiences. SMEs reported that they were instructed to approach the systems integrator first in order to obtain permission to talk to a Department and that some Departments refused to deal with them directly.

**

We take seriously the concerns expressed by many SMEs that by speaking openly to the Government about innovative ideas they risk losing future business particularly if they are already in a sub-contracting relationship with a systems integator.

Government should deal directly with SMEs

The Government should reiterate its willingness to speak to SMEs directly, and commit to meeting SMEs in private where this is requested. We recommend that the Government establish a permanent mechanism that enables SMEs to bring innovative ideas directly to government in confidence, thereby minimising the risk of losing business with prime contractors.

Is government policy shutting out SMEs even more?

“…the Government has been moving to act as a single buyer to obtain economies of scale… This approach can be counter-productive. The effect of demand aggregation can be to aggregate supply, further concentrating contracts in the hands of a few large systems integrators.

Departments are following instructions from the Cabinet Office Efficiency and Reform Group to switch away from their existing direct SME contracting arrangements in favour of centralised procurement models. This would mean that SMEs would become tier 2 suppliers behind selected large suppliers, preventing SMEs from contracting directly with departments. The Cabinet Office has confirmed that:

Spend is being channelled into three current channels: a) existing framework contracts where spot buying is undertaken centrally (this is known as Home Office Cix), b) department-specific arrangements based on their unique needs (such as FCO’s arrangements with Hays) and c) an existing contract with Capita, owned and managed by DWP and available to all government departments.

It is unclear to us how narrowing the supply channels will create a more open and competitive market. The nature of this supply-side aggregation of SMEs under large contracts appears to be in direct contradiction of the policy articulated by the Minister when he indicated his desire to encourage Departments to secure more direct contracting with SMEs.

“… the Government’s plan to act as a single buyer appears to be leading to a consolidation towards a few large suppliers. This could act against its intention to reduce the size of contracts and increase the number of SMEs that it contracts with directly. We are particularly concerned with plans to move SME suppliers to an “arm’s length” relationship with Government. The Government needs to explain how it will reconcile its intentions to act as a single buyer, secure value for money and reduce contract size to create more opportunities for SMEs.

Procurement barriers for SMEs

The way procurement currently operates favours large companies that can afford to commit the staff and resources to navigate the convoluted processes. It also encourages the Government to confine discussions to as few potential contractors as possible.

If the Government is serious about increasing the amount of work it awards to SMEs it must simplify the existing processes

**

We recommend that the Government investigate the practices which seem unintentionally to disadvantage SMEs. When contracts and pre-qualifying questions are drawn up thought must be given to what impact they could have on the eligibility and ability of SMEs to apply for work, and whether separate provision should be made for SMEs. We believe it would be preferable if the default procurement and contractual approach were designed for SMEs, with more detailed and bespoke negotiation being required only for more complex and large scale procurements.

Have Departments the people and skills to handle more SMEs?

Increasing the use of SMEs will place extra pressure on departments. The management of smaller organisations is currently outsourced to the large systems integrators.

For example the Aspire framework provides HMRC with access to over 200 IT suppliers. Mr Pavitt, HMRC Chief Information Officer said that:

“managing those individually would be quite a heavy bandwidth for a Government department”.

It is not clear that Departments are willing to take on the additional work that contracting directly with SMEs implies even where this could yield significant savings…

Ministers need to ensure their officials have the skills, capacity and above all the willingness to deliver on ministerial commitments to SMEs.

On agile methods:

“… greater use of agile development is likely to necessitate behaviour changes within Government. As agile methodology requires increased participation from the business to provide feedback on different iterations of the solution, departments will need to release their staff, particularly senior staff with overall responsibility of the project, to allow them to participate in these exercises.

Agile development is a powerful tool to enhance the effectiveness and improve the outcomes of Government change programmes. We welcome the Government’s enthusiasm and willingness to experiment with this method. The Government should be careful not to dismiss the very real barriers in the existing system that could prevent the wider use of agile development.

