Category Archives: npfit

CSC NPfIT deal is a crucial test of coalition strength

By Tony Collins

Comment:

The Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority has intervened in NHS Connecting for Health’s running of the NPfIT.

In particular the Authority has taken a role in the negotiations between CSC and the Department over the future of about £3bn worth of local service provider contracts.

Had the Authority not intervened a memorandum of understanding between CSC and the DH is likely to have been signed several months ago. Fortunately for taxpayers a deal wasn’t signed.

According to a leaked Cabinet office memo the deal would have been poor value for money. It would have cut £700m or more from the cost of CSC’s contracts but doubled the cost to taxpayers of the remaining deployments.

The Cabinet Office memo said the “offer [from CSC] is unattractive”. It added:

“This is because the unit price of deployment per Trust under offer roughly doubles the cost of each deployment from the original contract”.

It could be said that signing such a deal with CSC would be as naive as a shopkeeper asking a Cadbury wholesaler to change his order from 100 chocolate bars to 30, and thus agreeing to paying Cadbury double the price for each bar.

Now it transpires that the official within the Cabinet Office who wrote the memo expressing concern about CSC’s offer is leaving. This could imply that an “unattractive” deal between the Department of Health over Lorenzo will go through after all.

Indeed the Cabinet Office has published its assessment of the NPfIT – the “Major Projects Authority Programme Assessment Review of the National Programme for IT” – which includes a section on CSC that suggests a new deal with the supplier may be signed, even though critics say the NPfIT contract with CSC should be “parked” with no further action taken on it.

The DH has accused CSC of breach of contract and vice versa. A legal dispute can be avoided by parking the contract with the agreement of both sides. If the DH signs a new deal with CSC it will be a sign that the intervention of the Cabinet Office has come to little or nothing.  It will also be a sign of coalition weakness. If the coalition cannot have an effect on a deal the DH has long wanted to sign with CSC when can it effect in terms of central government reform?

This is the worrying  section in the report – dated June 2010 – of the Major Projects Authority:

“… if the decision is taken to allow the Lorenzo development and deployments to continue there needs to be a considerable strengthening of the renegotiated position first to give CSC the opportunity to step up to its failings and for a clear statement of obligations on all parties and a viable and deliverable plan to be created and adhered to.

“There is no certainty that CSC would deliver fully in the remaining time of the contract, but the terms of the renegotiation could enable them to have a completed Lorenzo product which can compete in the market which replaces Local Service Providers…”

Other parts of the Major Projects Authority report are highly critical of Lorenzo. It says that in the North, Midlands and East of England there have been “major delays in the development of …Lorenzo”. As a result of the delays “interim and legacy systems have been used to maintain operational capability”.

The report also says the “productisation of Lorenzo is not mature” and adds: “This is evidenced by the fact that bespoke code changes are still being used in response to requirements from the early adopter trusts. This issue will be exacerbated if the remaining product development (of the modules referred to as Deployment Units) is not completed before future implementation roll-outs commence.”

The report says there is a need to be “certain about the capacity and capability of CSC to furnish sufficient skilled resources to undertake the level of roll-out needed to satisfy the existing schedule”.

It continues: “During the review it was mentioned that on occasion, people needed to leave the Morecambe Bay activity to go to the Birmingham installation at short notice to resolve problems. At this stage of the programme, CSC skills, schedule and utilisation rate, including leveraged resources, should be available to support a proposed roll-out schedule…”

There is still a “significant degree of uncertainty both about the planning of [Lorenzo] implementations and also the capability of the solution. The four key trusts chosen to implement the Lorenzo solution are in very different situations. University Hospitals Morecombe Bay is close to sign-off whilst Pennines Trust has stated its desire to leave the programme. Birmingham Women’s Hospital Trust is being held back by one issue which views have suggested are about a difference of opinion with the Supplier believing that they have met the Deployment Verification Criteria whilst the Trust is not happy about the level of functionality delivered. Connecting for Health expect to resolve this difference of opinion soon.”

And the MPA report says the latest implementation of Lorenzo 1.9 is “a long way short of the full functionality of the contracted solution which has four stages of functionality and is intended to be rolled currently out to 221 trusts”.

Lorenzo was originally due to have been delivered by the end of 2005.  If, after all the MPA’s criticisms, a new Lorenzo deal is signed what will this say about the ability of the Cabinet Office to influence decisions of civil servants?

In 2006 an internal, confidential report of CSC and Accenture on the state of Lorenzo and its future was positive in parts but listed a multitude of concerns. The summary included these words: “…there is no well-defined scope and therefore no believable plan for releases beyond Lorenzo GP…”

The current outdated NPfIT deal with CSC should be set aside , and no further action taken on it by both sides. CSC will continue to have a strong presence in NHS IT, at least because many trusts that have installed iSoft software will need upgrades.

But if a new NPfIT deal is signed with CSC it will greatly undermine the credibility of the Cabinet Office’s attempts to effect major change on the machinery of departmental administration; and it could help consign the so-called reforms of central government to the dustbin marked  “aspirations”. It will certainly give ammunition to the coalition’s critics. The Government has said it is dismantling the NPfIT. It didn’t say it was prolonging it.

NPfIT: NHS CE is still positive after all these years

By Tony Collins

 Last week the Department of Health announced the dismantling of the NPfIT. In the Department’s press release the comments of Francis Maude, Minister for the Cabinet Office, were harsh.

