Category Archives: managing change

How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money? (2)

By Tony Collins

One reason doctors and nurses hold the tech team at Trafford General Hospital in high regard is the quiet professionalism of Steve Parsons who’s a civil engineer and Head of IM&T at Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust in Manchester.

Civil engineering is a  world where openness  is allied to safety. Parsons  designed buildings and pumping stations in the water industry where managers don’t tolerate unnecessary secrecy from their suppliers. From there he became involved in managing IT-led change and came to Trafford General Hospital in 2000.

“It’s having an analytical questioning mind, not just accepting what people say. I will ask all the questions that can make me seem a pain. You want to know why it [a supplier’s software] is going to work,” he says.

“If they don’t give me the confidence that their product is going to work under certain conditions I will not want it. I will not take a black box without knowing what is going to happen with it. I am not having that dependency. I want to strip it down to its basics. It has to be practical. Where else is it working? What is the underlying database?”

Patient data and suppliers 

He says that hospital data belongs to the hospital, not the supplier. “There are people working in the health service who will say: ‘we are the system supplier. It is our data.’ But ours is patient data. This is client’s data, not the supplier’s.”

To an outsider – one who doesn’t work in the NHS – the most surprising thing about seeing the IM&T engine rooms at Trafford General is the complexity and the different ways each ward works. These complexities have to be managed to give doctors and nurses a seamless view of what is happening with each patient.

Could the NPfIT ever have worked?

It’s remarkable, given these complexities, that anyone thought a national system – the National Programme for IT in the NHS –  could ever have worked. It’s hard enough to integrate IM&T within a single hospital let alone on a regional or national scale.

Parsons and Peter Large, Director of Planning at Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust,  consider it lucky that Trafford went live with the Graphnet patient record technology as early as 2003, several months before the tenders for the NPfIT systems were awarded.

It meant that, while some in the NHS were waiting in eager anticipation for NPfIT systems that never arrived, Trafford’s technical staff were learning in precise terms what clinicians wanted and converting this knowledge into working systems. At no point did the promised national systems offer more than Trafford’s.

How patients benefit from Trafford’s IM&T   

In a room close to each ward is a 46” screen known as the “whiteboard” which shows lists of every patient, whether in a bed or visiting outpatients. Allied to the patient’s name are relevant details including colour-coded alerts to warn if a VTE [thrombosis] check hasn’t yet been done, an observation is overdue or an x-ray has not been assessed. In A&E the icon turns red if a patient has waited for three hours, and purple if more than four hours.

Also on the whiteboards, breaches of Department of Health guidelines on waiting times are shown clearly for each patient. The screen also shows which doctor is responsible for any breaches of waiting times.

If nothing else, these system alerts and icons – which include ticking clocks – show how technology can make treatment and care safer for patients.

Why doctors keep their smartcards at all times 

Clinical staff must use smartcards to access the system, and they are unlikely to forget them because they also allow access to the car park.

In trials of NPfIT systems, some doctors were reluctant to use smartcards because of the time taken to log on each time they returned to the computer. At Trafford log-on takes a few seconds, and Imprivata’s single sign-on means that holders of smartcards do not have to remember different passwords. Take out the smartcard and the screen goes blank.

Says Parsons: “We are dependent on EPR now. A year ago one or two consultants refused to look at the EPR. Their secretaries had to print off the last letter from outpatients because they would rather not look at it on a screen. That’s changed.”

Patients give their details only once 

In parts of the NHS patients give their name and address every time they visit a different part of the hospital. At Trafford General Hospital a new patient has a file created at, say, A&E. It is then available to all parts of the hospital, ready for staff to order electronically a blood test or x-ray, or book an appointment.

Links to GPs 

Through Sunquest’s Anglia order communications system and using the HL7 messaging standard, GPs can from their desks order hospital blood tests and x-rays, and get the results in their inboxes. The orders and test results are recorded in the hospital’s Graphnet EPR.