We therefore invite the Government to outline in its response how it will adapt its existing programme model to enable agile development to work as envisaged and how new flagship programmes will utilise improved approaches to help ensure their successful delivery….

The Government will have to bear in mind the need to facilitate agile development as it renegotiates the EU procurement directive and revises the associated guidance.

Need for more people with the right skills to manage suppliers

Managing suppliers is as important as deciding who to contract with in the first place. To be able to perform both of these functions government needs the capacity to act as an intelligent customer. This involves having a small group within government with the skills to both procure and manage a contract in partnership with its suppliers.

Currently the Government seems unable to strike the right balance between allowing contractors enough freedom to operate and ensuring there are appropriate controls and monitoring in-house.

The Government needs to develop the skills necessary to fill this gap. This should involve recruiting more IT professionals with experience of the SME sector to help deliver the objective of greater SME involvement.

When disaster strikes is anyone responsible?

We are concerned that despite the catalogue of costly project failures rarely does anyone – suppliers, officials or ministers – seem to be held to account. It is therefore important that, when SROs do move on they should remain accountable for those decisions taken on their watch, and that Ministers should be held accountable when this does not happen.

Open source and open standards

Recent initiatives such as the Skunkworks team, dotgovlabs, data.gov.uk, and the Alphagov project suggest that the Government is moving in this direction

Government should omit references to proprietary products and formats in procurement notices, stipulating business requirements based on open standards. The Government should also ensure that new projects, programmes and contracts, and where possible existing projects and contracts, mandate open public data and open interfaces to access such data by default..

Report’s conclusion

“… The last 10 years have seen several failed attempts at reform. The current Government seems determined to succeed where others have failed and we are greatly encouraged by its progress to date.

“Numerous challenges remain and fundamentally transforming how Government uses IT will require departments to engage more directly with innovative firms, to integrate technology into policy-making and reform how they develop their systems.

“The fundamental requirement is that Government needs the right skills, knowledge and capacity in-house to deliver these changes. Without the ability to engage with IT suppliers as an intelligent customer – able to secure the most efficient deal and benchmark its costs – and to understand the role technology can play in the delivery of public services, Government is doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past.”

Links:

Jerry Fishenden, adviser to the PASC, gives his view of the report.

Today’s Public Administration Committee report: Recipe for rip-offs – time for a new approach

Government reliance on large IT suppliers is recipe for rip-offs.

Government IT rip-offs – surely time for a new approach – my view of the report

Techmarketview on the report

Good analysis of PASC report – Centre for Technology Policy Research.

MP responds to our campaign on £265m extra spend on Siemens passport IT contract

By Tony Collins

Richard Bacon, a Conservative MP on the Public Accounts Committee, has written to the head of the National Audit Office to ask that he consider an inquiry into £265m of extra payments to Siemens on a passport IT contract.

It comes after the Home Office declined to explain why a contract with Siemens that was expected to cost £80m to £100m ended up costing £265m.

On Monday this week Home Office spokesman Andrew Bell politely declined to answer any of Campaign4Change’s questions on the Siemens contract.

As a result we forwarded to Bacon emails of our questions to the Home Office and its answers.    

Now Bacon has written to Amyas Morse, head of the National Audit Office, drawing his attention to our email exchange with the Home Office.

Says Bacon in his note to Morse:

“I wondered if the NAO might consider looking at the Siemens contract for the IT infrastructure for the passport service?  The Home Office appears to see relatively little need to justify the fact that an £80-100 million contract with Siemens actually cost £365 million.”

Bacon also pointed out to Morse that CSC has replaced Siemens on the passport IT contract. CSC is a main supplier on the NHS National Programme for IT, NPfIT.  In a report due to be published shortly by the Public Accounts Committee, CSC’s work on the NPfIT is likely to be heavily criticised.

Unless the NAO investigates the passport contracts Parliament will have no certain way of knowing whether the CSC passport IT contract, like the Siemens deal, is deviating from the original expected costs, scope or timetable.