“The National Programme for IT embodies the type of unpopular top-down programme that has been imposed on front-line NHS staff in the past,” said Maude.

Not quite in accord with these sentiments is a letter that has been sent out by the Department of Health’s top civil servant Sir David Nicholson the Chief Executive of the NHS. Nicholson is the Senior Responsible Owner of the NPfIT. The letter sums up the current state of the NPfIT without a word of criticism of the scheme.

“The National Programme has provided us with a foundation, but we now need to move to more local decision making if we are going to truly unlock the potential of information to drive improvements for patients and achieve the efficiency and effectiveness required in today’s health service,” says Nicholson.

Having taken on the job in 2006, Nicholson was not responsible for the NPfIT – which was founded in 2002 – but he was appointed by Labour in part to promote the scheme within the NHS.

His positive view of the NPfIT remains a little out of step with the coalition’s criticisms. But Nicholson is part of the permanent civil service and ministers hold office temporarily. It’s easy to get the impression that senior officials see their ministers this way.

Nicholson’s stance reflects the view of senior civil servants that the NPfIT has been a success. Nicholson was party to a briefing in February 2007 of the then Prime Minister Tony Blair on the state of the NPfIT. The briefing paper was entitled “NPfIT Programme Stocktake and said  “ … much of the programme is complete with software delivered to time and to budget.”

In fact much of the National Programme is incomplete, late and the costs far exceed the original budgets, according to the Public Accounts Committee. Nicholson was knighted in 2009.

This is his letter last week to NHS chief executives on the “National Programme for IT and the latest steps to no longer run it as a centralised programme” …

Dear Colleague

In September 2010, we announced that the National Programme for IT (NPfIT) would no longer be run as a centralised programme and today I am writing to update you about the renewed steps being taken to achieve that change.

A modernised NHS needs information systems that are driven by what patients and clinicians want. Restoring local control over decision-making and enabling greater choice for NHS organisations is key as we continue to use the secure exchange of information to drive up quality and safety.

We are undertaking a review, led by Katie Davis, Managing Director for Informatics, of the full portfolio of Department of Health informatics applications and services to determine how we will take this work forward. I expect this to conclude and report in the Autumn. Alongside this, we are introducing new governance arrangements to support local decision-making, which we expect to be in place in the Autumn.

It is important to be clear that this review will build on the substantial achievements that have now been firmly established and are delivering real benefits to patients. Applications and services such as the Spine, N3 Network, NHSmail, Choose and Book, Secondary Uses Service and Picture Archiving and Communications Service will all carry on providing vital support to the NHS. Similarly, key national applications such as the Summary Care Record and the Electronic Prescription Service will continue to develop in line with our commitment to give patients real information and choice about their care.

We are working in partnership with Intellect, the Technology Trade Association, to develop proposals for how we can stimulate the healthcare IT and technology marketplace in future, to offer greater choice of supplier to local NHS organisations, while still achieving value for money across the service.

The National Programme has provided us with a foundation, but we now need to move to more local decision making if we are going to truly unlock the potential of information to drive improvements for patients and achieve the efficiency and effectiveness required in today’s health service.

Yours sincerely

Sir David

Comment:

There is no doubt that Nicholson’s actions are guided by sincerity and integrity. But his letter is a reminder that it is the civil servants that are in charge of Whitehall, not the ministers. The National Audit Office has exposed the blight on NHS IT of the National Programme for IT, as has the Public Accounts Committee and many others including academics.

Nicholson’s voice is the only one that really counts, though.

His views are in line with the institutional resistance in Whitehall to admit mistakes when anything undertaken by the civil service goes wrong. Senior civil servants who preside over failures and defend them in the face of outside criticism  – particularly criticism from MPs and the media – are much more likely to be knighted than those that share the concerns of outsiders.

Andrew Lansley should take control of his civil servants, which may set a precedent for a secretary of state, Department of Health. If this is beyond Lansley,  Francis Maude and Cameron should seek to exercise more control of the department.

Until ministers run the civil service, not vice-versa, reforms of central government IT, or indeed any major change in the machinery of government will not happen. All the signs are that senior civil servants are biding their time until after the next election when, they hope, reforms of government will have run out of steam. If the reforms fizzle out a great opportunity will have been lost.

NPfIT to be dismantled brick by brick

NPfIT to be “dismantled” – brick by brick

By Tony Collins

A Department of Health press release issued this morning is headlined:

                        Dismantling the NHS National Programme for IT

I asked a senior official at the Department what is new in the announcement. The official’s diplomatic reply was simply: “I am not sure how to answer that.”

There is nothing new. There is no evidence in the press release of the Department’s claim that the NPfIT is being dismantled. Negotiations continue with CSC over its £3bn worth of NPfIT contracts and BT’s deals will remain in place.

Spending on the NPfIT has been about £6.4bn so far – and about £4bn has yet to be spent. The Government has succeeded in persuading some in the general public that the NPfIT is dead. The Daily Mail’s front page has the headline:

                                £12bn NHS Computer System is Scrapped

The online version of the story has had more than 460 comments, which suggests it has been widely read.

The actual announcement gives a hint of the conflicting views among civil service and ministers. The first paragraph of the Department of Health’s press release says the NPfIT is being dismantled and the second paragraph praises the scheme.