If the local GP has authorised it – and so far about half in Trafford’s catchment area have – A&E doctors will soon be able to see a synopsis of the GP-held patient record which would show any treatments outside the Manchester area as well as medications and significant medical events. The synopsis comes into a hospital server that is controlled by GPs, using their local Emis or Vision systems. In return, GPs have access to their own patients within the hospital-based EPR where they can see all the records related to a patient’s episodes of treatment .

Real-time view of free beds

On the whiteboard, staff can see when beds are due to become vacant, doctors having given the system an estimated time and date of departure for each inpatient. If a doctor fails to give an estimate the system shows an alert.

Says Laura Slatcher who is an assistant to Parsons, “Doctors are restricted with what they can do with the patient’s record  – cannot make referrals, cannot update whiteboards – unless the estimated discharge date is kept up to date. Doctors will complain that they cannot get on because clerks or nurses haven’t kept this administrative information up to date.”

The estimated discharge date is also useful to ensure that the system has alerted district nurses if the patient, after leaving hospital, needs physiotherapy, dietary monitoring or help from social services.

Bed management is a module now removed from the “Lorenzo” system as part of the Department of Health’s plans to cut the costs of NPfIT contracts.

Duplicated patient records are rare

Parsons and his team have done much to tackle the bane of hospital administration: duplicate patient records. Says Parsons: “We have a central patient index which is updated nightly from all GP practices. If you say your name we check date of birth and previous addresses, maybe from the GP – you may still get two people with the same name living in the same house.

“Once we have updated John Jone to John Jones, the central system will update all other related systems to the new spelling. One single ID for everyone avoids having duplicates which could end up with patients having the wrong records. That’s critical to get right.”

Medical Director Dr. Simon Musgrave says: “Duplicates are a fairly rare event now.”

Staff in A&E can create duplicates very easily from patient provided information but “we have systems in place to track those in the following 24 hours and merge them back to the correct record”, says Parsons.

The hospital’s old iSoft patient administration system had 150,000 duplicate files in a database of 460,000 patients. That was typical for an acute hospital says Parsons.

Trafford dispensed with its patient administration system –  it doesn’t have one, having replaced it with the Graphnet’s EPR and Ultragenda from iSoft [now owned by CSC].

EPR goes beyond Trafford

Many doctors are sceptical of the need to make electronic patient records available across England, which was one of the main – and ultimately unsuccessful – aims of the NPfIT. The sceptics say it is very rare for patients to need treatment outside their locality.

Trafford has 250,000 patients in its catchment area but its EPR has 1.4 million records which includes most people in Manchester.

Board support

Trafford adopted the Department of Health’s pre-NPfIT strategy in the late 1990s which called for hospitals to install, incrementally, six levels of EPR – electronic patient records. Level one was a patient administration system and departmental systems. The highest, level six, was a full multi-media EPR online.

Says Parsons: “I have been fortunate of having the support of the Trust Board throughout the 10-year period of staying on a strategy that said: ‘we will continue to build that six-level EPR and all that went with it until an equivalent and better came from the National Programme for IM&T  through Connecting for Health’.”

Reporting, accountability and safety 

Trafford publishes hundreds of reports to operational managers: how long patients have been in their bed or how have they waited, how many patients have had certain types of forms filled in such as VTE forms. Every morning emails to consultants tell them the number of patients they had admitted the day before and how many have not had, say, thrombosis assessments.

Standard reports from some suppliers to the NHS may be too limited for Trafford’s demands, says Parsons. “Some of the questions we are asking require difficult algorithms. On bed occupancy for example doctors get credits for the numbers of patients they are caring for. The standard unit for care is one day or night in hospital.  If somebody is in for six hours, if you work in units of one day, nobody gets credits for that. We want to break IM&T down to parts of days and look at trends.”

Challenges remaining

Ensuring patient safety during the transition from paper to computer needs careful management.

Says Musgrave, Trafford General’s Medical Director: “When you ask for an x-ray [on paper] you fill out a form, get the x-ray done, and the x-ray report is written on a piece of paper which comes back to you so your secretary gets a bit of paper that says “cancer” on it. That’s the end point, the safe point, and you do something about it.

