Office for Public Management discusses mutuals agenda

This blog from the Office of Public Management sets out the possible landscape for mutuals over the next few months now that the consultation period for the Open Public Services White Paper has come to a close.

It suggests that a follow on report explaining how departments will take open public services forward should be expected in November.

There is some background on OPM and mutuals here. The organisation is also organising an event  at the 2011 National Children and Adult Services (NCAS) conference around the local authority spinning out of  children’s and adults’ services.

Socitm response to the Open Public Services White Paper

Hammersmith & Fulham Pathfinder expected to launch in January 2012

NPfIT – criminal incompetence says The Times

By Tony Collins

In an editorial not everyone would have seen, The Times said the history of the NPfIT was “one of criminal incompetence and irresponsibility”.

The main leader in The Times on 23 September had the headline “Connecting to Nowhere”.

It said:

“The comically misnamed Connecting for Health will continue to honour its contracts with big companies and to swallow taxpayers’ money for some time to come: up to £11bn on current estimates. The figure demonstrates the truly egregious scale of the previous Government’s incompetence on this issue: this vast sum seems to have been committed irrevocably, even though the project has never achieved its objectives.

“The story is a dismal catalogue of naivity, ambition and spinelessness. NHS managers and officials …were [not] brave enough to question the direction of travel at crucial moments when IBM and Lockheed pulled out of the project early on. Whitehall was sold a grand vision by consultants, software and technology companies charging grandiose fees. It signed contracts that appear to have been impossible to break when the promised land did not appear. Yet no one seems responsible. No one has been sacked. Most of the officials involved have long moved on…

“There have been spectacular failures in the private sector too. But businesses, with tighter controls on spending, tend to halt things earlier if they are going wrong. Many prefer off-the-shelf systems such as SAP or Oracle, which are tried and tested. They know that it is cheaper to adapt their processes, not the software.

“This newspaper is in favour of serious investment in technology, which could play an important part in economic growth. The NHS debacle has done enormous damage to this country’s reputation for expertise in IT systems. The lessons for the future are clear. Governments must hire people who can make informed and responsible procurement decisions. Patients, in every way, are going to end up paying the price.”

A separate article in The Times 0f 23 September included comments by Campaign4Change whose spokesman said that if the Department of Health continues to spend money on NPfIT suppliers it will probably get poor value for money.

Comment:

Compare the remarks in The Times with those of David Nicholson, Chief Executive of the NHS and Senior Responsible Owner of the NPfIT who refused to agree to a request by 23 academics to have an independent review of the scheme. Nicholson could not contain his enthusiasm for the NPfIT when he told the Public Accounts Committee on 23 May 2011:

 “We spent about 20% of that resource [the £11.4bn projected total spend on the NPfIT] on the acute sector. The other 80% is providing services that literally mean life and death to patients today, and have done for the last period.

“So the Spine, and all those things, provides really, really important services for our patients. If you are going to talk about the totality of the [NPfIT] system … you have to accept that 80% of that programme has been delivered.”

It’s difficult to accept Nicholson’s figures. But even if we do, we’d have to say that the 20% that hasn’t been delivered was the main reason for the NPfIT: a national electronic health record which hasn’t materialised and isn’t likely to in the near future.

The contrasting comments of The Times and Nicholson’s are a reminder that the civil service hierarchy at the Department of Health operates in a world of its own, unanswerable to anyone, not even the Cabinet Office or Downing Street.

Can the Department of Health be trusted to oversee health informatics when it has such close relationships with major IT companies and consultants? While Katie Davis is in charge of health informatics there is at least an independent voice at the DH. But as an interim head of IT how long will she last? The DH has a history of not being keen on independent voices.

Nicholson: still positive after all these years.

NPfIT goes PfffT.

Beyond NPfIT.

Surge in tenders for non-NPfIT systems.

Agile for Universal Credit – a good choice says report

By Tony Collins

Universal Credit is one of  the government’s biggest IT-based projects and the biggest test for agile in the public sector. It is due to start rolling out in April 2013.