Officials are keeping Gateway reviews secret – though these could give MPs an insight into progress of the CSC passport contract.  

My questions to the Home Office, and its reply, are here.

Siemens given extra £265m on passport contract

By Tony Collins

Changing the culture of the Home Office will be quite a challenge – but not an impossible one.

The immigration minister Damian Green has revealed in a Parliamentary reply that Siemens received at least £265m more than expected on a contract to build and run passport IT systems.

The extra money to Siemens was funded by the fees charged to passport applicants. The Home Office requires that the Identity and Passport Service covers its costs from passport fees – which have more than trebled since the start of the contract.

In September 1999, the fee payable by a member of the public making a postal application for a standard 10-year passport was:

– £21 for a standard passport

– £31 for passports issued over-the-counter.

Today a passport costs:

– £77.50 for a standard passport

– £129.50 for one over-the-counter.

Campaign4Change asked the Home Office for an explanation of the extra payments to Siemens. Its spokesman gave only a general account which answered none of our specific questions.  

When we expressed gratitude to Andrew Bell in the Home Office’s press office for his quick response to our questions and pointed out that he hadn’t answered any of them he replied: “We have nothing to add”.

What’s clear is that the Home Office may be under new coalition management but its culture of non-accountability and secrecy haven’t changed.

It’s also clear that, with Gateway reviews remaining secret, Parliament has no certain way of knowing when any large IT-enabled change contract is deviating substantially from the contract in time, scope or costs.

In 2009 the Home Office replaced Siemens with CSC as the main passport IT supplier contract. Have extra payments been made to CSC under its £385m 10-year passport contract? Parliament has no idea, and neither do we.

Damian Green reveals extra payments to Siemens

This was Damian Green’s reply to a question by SNP MP Dr Eilidh Whiteford.

Dr Whiteford: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what the original estimate, at current prices, was for the cost to the public purse of the Siemens IT system for the Passport Agency; what the final cost, at current prices, was at the time of completion; and whether additional costs have been incurred since completion.

Damian Green: At the time of contract award, the anticipated contract value was between £80 to £100m over a 10-year period. The contract duration extended to 11 years at a total cost of approximately £365m.”

Green added: “The increase in costs over the term of the Siemens contract can be attributed to numerous factors including additional demand for passports, enhancements of the IT infrastructure and business processes to accommodate changes in policy, response to changes in security threats and customer service improvements.”

How well did Siemens perform on its £365m passport contract?

Siemens had mixed success on its passport contract. It helped introduce the new  Passport Application Support System [PASS] in 1999 which failed badly, in part because of errors in scanning forms; and nobody realised until too late that extra processing time on applications was slowing down the issuing of passports.

The result was that  hundreds of passport applicants had to cancel their holidays or change their travel dates. A national roll-out of PASS was delayed, and the new work processes and system eventually stabilised.

When the contract finished in 2009, CSC was appointed to build and run new IT systems under a £385m 10-year contract which included replacing  the PASS. An  upgrade of PASS in 2007 destabilised the system temporarily.

The incident made staff at the Identity and Passport Service realise that they could not  subject the PASS system to further major changes without risking disruption to internal operations.

A year earlier,  in 2006, the Identity and Passport Service had a failure with its introduction of an electronic passport application system EPA2. To its credit the Service later published the lessons from the project. This decision on openness came from managers at the passport service,  rather than from within the Home Office HQ.

Home Office culture of secrecy remains

To see if anything has changed on openness and accountability since the last administration we asked the Home Office the following:

a)       Does the Home Office consider the contract with Siemens to have been value for money?

b)       Has, or will, the Home Office publish any information on the contract to justify or explain the extra spend, such as Gateway reviews?

c)       Any comment please on a suggestion that Parliament should be kept informed of such increases.

d)       Are there any plans to explain or tell Parliament about any increases in the cost of the [replacement] contract with CSC?

This was the reply of the Home Office’s spokesman Andrew Bell:

“The parliamentary answer – enclosed below – covers some of this.