“If you order it on a computer and you do not have a paper record, you have to have some other different system for making it safe.  How do you know the x-ray has been ordered, has been done, and been reported? And what is the report? There is no back-stop there unless you invent one via the computer.”

“Will we ever do entirely without paper?” asks Parsons. “Hmm.”

Part one – How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money?

Final part – How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money?

How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money?

By Tony Collins

Laura Slatcher dreams of forms – reducing the number of them.

She works with a small IM&T team at Trafford General Hospital that is trying to standardise and reduce the number of paper forms doctors and nurses use in the care and treatment of patients.

As is typical for a hospital of its size there are up to 70 – mostly different – paper forms on every ward. Slatcher is working with clinicians to define ways of switching from paper to electronic records – which they are doing with alacrity.

“We have to standardise here,” says Steve Parsons, Head of IM&T at Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust in Manchester. “The doctors and nurses welcome that. They want to work better and more efficiently because they are under pressure themselves to do that.”

Clinical support 

Trafford General bought its main systems outside of the £11.4bn the National Programme for IT [NPfIT]. The hospital, though, is one of the most technologically-advanced in the UK says Peter Large, Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust’s Director of Planning.

There has been no risky “Big Bang” implementation of a Whitehall-bought patient administration system. Rather, Parsons’s approach has been step by step progress over 10 years: implementing systems, learning from what went well and not so well, and integrating hardware and software from a range of suppliers. This strategy could help to explain why the clinical staff we spoke to at Trafford hold the small IM&T team in high regard.

In 2000 the hospital had rudimentary technology – isolated systems in some departments. Now the IM&T team is able to give clinicians what they have asked for; and at Trafford it’s the doctors and nurses who say what they want. Systems are not imposed on them. Here the technologists are in the background, not centre-stage as in the NPfIT.

Trafford and the NPfIT

Says Large: “We found ourselves in the position of being ahead of the game. When we were asked to commit to the National Programme we held back because we needed to know we would be committing to a better solution than was already available to us.”

Parsons adds: “Some trusts didn’t really have anything at all so were desperate to be in the first wave. From their perspective the national programme was a brilliant step forward. But the right products never arrived.”

Integrated systems

One reason for Trafford’s success is the integration of the hospital main and departmental systems. Before electronic patient records, patients could come into hospital without their paper notes being available. Now doctors across the hospital’s departments and clinics can access at the hospital’s XML-based electronic patient records at any time, day or night – and from home if they have remote access.

Doctors can view x-rays and assessments of them from the patient record; and from system alerts and patient tracking, operational managers can see how well individual doctors and nurses are coping with the numbers of patients on their daily lists.

No black-box technology

The hospital’s three main systems are an electronic patient record from Graphnet, software to schedule and manage appointments from Ultragenda, owned by iSoft (now acquired by CSC), and the “Ensemble” integration engine from InterSystems.

What sets these and the hospital’s other systems apart is that they are not black boxes, impenetrable to Trafford’s technologists. Parsons insists that Trafford’s suppliers make their software transparent so that it can be understood by the hospital’s IM&T staff and integrated with other systems, at database “field” level if necessary. That way Parsons can produce any report clinicians need and usually in real-time.

When a supplier keeps its software opaque for reasons of proprietary and commercial confidentiality, Parsons is restricted in the type of medical and administrative reports he can ask the company to supply – and may have to wait hours or a day to get them. He wants none of that.

It’s this level of control that Parsons believes he has a right to expect – and he seems a little surprised that CIOs don’t always require openness from their software suppliers.

How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money? (2)

How does this tech team achieve so much on so little money [final part]

Met Office has IBM secondee as CIO

By Tony Collins

The Met Office gained ministerial approval to appoint an IBM employee for a year as secondee CIO, until the end of October 2011, according to information released under the FOI Act.

It appears that the salary of the IBM executive David Young is being paid, at least in part, by the Met Office. In documents released under the FOI Act the Met Office has redacted [edited out] details of Young’s proposed remuneration and performance bonus.