The choice of agile for the scheme is supported by a “Starting Gate” review which was carried out for the Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority, and for Terry Moran, the Director-General, Universal Credit at the Department for Work and Pensions. The review was carried out between 28 February 2011 and 4 March 2011.

This is what the Starting Gate report says on agile aspects of the project.

Agile

The challenging timetable for delivery of UC meant that DWP elected to use an Agile approach to the delivery. There is no evidence of such a methodology being used on a public sector programme of such scale and during the course of the review it was evident that there had been some initial scepticism to the use of such a methodology with a programme of this scale.

However, during the review there was overwhelming evidence of buy-in to the methodology at all levels up to and including the highest levels. DWP have set about thoroughly educating all involved on what can be expected from them and there was clear evidence within the interviews that this is being taken up enthusiastically.

There was a view that policy decisions being made later in the programme would pose a problem for delivery. This was countered by the view that the methodology should allow decisions to be made when they need to be made, which is in contrast to fixing requirements early in more traditional (‘waterfall’) methodologies.

On balance, the review team found that the use of the chosen methodology here was judged by interviewees to provide greater assurance of delivery in such an environment. The review team agrees with this finding.

In terms of the use of Agile within Government, DWP also have the best current experience via their Automated Service Delivery (ASD) Programme, which used a slightly less ‘lean’ version of the methodology based on an Accenture interpretation.

However, there are still valuable lessons that can be transferred from this programme and there exists experience that is being directly deployed on UC. The review team felt that whilst effectively piloting this methodology on a programme such as UC did pose a risk, this was acceptable in view of the risk of delivery out of line with expectations, for example in terms of timing or quality of service to the public.

Accenture remain involved in UC, although DWP have brought in consultants (Emergn) to provide an independent methodology not based on any ‘out of the box’ methodologies, but rather one that Emergn have tailored.

New contracts supporting this development are due to be awarded in June 2011 and DWP state that their use of this independent methodology will serve to remove any supplier advantage.

There was evidence that DWP have understood the need for decision-making delegated to the level at which the expertise exists, with the appropriate empowerment supported within the planned governance re-design.

There was also an acknowledgement that the right domain/business knowledge needs to be made available at the workshops that will drive the detailed design processes. It was also accepted that there is a continuing need for this knowledge to be made available and also that it will need to keep pace with the changing policy.

One key risk identified by DWP is how an Agile methodology will interact successfully with the various approvals processes that will come into play across the programme – most especially the ICT Spend Approval process (formally known as the ICT Moratorium Exception process).

Engagement has begun already with the Major Projects Authority (MPA) on designing the Integrated Assurance and Approval Plan (IAAP) that will ensure the correct internal and external assurance is brought to bear for the identified approval points. The production of this plan is seen by the review team as a key mitigating factor for the risk identified and it is recommended that this is produced, with MPA guidance, by the end of March 2011 at the latest. This may need fine-tuning as approval points are finally agreed.

Recommendation:

DWP, with guidance and assistance from the MPA, produces an Integrated Assurance and Approvals Plan (IAAP) by the end of March 2011.

As noted earlier, there are contracts that are relevant to this development that are being re-competed at this time, with a wish to award in June 2011. There was some evidence that the design of contracts to deliver in an Agile environment will require a different design in order to draw out supplier behaviour in line with an accelerated delivery environment.

There is a always the risk that any development methodology will fail to deliver and whilst this methodology itself provides early warning of failure, there is recognition that in such a circumstance the prioritisation of customer journeys with high-value returns would be needed.

There was much evidence of the reliance of UC on successful delivery of the HMRC PAYE Real-Time Information (RTI) programme. There was also recognition that whilst ‘just-in-time’ decisions as a consequence of policy development could be made within UC, the RTI requirement would need to be more rigidly fixed as the traditional ‘waterfall’ development methodology in use cannot so easily absorb such changes without consequence.