“The government today announced an acceleration of the dismantling of the National Programme for IT, following the conclusions of a new review by the Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority (MPA). The programme was created in 2002 under the last government and the MPA has concluded that it is not fit to provide the modern IT services that the NHS needs. In May 2011 the Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons that the MPA would be reviewing the NHS National Programme for IT. 

 “The MPA found that there have been substantial achievements which are now firmly established, such as the Spine, N3 Network, NHSmail, Choose and Book, Secondary Uses Service and Picture Archiving and Communications Service.  Their delivery accounts for around two thirds of the £6.4bn money spent so far and they will continue to provide vital support to the NHS. However, the review reported the National Programme for IT has not and cannot deliver to its original intent.”

The signs are that the scheme will be dismantled brick by brick – and will be almost completely dismantled by the time the NPfIT contracts with BT and CSC expire in 2013 and 2014.  The coalition has achieved a PR coup with the Daily Mail story because the public has the impression that in these austere times a £12bn NHS IT scheme initiated by Labour has been scrapped.

The reality is that nothing has changed.

Department of Health announcement

End of NPfIT? – Campaign4Change on BBC R4 Today programme

By Tony Collins

Link to Campaign4Change audio on BBC R4 Today programme

BBC Radio 4’s Today programme this morning reported a Daily Mail article that the National Programme for IT in the NHS is being scrapped and that a coalition announcement is to be made this morning.

The Mail says that the money spent on the NPfIT would pay for 60,000 nurses for a decade, and that the scheme will be replaced by a “cheaper alternative”.

It says that there will be a new urgency in “dismantling the scheme”. Campaign4Change told the BBC R4 Today programme this morning that the NPfIT is not being scrapped and that about £4bn has yet to be spent on it. It said that trusts have the freedom to buy their own IT systems but using their budgets. The NPfIT will continue to provide Cerner and Lorenzo systems that are subsidised centrally, which gives the NHS an incentive to continue using NPfIT.

There is a difference of opinion within Whitehall over the NPfIT: that the Cabinet Office takes a rigorously independent view of the NPfIT and wants to wind it down. The Department of Health’s civil servants at a press conference last year justified the spend on the programme and said the contracts with CSC and BT would continue.  Campaign4Change told Today that the Cabinet Office should have the final say, not the Department of Health.

The Government clearly wishes it to be known that the NPfIT is being scrapped but that is not what is happening in practice. Contracts with CSC, which at present are worth about £3.2bn, are unlikely to be scrapped because of the compensation that would have to be paid to the supplier. The contracts may be cut back  by about £800m, though the cost of deployments remaining may double. BT’s contracts worth more than £1bn are also likely to remain.

The Daily Mail says the NPfIT will be “replaced with cheaper regional alternatives” and that the Coalition will “today announce it is putting a halt to years of scandalous waste of taxpayers’ money on a system that never worked”.

“Following an official review, the ‘one size fits all’ IT project will be replaced by much cheaper regional initiatives, with hospitals and GPs choosing the IT system they need.

“And a new national watchdog will be established to ensure such huge sums can never again be thrown away on uncosted projects.”

The decision to accelerate the dismantling of the scheme has been made by Health Secretary Andrew Lansley and Francis Maude, the Minister for the Cabinet Office, says the Mail.

It quotes from what appears to be a leaked memo from the Major Projects Authority of the Cabinet Office which has been reviewing CSC’s contracts.

“The authority said the IT scheme, set up in 2002, is not fit to provide services to the NHS – which as part of austerity measures has to make savings of £20billion by 2014/15.

It concluded: ‘There can be no confidence that the programme has delivered or can be delivered as originally conceived.’

The report is said to recommend that the Government  “dismember the programme and reconstitute it under new management and organisation arrangements”.

It added: “The project has not delivered in line with the original intent as targets on dates, functionality, usage and levels of benefit have been delayed and reduced.

“It is not possible to identify a documented business case for the whole of the programme.Unless the work is refocused it is hard to see how the perception can ever be shifted from the faults of the past and allowed to progress effectively to support the delivery of effective healthcare.”

Daily Mail article on the NPfIT today

Department of Health announcement

Firecontrol: same mistakes repeated on other projects

By Tony Collins

A report published today by the Public Accounts Committee on the £469m Firecontrol project reads much like its others on government IT-enabled project disasters.

Margaret Hodge, chair of the Committee said:

“This is one of the worst cases of project failure that the committee has seen in many years. FiReControl was an ambitious project with the objectives of improving national resilience, efficiency and technology by replacing the control room functions of 46 local Fire and Rescue Services in England with a network of nine purpose-built regional control centres using a national computer system.

“The project was launched in 2004, but following a series of delays and difficulties, was terminated in December 2010 with none of the original objectives achieved and a minimum of £469m being wasted.

“The project was flawed from the outset, as the Department attempted, without sufficient mandatory powers, to impose a single, national approach on locally accountable Fire and Rescue Services who were reluctant to change the way they operated.

“Yet rather than engaging with the Services to persuade them of the project’s merits, the Department excluded them from decisions about the design of the regional control centres and the proposed IT solution, even though these decisions would leave local services with potential long-term costs and residual liabilities to which they had not agreed.