As a trading fund within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Met Office is required to operate on a commercial basis. It was part of the Ministry of Defence at the time of Young’s appointment. His recruitment was approved by the Secretary of State.

Internal emails show that the Met Office apparently overcame a recruitment ban and constraints on secondments.

Having your CIO seconded from your biggest IT supplier may be novel but it could be controversial because of the perception of a potential conflict of interest.

It would not the first time a public authority has been involved in a controversy after seconding an IBM employee as head of IT.

In 1993 a report of the district auditor criticised the then Wessex Regional Health Authority after it transpired that a member of the health authority was a director of IBM. The IBM director at Wessex promoted a controversial and successful bid for core systems to be supplied to the health authority by IBM and Andersen Consulting (later Accenture). The director later asked that his letter lobbying for the contract be destroyed.

The auditor also found that the Wessex authority bought an IBM mainframe without proper legal authority, the members of the authority having not been informed. The authority paid an unnecessarily high sum for the mainframe and there were doubts the machine was needed. A decision to proceed with the purchase of the mainframe at Wessex was made on the advice of the regional health authority’s new regional information systems manager who was an IBM secondee.

The Met Office, however, has given full consideration to the potential for a conflict of interest in appointing Young as its CIO. It said in a statement this week:

“Full consideration of any potential conflicts of interest regarding David Young’s appointment were fully considered prior to his appointment and his terms of engagement specifically cover these.

“The Met Office complies with specific rules set by the government with regard to procurement and purchases of IT equipment must be agreed by the Met Office Executive.”

The Met Office is one of IBM’s biggest customers. It says on its website: “We are now using an IBM supercomputer which can do more than 100 trillion calculations a second. Its power allows it to take in hundreds of thousands of weather observations from all over the world which it then takes as a starting point for running an atmospheric model containing more than a million lines of code.”

The Met Office reports that Young is responsible for the organisation’s IT strategy and ensuring that it adapts to support the business strategy.

Its website says that Young worked for IBM but does not make it clear he is still employed by the company while on secondment to the Met Office. It says that before joining the Met Office he “held a number of executive position within the IT industry, working for IBM, CSC and Siemens”.

Young’s Linked In profile says he is CIO at the Met Office and Director, System zStack and Mainframe Platform, Central Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa at IBM.

In response to an FOI request by Dave Orr, the Met Office has released internal emails relating to Young’s recruitment and later appointment. Young is described in the Met Office’s Register of Interests 2010/11 as an “Executive, IBM UK Ltd (non-active)”.

The email exchanges show that the Met Office was keen and anxious to employ Young. Talks over Young’s recruitment, initially as Chief Technology Officer, began in July last year and took several months to conclude.

In August 2010 John Hirst, Chief Executive at the Met Office, wrote to Young mentioning, among other things, a ban on recruitment.

“It was good to talk to you on the phone this afternoon. This is to confirm that you are interested in joining us at the Met Office and we are interested in offering you a post.

“As we discussed there are issues of the recruitment ban, terms of secondment and security clearances amongst others but we have both declared an intent to try and get something organised between us.”

Also in August 2010 Diana Chaloner, the Met Office’s Director of Human Resources, emailed IBM on the costs and restrictions relating to the “possible secondment of David Young”.

Her email said: “I will need to get confirmation from John Hirst (our CE) before committing to the costs as outlined below. Whilst I don’t see it as a problem, I do also need to seek a way to overcome external secondee restrictions placed on us by central government recently. I will attempt to get this moving as quickly as possible at this end.”

In another email to IBM in August 2010, Chaloner referred again to the costs of seconding Young. She said:

“Following John’s earlier meeting with David (in his garden!) Alan Dickinson [then the Met Office’s Director of Science and Technology] and I met him last week. John has now spoken to David and is keen to try to progress a secondment. I know David is very keen too, but inevitably, with all the various restrictions placed on us, cost may be an issue, as will enabling the secondment contract to be approved.

“Whilst this might be quite challenging , I think there are usually ways to manage these things, so would really like to understand cost and timing…”

The following month, September 2010, Chaloner emailed Hirst on the need for Young’s appointment to be approved.