There was some concern that fraud would remain a major issue for UC and appropriate Information Assurance should be built into the requirement from the outset – rather than being a ‘bolt-on’. Also, as UC and its interface with PAYERTI [PAYE RTI] will become part of the UK Critical National Infrastructure, appropriate discussions should be maintained. There was evidence that DWP have gripped these requirements.

Overall, the use of an Agile methodology remains unproven at this scale and within UK Government; however, the challenging timescale does present DWP with few choices for delivery of such a radical programme.

That said, there has been evidence of strong support at all levels and DWP do have some expertise within their own organisation that they can call upon from the outset. The review team not only felt that an Agile development is an appropriate choice given the constraints, they also believe that DWP are well placed with their level of support, knowledge and enthusiasm to act as a pilot for its use at such a scale.

Compound failure

DWP has made a strong start in identifying risks to delivery.   This could be developed further by thinking through the likelihood and impact of a number of risks being realised simultaneously (eg lack of synchronisation between reduced income and UC top-up, plus wrong employer data plus labour market downturn).and what the responses might be.

The programme could extend its preparedness by drawing on a wider range of experience the elements of recovery and their prioritisation; and test their robustness in advance, including an early warning system for Ministers.

Agile and Universal Credit – Secret report.

Agile can fix failed GovIT says lawyer.

Mutuals: IT group’s white paper response warns of risk of ‘fragmented and disconnected IT systems’

By David Bicknell

In its response to the Open Public Services White Paper, Socitm,  the association for all IT professionals working in local authorities and the public and third sectors, has said it welcomes the prescription for strong local government set out in the White Paper.

“Greater freedoms from central control, devolution of functions, funding following the individual, power and control to neighbourhoods, enhanced local democracy, community budgets and commissioning combine to create a vision of the future” consistent with its own strategy for IT-enabled local public service reform launched by earlier this year.”

But, it argues, “this liberating, optimistic future is at variance with much of the current commentary about the future of local public services which is based on analysis of the likely impact of actual policies that have been put in place.”

For example, it says, the recent NLGN report, Future Councils, envisages four types of council emerging by 2020:

Clustered – federations of local authorities sharing many services;

Residual – councils that have followed strategic commissioning to its logical conclusion, divesting themselves of all direct service provision;

Commercial – entrepreneurial councils, selling services to other local authorities and the private sector;

Lifestyle – local authorities which establish a particular brand for their area and focus their energies on promoting that brand.

Socitm’s view is that all these models would have a detrimental impact on the ability of local politicians to shape local services in response to local needs in the ways envisaged in the Open Public Services White Paper. None, it argues, would enthuse local government employees with a sense of purpose nor, consequently, commitment to the proposals presented.

It insists that it is not arguing for maintaining the status quo. On the contrary, it says, change is essential if the relationship between the public and public service is to be rebuilt. Reform would be founded upon greater collaboration, redesign and innovation in which local public services organisations continually renew themselves. Local authorities would play a key role by becoming ‘reforming’ councils.

However, Socitm doesn’t appear to be too keen on mutuals and new service providers playing a role. Its response says, “Reforming councils recognise that much of their ability to transform is enabled by developments in information handling and technology deployment. Merely implementing technology is not in itself the change needed. Fundamental changes to processes, organisational structures, job roles and cultures are also required across localities and public service organisations. This will be essential if citizens and neighbourhoods are to be empowered, rather than confronted by a plethora of fragmented and disconnected information systems run by mutuals and other new and existing service providers.”

In the past, Socitm has criticised central government ICT strategies for being too focused on central government and for failing to include local government effectively enough in its thinking.

Socitm says, “Socitm supports the principle of anytime, anywhere, any place availability of public services referenced in section 7.9 of the White Paper.

“The new Government Digital Service (GDS) is presented as the agency that will drive this development. However, the scope of the GDS, as set out in the White Paper, spans central government only; this is at odds with our understanding that the intention of GDS is to cover all public services.

“Four billion of the five billion citizen-government transactions that take place annually are estimated to involve local public services. Consequently, devolution of central government services and their digital delivery will require close integration with local public services if they are to make any sense to the citizen and other service users in localities.