“The Department launched the project too quickly, driven by its wider aims to ensure a better co-ordinated national response to national disasters, such as terrorist attacks, rail crashes or floods. The Department also wanted to encourage and embed regional government in England.

“But it acted without applying basic project approval checks and balances – taking decisions  before a business case, project plan or procurement strategy had been developed and tested amongst Fire Services. The result was hugely unrealistic forecast costs and savings, naïve over-optimism on the deliverability of the IT solution and under- appreciation or mitigation of the risks. The Department demonstrated poor judgement in approving the project and failed to provide appropriate checks and challenge.

“The fundamentals of project management continued to be absent as the project proceeded. So the new fire control centres were constructed and completed whilst there was considerable delay in even awarding the IT contract, let alone developing the essential IT infrastructure.

Consultants made up over half the management team (costing £69m by 2010) but were not managed. The project had convoluted governance arrangements, with a lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities. There was a high turnover of senior managers although none have been held accountable for the failure.  The committee considers this to be an extraordinary failure of leadership. Yet no individuals have been held accountable for the failure and waste associated with this project.”

Comment:

Firecontrol was a politically-motivated project which used  bricks, mortar and IT to try and change the way people worked. The users in the fire service didn’t want a single national approach of nine new regional centres – complete with new hardware and software – just as NHS clinicians, in general, did not want the National Programme for IT [NPfIT]. The Firecontrol regional centres were built anyway and the NPfIT went ahead anyway.

One lesson is that, in the public sector, you cannot engage users who won’t support the scheme. If they want to change, and they want the new IT, they’ll find ways to overcome the technology’s deficiencies. If they don’t want the scheme – and fire personnel did not want Firecontrol – the end-users will be incorrigibly harsh evaluators of what’s delivered, and not delivered.

It’s better to get the support of users, and involve them in the prototype design and test implementations, long before the scheme is finalised. It’s different in the private sector because the support of users is not essential – those who don’t accept business change and the associated IT will be expected to quit.

So what today is the mistake that is being repeated? The Public Accounts Committee touched on it when it said that the Department for Communities and Local Government – which was responsible for Firecontrol –  “failed to provide appropriate checks and challenge”.

During the life of Firecontrol, the Office of Government Commerce carried out “Gateway reviews” which independently assessed progress or otherwise. The reviews  could have provided an early warning of a project that was about to waste hundreds of millions of pounds. But the Gateway review reports were not published. They had a limited internal distribution and, it appears, were ignored.

According to the Public Accounts Committee, a Gateway review in April 2004, near the start of the Firecontrol project, said the scheme was in poor condition overall and at significant risk of failing to deliver.

Why was this Gateway review not published? If it had, Parliament and the media could have held ministers to account – and perhaps have campaigned to stop the project before millions were thrown away.

There was indeed a media campaign in 2004 – and before – to have Gateway reviews published, but ministers – and particularly civil servants – said no.

Now the same thing is happening. The civil service has persuaded the coalition government to carry on Labour’s tradition of keeping Gateway reviews secret. So Parliament and the media will continue to be kept in the dark on whether a major project is going wrong.

By the time details of the reviews are published, perhaps years later in a report of the National Audit Office,  it may be too late to rescue the scheme. By then tens or hundreds of millions may have been wasted. Gateway reviews should be published around the time they are written, not years later.

Ministers do not have to pander to civil servants. They are paid to stand up to them. They receive a premium over the salary of MPs in part to be independent voices – to provide a challenge.

Subservient ministers in the DWP are among those who continue to allow Gateway reviews to remain hidden. If you ask the DWP under the Freedom of Information Act for the release of the Starting Gate report on Universal Credit (which I am told is not the same as a Gateway review report) the DWP will refuse your request. It refused mine.

So we have to accept the word of civil servants that the Universal Credit programme is going well; but haven’t there been enough IT-related disasters in government for all to know that the word of civil servants on whether things are going well needs to be tested independently? The publication of Gateway reviews – and Starting Gate reviews – could help outsiders hold a department to account. It’s time ministers began to realise this.

Are ministers such as Iain Duncan Smith in control of their departments – or are their civil servants in control of them?

Links:

Margaret Hodge on BBC “Today” programme 20/9/11 – “what could go wrong did go wrong” – did PA Consulting get away without blame?

What the NPfIT and Firecontrol have in common.

Firecontrol:  should PA Consulting share some responsibility for what happened?

An NHS success story – what’s to learn from it?

By Tony Collins

IM&T at Trafford General Hospital makes visits to hospital safer for patients and gives managers the information they need to monitor the work of clinicians. Even doctors like the advanced technological environment and come up with ideas for improvements. So what lessons can be learnt? Here are four:

–           Be in control of your IT suppliers. Too often in the public sector it’s the other way around

–           Don’t buy from suppliers that seem excessively secretive and talk much about their proprietary information – which may include your data. Know their systems well enough to produce the reports you want, when you want them and in the format you want, rather than wait for your information to be given to you when the suppliers want to give it, and in their format.

–           Don’t impose change. Have the push come from the business users [in Trafford’s case clinicians] who understand what technology can do for them.

–           Keep IT in the background – not centre stage.

Advanced health technology on a £1.5m yearly budget

By Tony Collins

[This is the final part of a 3-part series on how Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust’s IM&T team achieves much on a small budget]

Trafford General Hospital bought its main systems outside of the £11.4bn the National Programme for IT [NPfIT]. The hospital, though, is one of the most technologically-advanced in the UK.