“In addition, to note that Siemens contract was for developing and maintaining the IT infrastructure for IPS  [Identity and Passport Service] to issue passports. It also included support for processing applications such as the scanning of the documents required for passports.

“The Identity and Passport Service awarded this new contract for providing this service to Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) in October 2009.”

**

Campaign4Change has given details of the Home Office’s replies to us to a campaigning MP.

We are grateful to publicservice.co.uk for its article which drew our attention to Damian Green’s reply.

Link:

MP asks NAO to consider an inquiry after our article on the Siemens passport contract.

MP questions why IT costs at two nearby hospital trusts are vastly different for similar systems

By Tony Collins

A Conservative MP has asked the NHS Chief Executive Sir David Nicholson to explain why an NHS trust is deploying a centrally-chosen Cerner patient record system at more than twice the cost of a similar but non-NPfIT system at a nearby Foundation trust.

University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust is deploying the Medway system from System C  (now owned by McKesson] at a reported cost of £8.2m over seven years. The acute trust is one of the largest in the country.

With support for less than five years, the nearby North Bristol NHS trust is taking the Cerner Millennium patient record system under the NPfIT at a cost of £21m from BT – and the go-live date in June has slipped to July.

Now Richard Bacon, a member of the Public Accounts Committee, has written to Sir David Nicholson asking for an explanation of why the two trusts are paying vastly different amounts for systems that do similar things. Bacon has also asked Nicholson whether he believes the higher sum is value for money.

The average cost of BT Cerner go-lives under  the NPfIT is £28.3m according to the National Audit Office.

Bacon’s letter is part of evidence which suggests that continuing NPfIT contracts is costing hundreds of millions of pounds more than necessary.

The coalition government, despite its plan to cut public sector IT costs, may spend a further £3bn to 4.bn with the NPfIT’s two major suppliers, BT and CSC, though the Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority is reviewing CSC’s £2.9bn worth of contracts.

Bacon’s letter also questions advance payments to CSC, and whether a recent hearing of the Public Accounts Committee was told the full truth.

An unwavering defender of the NPfIT, Nicholson is likely to defend the cost of the North Bristol implementation, and the advance payments to CSC. On costs, he will argue that North Bristol’s systems have better resilience than at non-NPfIT sites.

If that were true – and there is no evidence it is – the extra costs of having a “hot”, or real-time standby data centre, may not justify a doubling of a rival’s prices. 

This is Bacon’s letter to Sir David Nicholson:

Chief Executive, National Health Service, Department of Health, Richmond House, London SW1A 2NS

27 June 2011

Dear Sir David

NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR IT IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE

I am writing following the hearing of the Public Accounts Committee on Monday 23 May 2011, to follow up on two important issues that were raised during your evidence:

ADVANCE PAYMENTS TO SUPPLIERS

In your supplementary memorandum to the PAC following the hearing you gave a total of advance payments made up to 31 March 2011, in respect of all contracts over the whole period of the Programme, of £2,532m of which suppliers have retained £1,328m. You also identified a further £119 million of advance payments to be earned or refunded.  Since the memorandum was received by the PAC, it has been reported that the NHS made an advance payment of £200 million to CSC in April 2011.

I should be most grateful if you would let me know the answers to the following questions:

Is this report accurate?

Why was this payment was not reported to the PAC, either during the hearing or in the subsequent memorandum?

What was the justification for this payment and what value does it represent to the NHS?

What will happen in respect of this payment if a new memorandum of understanding is not in fact signed with CSC?

I would also be grateful if you would comment on the CSC filing with the US Security and Exchange Commission, which states that in the opinion of the company, if the NHS were to terminate the current contract “for convenience” it would owe fees totalling less than the $1 billion asset value CSC now has on its books for the contract.  

How is this consistent with the claim at the PAC  hearing by Ms Connelly that the cost of terminating the CSC deal could “potentially leave us exposed to a higher cost than if we completed as it stands today”?