“This issue not mentioned in the White Paper and Socitm is aware of a number of current initiatives supporting distributed service access and digital by default where the centralist, top-down, large scale, standardised, single supplier approach to implementation continues to dominate.

“The hugely important ID authentication and Universal Credit projects fall into this category – local public services have not yet been consulted on these projects despite the extensive experience and know-how they have in establishing service users‟ identities and of taking benefits to the most vulnerable and excluded in our society.”

Why the public sector must stop buying printers

In the first in a series of Campaign4Change guest insights, Tracey Rawling Church, Director of Brand and Reputation at Kyocera Mita UK explains what steps the public sector needs to take to transform its procurement of printers and make its ITTs more cost efficient and low-carbon friendly

To cut its costs and carbon emissions, the public sector should stop buying printers. That may seem a ridiculous statement, coming from an imaging company executive, but actually there’s a serious point here. Most ITTs are written around a notional product – calling for a certain number of machines of a certain specification. And the tender process is quite rigid, so companies invited to tender are forced to propose a solution that fits the criteria in the ITT.

But in many organisations, the number of devices has crept up over time and device to user ratios are unnecessarily high – so replacing machines on a one-for-one basis only perpetuates a system that has become bloated and inefficient.

Sometimes the decision is made to consolidate devices, replacing desktop printers with shared multifunctional devices and an ITT is written on that basis, but to achieve real efficiencies that could reduce costs by typically 30% and carbon by as much as half, a detailed print audit should be undertaken to determine precisely what hardware is needed at which locations to support business processes.

However, even this approach misses the opportunity to obtain a solution that is properly optimised not just at the point of implementation, but into the future.

In the private sector, there is a growing trend towards managed document services, a holistic approach that encompasses every aspect of the printing and imaging needs of an organisation.

A managed document service project begins with a detailed audit of both the machines currently in place and the document flows through and within the organisation. Then a solution is designed that aims to reduce reliance on hard copy by combining document management software with a fleet of machines that have exactly the right functionality to support the document flow.

In most cases, this results in a much smaller number of devices, usually with more extensive functionality than those they replace. A bespoke service contract is crafted that includes remote monitoring of device states, service support to agreed service levels and detailed reporting of device use that can be segmented and analysed in a myriad of ways. And using the business intelligence gained from the reporting suite, the service can be continuously optimised to ensure it remains efficient, accommodating changes in the organisation over time.

For example, the managed document solution provided for insurance giant RSA has reduced paper consumption by 21% in just one year – despite the fact that their product depends on having a printed certificate. And energy consumed by imaging devices has been reduced by 55% with resulting savings in both electricity costs and CRC levies.

As you can imagine, this type of service doesn’t fit easily into a device-centric ITT. So vendors who know they could save cash and carbon through applying a managed document service are forced to respond with a ’round peg, square hole’ solution that is less than ideal, simply because the tender process focuses on products rather than outcomes.

Concerns about carbon emissions and resource scarcity are driving the evolution of innovative business models that overturn conventional norms and challenge the status quo. But unless procurement processes keep pace with these changes, the benefits of this fresh thinking won’t be realised.

To really drive through change, let’s have ITTs written by commercial managers and procurement departments that focus on objectives and targets rather than feeds and speeds. Throw down a challenge to reduce paper consumption by x, cut energy use by y% and drive down costs by z and see what the industry comes up with. I guarantee it will deliver solutions that are more resource efficient, productive and economical.

Events: http://www.kyoceramita.co.uk/index/events.html

MDS in the public sector http://www.kyoceramita.co.uk/index/mds/mds_in_the_public.html
RSA case study
For more information on the full results of the latest independent research into printing attitudes and behaviour,  email Tracey Rawling Church: trc@kyoceramita.co.uk

Investors’ writ against CSC on NHS contracts – more detail

By Tony Collins

The Guardian has published the 123-page writ against CSC by lawyers acting behalf of some of the supplier’s investors. The writ contains many allegations against CSC and named directors. The company’s response is that it is corporate policy not to discuss litigation.