Part one of our series on Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust covered the clinical support for IM&T, integrated systems, and the openness that’s required of the trust’s suppliers.

Part two covered the trust’s  control of its data, how NPfIT could ever have worked, how patients benefit from the IM&T,  why doctors keep their smartcards on them at all times, links between hospital and GP systems, the real-time view of free beds, why duplicated patient records are rare, board support for  integrated electronic patient record systems, and some of the remaining challenges.

Some of  Trafford’s further challenges include:

–           Securing the agreement of all GPs in the area to share a synopsis of their records. About half have agreed so far.

–           Scanning in all paper notes to the EPR. At present about 50% of patient notes have been scanned and are available to clinical staff as “PDF” files, normally with chapter headings. They include diagrams, charts and handwritten text.

–           Dealing with any uncertainties that arise when the Trust is acquired – in all probability by Central Manchester Foundation Trust .

–           Maximising the IM&T opportunities that the acquisition will bring both Trusts in terms of modernising systems and extending the concept of the shared electronic patient record across a wide area of Manchester.

Costs

Trafford has 14 people working on IM&T and IT infrastructure related matters who handle support, infrastructure and integration. The total yearly cost, including salaries, is about £1.5m in capital and revenue which covers the spend with all of Trafford’s  IM&T suppliers.

This compares with costs of between £23m and £31m for each NPfIT installation at acute trusts in London and the South – and these sums do not include the costs of running a hospital’s IM&T and associated infrastructure. Neither do the NPfIT costs include the salaries for an acute hospital’s IT and IM&T staff.

Steve Parsons, Head of IM&T, says of his hospital’s technology: “This is bargain stuff”.

If Trafford can do so much for so little, can centrally-bought NPfIT systems costing many times more – for less – still be justified? The Department of Health argues that NPfIT systems offer more than non-NPfIT. But how much more could Trafford offer its clinical staff, in terms of proven technologies and integration?

Asked where he’d put Trafford in a league table of UK hospitals with systems that clinicians need and want to use, Peter Large, Director of Planning, pauses and says with a slight smile: “Let’s be modest – in the top 10%.”

He’s probably not joking.

**

•           Since writing this article Parsons and his team have been short-listed by the eHealth Insider Awards for the trust’s electronic whiteboard project, in the category of “innovation in healthcare interoperability”.

Part one: How does this IM&T team achieve so much for so little money?

Part two: How does this IM&T team achieve so much for so little money? (2)

How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money? (2)

By Tony Collins

One reason doctors and nurses hold the tech team at Trafford General Hospital in high regard is the quiet professionalism of Steve Parsons who’s a civil engineer and Head of IM&T at Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust in Manchester.

Civil engineering is a  world where openness  is allied to safety. Parsons  designed buildings and pumping stations in the water industry where managers don’t tolerate unnecessary secrecy from their suppliers. From there he became involved in managing IT-led change and came to Trafford General Hospital in 2000.

“It’s having an analytical questioning mind, not just accepting what people say. I will ask all the questions that can make me seem a pain. You want to know why it [a supplier’s software] is going to work,” he says.

“If they don’t give me the confidence that their product is going to work under certain conditions I will not want it. I will not take a black box without knowing what is going to happen with it. I am not having that dependency. I want to strip it down to its basics. It has to be practical. Where else is it working? What is the underlying database?”

Patient data and suppliers 

He says that hospital data belongs to the hospital, not the supplier. “There are people working in the health service who will say: ‘we are the system supplier. It is our data.’ But ours is patient data. This is client’s data, not the supplier’s.”

To an outsider – one who doesn’t work in the NHS – the most surprising thing about seeing the IM&T engine rooms at Trafford General is the complexity and the different ways each ward works. These complexities have to be managed to give doctors and nurses a seamless view of what is happening with each patient.

Could the NPfIT ever have worked?

It’s remarkable, given these complexities, that anyone thought a national system – the National Programme for IT in the NHS –  could ever have worked. It’s hard enough to integrate IM&T within a single hospital let alone on a regional or national scale.

Parsons and Peter Large, Director of Planning at Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust,  consider it lucky that Trafford went live with the Graphnet patient record technology as early as 2003, several months before the tenders for the NPfIT systems were awarded.

It meant that, while some in the NHS were waiting in eager anticipation for NPfIT systems that never arrived, Trafford’s technical staff were learning in precise terms what clinicians wanted and converting this knowledge into working systems. At no point did the promised national systems offer more than Trafford’s.

How patients benefit from Trafford’s IM&T   

In a room close to each ward is a 46” screen known as the “whiteboard” which shows lists of every patient, whether in a bed or visiting outpatients. Allied to the patient’s name are relevant details including colour-coded alerts to warn if a VTE [thrombosis] check hasn’t yet been done, an observation is overdue or an x-ray has not been assessed. In A&E the icon turns red if a patient has waited for three hours, and purple if more than four hours.

Also on the whiteboards, breaches of Department of Health guidelines on waiting times are shown clearly for each patient. The screen also shows which doctor is responsible for any breaches of waiting times.

If nothing else, these system alerts and icons – which include ticking clocks – show how technology can make treatment and care safer for patients.