Her email has in the subject heading: “IBM Confidential: Secondment of David Young to the Met Office”.  Says the email: “At the moment we cannot give a precise date for David to start his secondment. I did mention in an earlier email that there are some added constraints across Government, and one of those is around recruitment and secondments…”

In October 2011 Hirst emailed IBM about a possible delay in appointing Young. “I am sorry this has taken so long and been more complex than anticipated but the rules of engagement have changed at least twice over the last couple of months and therefore keeping things moving forward steadily has been more difficult. I am still confident we can conclude this although I have suggested to David we might need a weeks (sic) delay in starting … the contracts are signed and sitting in my draw awaiting final clearance of the admin hurdles so there is no decrease in my intent to make this happen.”

On 29 November 2011 Chaloner wrote to Hirst saying that Young’s appointment needed the approval of the Secretary of State. “… The situation is looking very positive but we require final approval from Secretary of State. I was told that there seemed no reason for the secondment not to be approved, but it has to go through the appropriate channels. I can only apologise in the delay in David starting, and continue to nudge it from this end, almost on a daily basis.”

Young was appointed by the end of December 2010. The business case for a new Chief Technology Officer (which became a CIO role) says the secondment from IBM would finish on 31 October 2011. It says there is a “need to bring a professional IT expert into the organisation, to reshape the function in order to achieve greater efficiency in delivery of information technology, as well as ensure it is fit for purpose in the future, hence the need, at this time, to manage this as a short term secondment.”

The Job Description, which is headed “Management in Confidence”, says the IBM secondee will “lead the IT function in the effective delivery of 24/7 IT services and enhance our world leading supercomputing and infrastructure capabilities to secure achievement of future corporate objectives.” The main responsibilities will include directing and co-ordinating 300 information technology, programme/project management professionals, and support staff…”

The job also involves overseeing the “selection, acquisition, development and installation of major information systems”. It further includes the need to “determine and manage all outsourced  external IT service provision as appropriate to meet service level agreements.”

Comment:

There is nothing wrong with the Met Office’s decision to hire an IBM secondee except perhaps that it underlines the reliance of the public sector on its major suppliers.

It’s clear that the Met Office has struggled hard to employ David Young because of his expertise. Nobody would understand the Met Office’s IBM systems better than IBM.

But we have seen evidence from the National Audit Office that suppliers all too often understand customer installations in the public sector better than the civil servants know their own systems. In the case of the NPfIT, auditors had to rely on suppliers to explain what they had been paid and why.

It’s time for the civil service to build up its expertise so that it ceases to rely on suppliers that dominate government IT.

Capita says govt can save billions but frontline cuts are “criminal”

By Tony Collins

Paul Pindar, Chief Executive of Capita, makes the valid point that billions of pounds can be cut from the costs of government back offices without the need for “criminal” cuts to frontline services such as police, libraries, youth centres or healthcare.

The Financial Times today quotes Pindar  as saying: “When you can see local authorities closing libraries, swimming pools, it’s criminal. It’s a political agenda. Billions of pounds could be saved and the public wouldn’t notice the difference.”

He said Capita, for example, could cut £2.5bn from the costs of police IT and human resources, without putting at risk uniformed jobs.

Comment:

Pindar sounds as if he’s making a pitch for more government work, which he probably is. But it’s hard to argue with what he says. Except that the savings can be made by SMEs rather than the big suppliers, like Capita, that already dominate government IT spending.    

It may cost more for the civil service to handle SME contracts rather manage a single large deal – but the savings may be greater through an imaginative use of IT and changes in working practices.

One reason it’s hard for civil servants to innovate?

By Tony Collins

James Gardner has seen for himself the institutional obstacles to innovation. . He was, in effect, chief innovator [CTO] at the Department for Work and Pensions. He now works for Spigit.

In a blog on the need for innovators to have “courageous patience” he quotes the British politician Tony Benn who used to be Minister of Technology in the Wilson government:

“It’s the same each time with progress. First they ignore you, then they say you’re mad, then dangerous, then there’s a pause and then you can’t find anyone who disagrees with you.”