The legal action appears to have been based, in part, on CSC’s poor share price, which is today near a five-year low, and the supplier’s repeated positive statements and assurances on the performance of its NHS IT contracts and its iSoft Lorenzo software

These are some of the claims made in the document:

– Lorenzo was originally designed by iSoft as a one-size-fits-all software for use in local medical practices. “However, the UK healthcare system is highly diverse, ranging from large university hospitals to small private medical practices to prison medical facilities. Thus, according to the Deputy Head of Testing for Lorenzo, Lorenzo was never the correct software for the job. Lorenzo therefore required significant development before it could be deployed throughout the UK’s healthcare system.”

– In September 2008, after years of delays in Lorenzo’s development [CSC] sent a Delivery Assurance Review Team to England to assess the development and testing of Lorenzo. In mid-September, the Testing Review Team met with the Deputy Head of Testing for Lorenzo, a CSC employee from December 2007 until April 2011. The Deputy Head of Testing told the Testing Review Team that the level of testing and test results for Lorenzo was “abysmal,” and that the various releases on which the project was based could not be delivered on time. Subsequently [a CSC employee] told the Deputy Head of Testing to “shut up,” which he took to mean that he should not further criticise the quality of the testing nor the testing results.

– The Deputy Head of Testing claimed that the Lorenzo software was rife with severe defects that were unacceptable under the NHS Contract. The Deputy Head of Testing said that the software defects were subject to the following ratings: Severity Level I: the defect cause important part of the Lorenzo system to fail. Severity Level II: similar to Severity I, but the defect has a workaround. Severity Level III: the defect is an important defect, but one that would not stop the system from functioning. Severity Level IV: defect is a minor defect and would not impact the Lorenzo system’s function, but would be a nuisance to a software user.

– According to the Deputy Head of Testing, throughout 2008 and 2009, the level of Severity I and II defects in every release of Lorenzo was “high and grossly beyond” what the NHS would accept. According to the Deputy Head of Testing, while CSC publicly reported that it had met certain delivery milestones and therefore could recognize revenue, CSC’s statements in this respect were misleading in view of the software defects detailed above.

– CSC said in November 12, 2008, when analysts asked about missed deadlines, that “Our confidence continues to build on the program. We are pleased with our progress.”

–  In financial statements CSC continued to assert that the NHS contract was profitable and the Company expected to recover its investment.

– Shortly before the Deputy Head of Testing retired from CSC in early April 2011, he sent an email directly to a CSC director, copying several other CSC executives, in which he said ‘You hope that you will succeed by August 2011. I do too but you won’t. The project is on a death-march where almost as many defects are being introduced as are being fixed.”

–  by 2006 CSC had determined that it had no believable plan for delivering on the NHS Contract and should not have booked revenue under the contract from that point forward.

– The significance of the NHS Contract to CSC “placed the project squarely in the spotlight of Wall Street analysts”.

–  CSC “continuously denied media reports critical of CSC’s performance of the contract”

CSC is expected to file its response to the allegations in due course.

CSC sued on losses over disastrous NHS contracts – Observer

CSC class action – document in full on Guardian’s website

CSC repays £170m to DH after non-signing of MoU

By Tony Collins

CSC reports today that it has repaid to the Department of Health £170m of a £200m advance it received earlier this year for NHS IT work that was due to be carried out under a memorandum of understanding.

The MoU was not signed as had been expected by 30 September 2011, so CSC has repaid the money.

But the Department of Health has entered into an “extended advance payment agreement” with CSC for £24m.

In a statement dated 3 October 2011 CSC has also disclosed that uncertainty continues over the future of its NPfIT contracts that are worth about £3bn.

It says that it is having a series of meetings with the NHS and Cabinet Office officials over the “next several weeks” and adds that: “there can be no assurance that the MOU [memorandum of understanding] will be approved nor, if it is approved, what final terms will be negotiated and included in the MOU”.