2. THE COST OF DEPLOYING CERNER MILLENNIUM AT NORTH BRISTOL

Second, I would be grateful if you could comment on the cost of deploying Cerner Millennium at North Bristol, reported in your memorandum as £21 million, including service for 56 months, and on the current expected go-live date.  Specifically:

Can you explain why the delivery date agreed with BT at the contract “reset” was 4th June 2011?

Why it was then revised to 2nd July 2011?

And why it now appears that there is no agreed delivery date at all?

Can you also give your best comparison of the cost of deploying the Cerner Millennium system at North Bristol, with the cost to University Hospitals Bristol of deploying the System C Healthcare Medway system outside the National Programme?  It would appear from media reports that this latter contract includes deployment of functionality including PAS, Accident and Emergency, maternity, theatres, clinical data collection, and a data warehouse and reporting system, as well as integration of third party and current Trust applications.  According to the National Audit Office, the average cost for each new site under the BT South contract is £28.3 million, but the cost of the Medway system to UHB has been reported as £8.2 million over seven years. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/healthcare-network/2011/may/19/university-hospitals-bristol-foundation-trust-awards-e-patient-contract)   What is the justification for this apparent difference?

As the Senior Responsible Owner for the National Programme, can you give your explicit undertaking that the North Bristol contract represents value for money for taxpayers?

I look forward to receiving your reply.

With many thanks

Yours sincerely

Richard Bacon

MP for South Norfolk, Member of the Public Accounts Committee

Cabinet Office takes on open-source specialist

By Tony Collins

“Let’s not waste this great opportunity to make British government IT the most effective and least expensive service per head in Western Europe.”

 An open source advocate and critic of the high costs of government IT, Liam Maxwell, is joining the Cabinet Office for 11 months  to provide expertise on how civil servants can use innovative new technology to deliver better, cheaper solutions.

His secondment from Eton College where he is ICT head underlines the determination of Francis Maude, the Cabinet Office minister, to continue bringing in strong people to oversee major changes in the way government works.

What remains unclear, however, is how much influence the Cabinet Office will have on autonomous government departments and their permanent secretaries.

Although David Cameron has given his personal backing to the changes being sought by the Cabinet Office, the PM has  little or no direct control over what departments do or don’t do.

Simon Dickson at Puffbox points out that Liam Maxwell has said all the right things in the past. Maxwell co-wrote a 2008 paper for the Tories on ‘Open Source, Open Standards: Reforming IT procurement in Government’, and also a 2010 paper Better for Less‘ for the Network for the Post-Bureaucratic Age, which said:

“British Government IT is too expensive. Worse, it has been designed badly and built to last. IT must work together across government and deliver a meaningful return on investment. Government must stop believing it is special and use commodity IT services much more widely.

“As we saw with the Open Source policy, the wish is there. However, the one common thread of successive technology leadership in government is a failure to execute policy.

“There is at last a ministerial team in place that “gets it”. The austerity measures that all have to face should act as a powerful dynamic for change. Let’s not waste this great opportunity to make British government IT the most effective and least expensive service per head in Western Europe.” 

In a statement, the Cabinet office said that Maxwell will help to develop ideas for how technology can:

– increase the drive towards open standards and open source software

– help SMEs to enter the government marketplace

– maintain a horizon scan of future technologies and methods

– develop new, more flexible ways of delivery in government

Ian Watmore, the Government’s Chief Operating Officer said: “Liam’s insight and knowledge will make him a valuable source to the team over the coming year. He has a strong track record of delivering success in government ICT and he also brings significant experience of turning the theory into practice.”

Dickson said that Maxwell was a Windsor and Maidenhead councillor who drove the debate a year or so ago on councils switching to Open Document Format, part of OpenOffice.

The Guardian said Maxwell has been an adviser to the  Conservative party on government ICT.  At the Cabinet Office he will advise the Efficiency and Reform Group and Ian Watmore. He will begin the job in September and is taking a sabbatical from Eton.