Why doctors keep their smartcards at all times 

Clinical staff must use smartcards to access the system, and they are unlikely to forget them because they also allow access to the car park.

In trials of NPfIT systems, some doctors were reluctant to use smartcards because of the time taken to log on each time they returned to the computer. At Trafford log-on takes a few seconds, and Imprivata’s single sign-on means that holders of smartcards do not have to remember different passwords. Take out the smartcard and the screen goes blank.

Says Parsons: “We are dependent on EPR now. A year ago one or two consultants refused to look at the EPR. Their secretaries had to print off the last letter from outpatients because they would rather not look at it on a screen. That’s changed.”

Patients give their details only once 

In parts of the NHS patients give their name and address every time they visit a different part of the hospital. At Trafford General Hospital a new patient has a file created at, say, A&E. It is then available to all parts of the hospital, ready for staff to order electronically a blood test or x-ray, or book an appointment.

Links to GPs 

Through Sunquest’s Anglia order communications system and using the HL7 messaging standard, GPs can from their desks order hospital blood tests and x-rays, and get the results in their inboxes. The orders and test results are recorded in the hospital’s Graphnet EPR.

If the local GP has authorised it – and so far about half in Trafford’s catchment area have – A&E doctors will soon be able to see a synopsis of the GP-held patient record which would show any treatments outside the Manchester area as well as medications and significant medical events. The synopsis comes into a hospital server that is controlled by GPs, using their local Emis or Vision systems. In return, GPs have access to their own patients within the hospital-based EPR where they can see all the records related to a patient’s episodes of treatment .

Real-time view of free beds

On the whiteboard, staff can see when beds are due to become vacant, doctors having given the system an estimated time and date of departure for each inpatient. If a doctor fails to give an estimate the system shows an alert.

Says Laura Slatcher who is an assistant to Parsons, “Doctors are restricted with what they can do with the patient’s record  – cannot make referrals, cannot update whiteboards – unless the estimated discharge date is kept up to date. Doctors will complain that they cannot get on because clerks or nurses haven’t kept this administrative information up to date.”

The estimated discharge date is also useful to ensure that the system has alerted district nurses if the patient, after leaving hospital, needs physiotherapy, dietary monitoring or help from social services.

Bed management is a module now removed from the “Lorenzo” system as part of the Department of Health’s plans to cut the costs of NPfIT contracts.

Duplicated patient records are rare

Parsons and his team have done much to tackle the bane of hospital administration: duplicate patient records. Says Parsons: “We have a central patient index which is updated nightly from all GP practices. If you say your name we check date of birth and previous addresses, maybe from the GP – you may still get two people with the same name living in the same house.

“Once we have updated John Jone to John Jones, the central system will update all other related systems to the new spelling. One single ID for everyone avoids having duplicates which could end up with patients having the wrong records. That’s critical to get right.”

Medical Director Dr. Simon Musgrave says: “Duplicates are a fairly rare event now.”

Staff in A&E can create duplicates very easily from patient provided information but “we have systems in place to track those in the following 24 hours and merge them back to the correct record”, says Parsons.

The hospital’s old iSoft patient administration system had 150,000 duplicate files in a database of 460,000 patients. That was typical for an acute hospital says Parsons.

Trafford dispensed with its patient administration system –  it doesn’t have one, having replaced it with the Graphnet’s EPR and Ultragenda from iSoft [now owned by CSC].

EPR goes beyond Trafford

Many doctors are sceptical of the need to make electronic patient records available across England, which was one of the main – and ultimately unsuccessful – aims of the NPfIT. The sceptics say it is very rare for patients to need treatment outside their locality.

Trafford has 250,000 patients in its catchment area but its EPR has 1.4 million records which includes most people in Manchester.

Board support

Trafford adopted the Department of Health’s pre-NPfIT strategy in the late 1990s which called for hospitals to install, incrementally, six levels of EPR – electronic patient records. Level one was a patient administration system and departmental systems. The highest, level six, was a full multi-media EPR online.

Says Parsons: “I have been fortunate of having the support of the Trust Board throughout the 10-year period of staying on a strategy that said: ‘we will continue to build that six-level EPR and all that went with it until an equivalent and better came from the National Programme for IM&T  through Connecting for Health’.”

Reporting, accountability and safety 

Trafford publishes hundreds of reports to operational managers: how long patients have been in their bed or how have they waited, how many patients have had certain types of forms filled in such as VTE forms. Every morning emails to consultants tell them the number of patients they had admitted the day before and how many have not had, say, thrombosis assessments.

Standard reports from some suppliers to the NHS may be too limited for Trafford’s demands, says Parsons. “Some of the questions we are asking require difficult algorithms. On bed occupancy for example doctors get credits for the numbers of patients they are caring for. The standard unit for care is one day or night in hospital.  If somebody is in for six hours, if you work in units of one day, nobody gets credits for that. We want to break IM&T down to parts of days and look at trends.”

Challenges remaining

Ensuring patient safety during the transition from paper to computer needs careful management.

Says Musgrave, Trafford General’s Medical Director: “When you ask for an x-ray [on paper] you fill out a form, get the x-ray done, and the x-ray report is written on a piece of paper which comes back to you so your secretary gets a bit of paper that says “cancer” on it. That’s the end point, the safe point, and you do something about it.