The statement relates to CSC’s negotiations with the Department of Health and the Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority over a draft memorandum of understanding that proposes cutting the cost to taxpayers of CSC’s contracts by about £800m but would cut back planned deployments of Lorenzo by nearly two thirds and could nearly double the cost of each remaining deployment. One Cabinet Office official has described the terms of the memorandum of understanding as unacceptable.

CSC says today that “progress is continuing in development and deployment projects under the contract in cooperation with the NHS, although progress has been constrained due to the uncertainty created by the government approval process”.

It adds:

“Humber NHS Foundation Trust has been confirmed as the early adopter for mental health functionality to replace Pennine Care Mental Health Trust, which withdrew as an early adopter in April 2011, and CSC and the NHS are preparing to formally document this replacement under the contract.

“On April 1, 2011, pursuant to the company’s Local Service Provider contract, the NHS made an advance payment to the company of £200m related to the forecasted charges expected by the company during fiscal year 2012.

“The amount of this advance payment contemplated the scope and deployment schedule expected under the MOU and the parties had anticipated that the MOU would be completed and contract amendment negotiations would be underway by September 30, 2011.

“… the advance payment agreement provided the NHS the option to require repayment of the advance payment if the parties were not progressing satisfactorily toward completion of the expected contract amendment by September 30, 2011.

“Because completion of the MOU has been subject to delays in government approvals and, as a result, contract amendment negotiations have not progressed, the NHS required the company to repay approximately £170m of the April 1, 2011 advance payment on September 30, 2011, and the company agreed and made the repayment as requested.

“Also on September 30, 2011, the NHS and the company entered into an extended advance payment agreement providing for an advance payment of approximately £24m to the company in respect of certain forecasted charges for the company’s fiscal year 2012.

“The extended advance payment agreement acknowledges that the company’s Local Service Provider contract, as varied by the parties in 2010, is subject to ongoing discussions between the parties with the intention of entering into a memorandum of understanding setting out the commercial principles for a further set of updated agreements.

“The company intends to discuss the extended advance payment structure and certain fiscal year 2012 deployment charges with the NHS in connection with the MOU negotiations.

“However, there can be no assurance that the parties will enter into the MOU or that the company’s forecasted charges under the contract for the remainder of fiscal year 2012 will not be materially adversely affected as a result of the delay in completing the MOU and the related contract amendment.”

Meanwhile some investors of CSC have taken legal action against the company.

.

Making the right noises about the social economy

By David Bicknell

Andrew Tyrie’s comments about the Big Society perhaps haven’t been overwhelmingly helpful when it comes to promoting  the growing role of mutuals and co-operatives. Hopefully when David Cameron gives his keynote speech at the Conservative Party Conference in Manchester on Wednesday, he’ll have some more  positive things to say about open public services, and specifically something about the well-flagged funding and procurement issues.

These issues have been well summed up in two recent blogs I came across by Craig Dearden-Phillips, and by Matthew Taylor from the RSA. They’re worth a read.

Investors sue CSC

By Tony Collins

The Observer reported yesterday that some CSC investors are suing the company, saying it was giving assurances about the “Lorenzo” software when it had been warned that the software project was on a “death march”.

According to the class action complaint, which was brought on behalf of a number of investors led by a major Canadian fund, the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, CSC knew in May 2008, through reports and testing, that Lorenzo was “dysfunctional and undeliverable”.

The complaint cites one member of an internal CSC “delivery assurance review team” which visited the UK and India, where Lorenzo was developed, in early 2008.

He said the team were consistent in the message that CSC could not meet its deadline. “We could not deliver the solution set that we had contracted with the NHS.”

The review team member added that, at the time, “costs were building up on the balance sheet and the project was behind schedule”. The review team knew that the contract was a loser and CSC should have recognised a loss in 2008, according to The Observer, quoting the team member.

Lorenzo’s deputy head of testing told a second delivery review team that test results were “abysmal”. According to court filings, the test official was later told by his boss to “shut up”, which he took to mean he should no longer criticise testing.