He also quotes Warren Bennis who, he says, established leadership as a credible academic discipline:

“Innovation— any new idea—by definition will not be accepted at first. It takes repeated attempts, endless demonstrations, monotonous rehearsals before innovation can be accepted and internalized by an organization. This requires courageous patience.”

Patience comes easily in the civil service but courage? The courage to spend a little with inventive SMEs rather than a lot with large systems integrators? Perhaps this is why it’s so hard to get central departments to innovate.

Some ways to change government practices

By Tony Collins

Mark Foden, a consultant to the public sector, says that transformation is much more likely to come about through collaboration and small incremental changes than strong-arm tactics such as mandation and regulation.

He also suggests that rather than pay high-cost contractors, government should pay more for talented specialists – and possibly pay them much more than their managers.

Foden has worked within government for many years and has seen some of what works and doesn’t. He advocates the use of internal social networks within and across departments.

He sets out his views in a critique of a report of the Public Accounts Committee on Information Communications and Technology in government.

Foden’s views are to some extent in line with the so-called “nudge” non-regulatory approach to behaviour change. Nudge was used originally by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein who define it as:

“… any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting the fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not”.

These are some of the points Foden makes:

Systemic change. It isn’t enough to change policy, process and structure and hope that deeper, more systemic, changes will naturally follow.

Targets. There is a deep-grained, almost unquestioned, culture of using targets to control performance. “Often, targets drive target-meeting behaviours rather than performance-improving ones…Measuring, on the other hand, is crucial; but it must be used in the spirit of learning and developing rather than explicitly for controlling…”

Language. Be careful how you use expressions such as “buy-in” and “deliver”.  Buy-in suggests something that is decided by one group of people then ‘sold’ to another. This is just not a great model for helping civil servants feel involved and empowered. “If people are going to play an important part in achieving something then they must be, and feel, involved from the beginning. Just using terms like this creates the wrong dynamic. Rather than cautioning about not achieving buy-in the Public Accounts Committee should be encouraging more-open, more-inclusive behaviours.” Deliver, says Foden, is too transactional. “I just can’t get the ‘deliver a parcel’ sense out of my head: something neatly packaged then sent to a recipient at a specific time. Managing change is just not about this.”

SMEs. “To get benefit from working with SMEs Government will need to bend, in perhaps significant ways; and people will need to behave differently. This is new territory: time should be taken to experiment and find out what approaches flourish. The useful approaches should be developed – incrementally – in much the same way the strategy proposes IT be developed. And this may take years.

Lean. “Change cannot be made by feeding new policy into an old machine. “Government will need to reshape (and that’s not ‘reorganise’) itself dramatically – perhaps using ideas like Lean – and, to do that, it will need to foster new behaviours; like being more open, being naturally collaborative and being more entrepeneurial. The Efficiency and Reform Group [of the Cabinet Office] should attend explicitly to nurturing such new behaviours.

Pay specialists more than their managers? “If government wants more talent, then it must be able pay the market rate for the people it needs and then provide them with hugely satisfying work in an affirming, supportive environment so that they stay around. This will be far cheaper and, in most cases, better than hiring long-term contractors. If this means paying specialists (sometimes considerably) more than their managers, so be it. There’s a real cultural hump to be got over here.”

More on Mark Foden’s views

CSC ambivalent on prospects of new NHS IT deal

By Tony Collins

CSC is not quite as confident as it was on new NPfIT contracts

CSC is meeting UK Government officials next month to discuss the company’s £3bn worth of NHS IT contracts. It follows a review of the NPfIT contracts by the Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority.

It’s likely officials will discuss a major revision of CSC’s contracts – and possibly an end to them. The Cabinet Office minister Francis Maude is thought to favour termination but the Health Secretary Andrew Lansley, on the advice of NHS Chief Executive Sir David Nicholson, wants to keep CSC in a revised NPfIT.

Recommendations from the Cabinet Office have gone to David Cameron for a decision.