“If you order it on a computer and you do not have a paper record, you have to have some other different system for making it safe.  How do you know the x-ray has been ordered, has been done, and been reported? And what is the report? There is no back-stop there unless you invent one via the computer.”

“Will we ever do entirely without paper?” asks Parsons. “Hmm.”

Part one – How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money?

Final part – How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money?

How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money?

By Tony Collins

Laura Slatcher dreams of forms – reducing the number of them.

She works with a small IM&T team at Trafford General Hospital that is trying to standardise and reduce the number of paper forms doctors and nurses use in the care and treatment of patients.

As is typical for a hospital of its size there are up to 70 – mostly different – paper forms on every ward. Slatcher is working with clinicians to define ways of switching from paper to electronic records – which they are doing with alacrity.

“We have to standardise here,” says Steve Parsons, Head of IM&T at Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust in Manchester. “The doctors and nurses welcome that. They want to work better and more efficiently because they are under pressure themselves to do that.”

Clinical support 

Trafford General bought its main systems outside of the £11.4bn the National Programme for IT [NPfIT]. The hospital, though, is one of the most technologically-advanced in the UK says Peter Large, Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust’s Director of Planning.

There has been no risky “Big Bang” implementation of a Whitehall-bought patient administration system. Rather, Parsons’s approach has been step by step progress over 10 years: implementing systems, learning from what went well and not so well, and integrating hardware and software from a range of suppliers. This strategy could help to explain why the clinical staff we spoke to at Trafford hold the small IM&T team in high regard.

In 2000 the hospital had rudimentary technology – isolated systems in some departments. Now the IM&T team is able to give clinicians what they have asked for; and at Trafford it’s the doctors and nurses who say what they want. Systems are not imposed on them. Here the technologists are in the background, not centre-stage as in the NPfIT.

Trafford and the NPfIT

Says Large: “We found ourselves in the position of being ahead of the game. When we were asked to commit to the National Programme we held back because we needed to know we would be committing to a better solution than was already available to us.”

Parsons adds: “Some trusts didn’t really have anything at all so were desperate to be in the first wave. From their perspective the national programme was a brilliant step forward. But the right products never arrived.”

Integrated systems

One reason for Trafford’s success is the integration of the hospital main and departmental systems. Before electronic patient records, patients could come into hospital without their paper notes being available. Now doctors across the hospital’s departments and clinics can access at the hospital’s XML-based electronic patient records at any time, day or night – and from home if they have remote access.

Doctors can view x-rays and assessments of them from the patient record; and from system alerts and patient tracking, operational managers can see how well individual doctors and nurses are coping with the numbers of patients on their daily lists.

No black-box technology

The hospital’s three main systems are an electronic patient record from Graphnet, software to schedule and manage appointments from Ultragenda, owned by iSoft (now acquired by CSC), and the “Ensemble” integration engine from InterSystems.

What sets these and the hospital’s other systems apart is that they are not black boxes, impenetrable to Trafford’s technologists. Parsons insists that Trafford’s suppliers make their software transparent so that it can be understood by the hospital’s IM&T staff and integrated with other systems, at database “field” level if necessary. That way Parsons can produce any report clinicians need and usually in real-time.

When a supplier keeps its software opaque for reasons of proprietary and commercial confidentiality, Parsons is restricted in the type of medical and administrative reports he can ask the company to supply – and may have to wait hours or a day to get them. He wants none of that.

It’s this level of control that Parsons believes he has a right to expect – and he seems a little surprised that CIOs don’t always require openness from their software suppliers.

How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money? (2)

How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money [final part]

Met Office has IBM secondee as CIO

By Tony Collins

The Met Office gained ministerial approval to appoint an IBM employee for a year as secondee CIO, until the end of October 2011, according to information released under the FOI Act.

It appears that the salary of the IBM executive David Young is being paid, at least in part, by the Met Office. In documents released under the FOI Act the Met Office has redacted [edited out] details of Young’s proposed remuneration and performance bonus.

As a trading fund within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Met Office is required to operate on a commercial basis. It was part of the Ministry of Defence at the time of Young’s appointment. His recruitment was approved by the Secretary of State.

Internal emails show that the Met Office apparently overcame a recruitment ban and constraints on secondments.

Having your CIO seconded from your biggest IT supplier may be novel but it could be controversial because of the perception of a potential conflict of interest.

It would not the first time a public authority has been involved in a controversy after seconding an IBM employee as head of IT.

In 1993 a report of the district auditor criticised the then Wessex Regional Health Authority after it transpired that a member of the health authority was a director of IBM. The IBM director at Wessex promoted a controversial and successful bid for core systems to be supplied to the health authority by IBM and Andersen Consulting (later Accenture). The director later asked that his letter lobbying for the contract be destroyed.

The auditor also found that the Wessex authority bought an IBM mainframe without proper legal authority, the members of the authority having not been informed. The authority paid an unnecessarily high sum for the mainframe and there were doubts the machine was needed. A decision to proceed with the purchase of the mainframe at Wessex was made on the advice of the regional health authority’s new regional information systems manager who was an IBM secondee.

The Met Office, however, has given full consideration to the potential for a conflict of interest in appointing Young as its CIO. It said in a statement this week:

“Full consideration of any potential conflicts of interest regarding David Young’s appointment were fully considered prior to his appointment and his terms of engagement specifically cover these.