Shortly before retiring in April this year, the deputy head of testing emailed CSC chief executive Michael Laphen saying: “The project is on a death march where almost as many defects are being introduced as are being fixed. Look at the defects reports.” Despite these internal concerns, CSC told investors that Lorenzo and CSC’s work for the NHS was on track.

Investors said they dismissed negative media reports on the basis of reassurances from CSC that the NHS work was on track, making significant progres in testing, and receiving positive feedback from the NHS. In response to press coverage, CSC is said to have told investors: “The press speculated wildly and inaccurately on the status of the NHS programme.”

CSC has made no statement.

Lorenzo is the main NPfIT product to be delivered and deployed to NHS trusts by CSC under contracts worth about £3bn. The Cabinet Office and the Department of Health are negotiating with CSC to continue or drop Whitehall’s commitments to CSC Lorenzo deployments.

CSC’s share price today stood at $26.85,  close to a five-year low.

Class action document – Guardian website

Simon Bowers’ article in The Observer

 

 

Agile and Universal Credit – secret report

By Tony Collins

Below are excerpts  from the supposedly confidential “Starting Gate” report by the Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority on Universal Credit.

The main finding is that, despite inherent challenges, “the programme can deliver Universal Credit”.

Media reports on Universal Credit have depicted the scheme as an impending disaster that may blight the coalition in the run-up to the next general election, but the Authority’s report says the programme has got off to an impressively strong start.

This will encourage advocates of agile in government as Universal Credit is the Government’s biggest agile development.

We requested the Starting Gate report on Universal Credit under the Freedom of Information Act but the Department for Work and Pensions refused to release it; and turned down our appeal.

We obtained the report outside the FOI Act, via the House of Commons Library. It appears that one part of the DWP was trying to keep the report secret while another part had released it to two Parliamentary committees [the Public Accounts Committee and the Public Administration Select Committee].

It may be that the DWP, when it comes to FOI, doesn’t know clearly what it’s doing – or is all but indifferent to the FOI Act and chooses secrecy to keep things simple. The DWP’s FOI reply to us was, at best, in  perfunctory compliance with the FOI Act. It made no attempt to set out the arguments for its decision not to disclose the report, other than to say disclosure was not in the public interest.

The Starting Gate  report was dated March 2011 and was largely positive about the start of the Universal Credit . These were some of the findings.

Deliverability

“The review team finds that the Programme has got off to an impressively strong start given the demanding timetable and complexity of the design and interdependency with other departments.

“This involves liaison with HMRC in particular, but also with CLG and local government in respect of the replacement of Housing Benefit as part of the Universal Credit.

“We found that the foundations for a delivery Programme are in place – clear policy objectives, a coherent strategy, Ministerial and top management support, financial and human resources – with no obvious gaps.

“The strong working relationship with HMRC and the inclusive approach with other key stakeholders within and outside DWP have quickly established a high level of common understanding.  All this gives a high degree of confidence that, notwithstanding the inherent challenges, the programme can deliver Universal Credit.

“There is a greater degree of uncertainty around the achievability of the intended economic outcomes because of factors which are not within DWP’s control e.g. the general state of the economy and availability of jobs.

“There are other risks which derive from trying new approaches: the Agile methodology offers much promise but it is unproven on this scale and scope.  The actual response of different customer groups to UC may pose a risk to its transformational impact if, for example, factors other than net pay turned out to be a greater barrier to take up of work than expected.

“The development of a range of approaches to contingency planning (which could be beyond changes to UC) could cover off unintended customer behaviour, whether ‘no change’, or ‘change for the worse’.”

Campaign4Change will publish more excepts next week.

Links:

Agile can fix failed Gov’t IT says lawyer

DWP FOI team hides Universal Credit report

Universal Credit – guaranteed to fail?

DWP gives IBM and Capgemini 60 application maintenance and development apps

DWP partners with IBM to help deliver Universal Credit