“The Met Office complies with specific rules set by the government with regard to procurement and purchases of IT equipment must be agreed by the Met Office Executive.”

The Met Office is one of IBM’s biggest customers. It says on its website: “We are now using an IBM supercomputer which can do more than 100 trillion calculations a second. Its power allows it to take in hundreds of thousands of weather observations from all over the world which it then takes as a starting point for running an atmospheric model containing more than a million lines of code.”

The Met Office reports that Young is responsible for the organisation’s IT strategy and ensuring that it adapts to support the business strategy.

Its website says that Young worked for IBM but does not make it clear he is still employed by the company while on secondment to the Met Office. It says that before joining the Met Office he “held a number of executive position within the IT industry, working for IBM, CSC and Siemens”.

Young’s Linked In profile says he is CIO at the Met Office and Director, System zStack and Mainframe Platform, Central Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa at IBM.

In response to an FOI request by Dave Orr, the Met Office has released internal emails relating to Young’s recruitment and later appointment. Young is described in the Met Office’s Register of Interests 2010/11 as an “Executive, IBM UK Ltd (non-active)”.

The email exchanges show that the Met Office was keen and anxious to employ Young. Talks over Young’s recruitment, initially as Chief Technology Officer, began in July last year and took several months to conclude.

In August 2010 John Hirst, Chief Executive at the Met Office, wrote to Young mentioning, among other things, a ban on recruitment.

“It was good to talk to you on the phone this afternoon. This is to confirm that you are interested in joining us at the Met Office and we are interested in offering you a post.

“As we discussed there are issues of the recruitment ban, terms of secondment and security clearances amongst others but we have both declared an intent to try and get something organised between us.”

Also in August 2010 Diana Chaloner, the Met Office’s Director of Human Resources, emailed IBM on the costs and restrictions relating to the “possible secondment of David Young”.

Her email said: “I will need to get confirmation from John Hirst (our CE) before committing to the costs as outlined below. Whilst I don’t see it as a problem, I do also need to seek a way to overcome external secondee restrictions placed on us by central government recently. I will attempt to get this moving as quickly as possible at this end.”

In another email to IBM in August 2010, Chaloner referred again to the costs of seconding Young. She said:

“Following John’s earlier meeting with David (in his garden!) Alan Dickinson [then the Met Office’s Director of Science and Technology] and I met him last week. John has now spoken to David and is keen to try to progress a secondment. I know David is very keen too, but inevitably, with all the various restrictions placed on us, cost may be an issue, as will enabling the secondment contract to be approved.

“Whilst this might be quite challenging , I think there are usually ways to manage these things, so would really like to understand cost and timing…”

The following month, September 2010, Chaloner emailed Hirst on the need for Young’s appointment to be approved.

Her email has in the subject heading: “IBM Confidential: Secondment of David Young to the Met Office”.  Says the email: “At the moment we cannot give a precise date for David to start his secondment. I did mention in an earlier email that there are some added constraints across Government, and one of those is around recruitment and secondments…”

In October 2011 Hirst emailed IBM about a possible delay in appointing Young. “I am sorry this has taken so long and been more complex than anticipated but the rules of engagement have changed at least twice over the last couple of months and therefore keeping things moving forward steadily has been more difficult. I am still confident we can conclude this although I have suggested to David we might need a weeks (sic) delay in starting … the contracts are signed and sitting in my draw awaiting final clearance of the admin hurdles so there is no decrease in my intent to make this happen.”

On 29 November 2011 Chaloner wrote to Hirst saying that Young’s appointment needed the approval of the Secretary of State. “… The situation is looking very positive but we require final approval from Secretary of State. I was told that there seemed no reason for the secondment not to be approved, but it has to go through the appropriate channels. I can only apologise in the delay in David starting, and continue to nudge it from this end, almost on a daily basis.”

Young was appointed by the end of December 2010. The business case for a new Chief Technology Officer (which became a CIO role) says the secondment from IBM would finish on 31 October 2011. It says there is a “need to bring a professional IT expert into the organisation, to reshape the function in order to achieve greater efficiency in delivery of information technology, as well as ensure it is fit for purpose in the future, hence the need, at this time, to manage this as a short term secondment.”

The Job Description, which is headed “Management in Confidence”, says the IBM secondee will “lead the IT function in the effective delivery of 24/7 IT services and enhance our world leading supercomputing and infrastructure capabilities to secure achievement of future corporate objectives.” The main responsibilities will include directing and co-ordinating 300 information technology, programme/project management professionals, and support staff…”

The job also involves overseeing the “selection, acquisition, development and installation of major information systems”. It further includes the need to “determine and manage all outsourced  external IT service provision as appropriate to meet service level agreements.”

Comment:

There is nothing wrong with the Met Office’s decision to hire an IBM secondee except perhaps that it underlines the reliance of the public sector on its major suppliers.

It’s clear that the Met Office has struggled hard to employ David Young because of his expertise. Nobody would understand the Met Office’s IBM systems better than IBM.

But we have seen evidence from the National Audit Office that suppliers all too often understand customer installations in the public sector better than the civil servants know their own systems. In the case of the NPfIT, auditors had to rely on suppliers to explain what they had been paid and why.

It’s time for the civil service to build up its expertise so that it ceases to rely on suppliers that dominate government IT.