In a conference call yesterday on the company’s first quarter results CSC’s executives said the outcome of the NHS contracts represented an “elevated” risk factor.  But they said CSC is still on target for signing a new deal.

Mike Laphen, CSC’s Chief Executive, said his company has included in its forecasts about $250m [£155m] of NHS turnover until the end of its financial year in April 2012. Any delay in reaching a new deal in September could affect the $250m forecast said Laphen.

He said: “Right now we are assuming that we are still on target with the MoU [Memorandum of Understanding between CSC and the Department of Health]. We are absolutely staffed up ready to execute. We’ve got the products in the delivery pipeline and we believe we have the demand…”

On its NHS work CSC continues to “execute and deliver against our current commitments across primary and secondary care”. CSC’s iSoft “Lorenzo” remains in production routinely supporting daily operations at three early adopter sites.

“We are progressing delivery modules… including emergency care and outpatient prescribing which are anticipated to be installed at the University Hospitals Morecambe Bay once an agreement is reached with the authority,” said a CSC spokesman.

The company told analysts that for its 2012 financial year “there are still a number of large balls still in the air” which include the NHS contract, integration of iSoft and US government spending. “Our business is sound and we have one of the strongest balance sheets in our industry,” said the company.

UK IT market analysts Techmarketview said CSC’s management team “isn’t quite as confident of a positive outcome [on talks over NHS contracts] as it was a few months ago – and rightly so.”

CSC also noted there had been a “significant shift in the market”  from outsourcing to cloud, though with cloud many companies are still deciding “what they’re going to do, or not do”.

MP contacts No 10 and Cabinet Office on CSC’s NHS IT contracts.

BT slammed over NPfIT value-for-money claim.

Was NPfIT really a programme?

Trust forced to buy NPfIT software or face fine

NPfIT has proved unworkable – BCS

MP contacts Cabinet Office and No. 10 on future of NPfIT

By Tony Collins

A Conservative MP has sent detailed suggestions to the Cabinet Office and No.10 on what should happen with the NHS contracts, mainly CSC’s.

Richard Bacon, a member of the Public Accounts Committee, has proved to be an important influence in the Parliamentary debate over the future of the NPfIT. He has now sent to the Cabinet Office and Downing Street a recommendation that CSC’s NPfIT contracts should be cancelled and trusts left to buy systems of choice with a small amount of central subsidy.

His email reveals that NHS Connecting for Health, which is a part of the Department of Health that is responsible for delivering the NPfIT, is rehiring contractors and that the arbitration proceedings between the DH and Fujitsu over the supplier’s £700m legal claim are scheduled to continue until the end of next year. He also says that the DH failed to minute all meetings correctly, which could put the Department at a disadvantage in any legal action against CSC.

It’s possible that Bacon’s suggestions on CSC’s contracts will be considered by David Cameron who may be asked to intervene in any disagreement between the Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority and the Department of Health.

The DH’s position is clear. The Health Secretary  Andrew Lansley and the NHS’s Chief Executive Sir David Nicholson are on record as expressing support for continuing CSC’s NHS IT contracts, although in a revised form.

The Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority under David Pitchford appears not to share the DH’s equanimity over CSC’s contracts. The recommendations of the Major Projects Authority have now gone to Downing Street.

Into the melting pot will go Bacon’s email to Pitchford, copied to No. 10, which is as follows:

Subject: Dealing with NHS IT’s Local Service Providers

“… As discussed, here are some comments on a possible way forward in dealing with Local Service Providers within the National Programme for IT in the NHS.

The LSP contracts have failed to deliver.  Fujitsu has been terminated.   The CSC contract needs to be terminated.  The BT contract has been renegotiated by reducing its delivery requirement by over 50% in return for a reduction in price of less than 10% (though it’s probably not worth terminating this now).

This would leave half of London acute Trusts, all but 11 Trusts in the South, and all Trusts in the North, Midlands and East outside of the Programme.

The simple answer is to have systems of choice for Trusts with small amounts of central subsidy.  Trusts would select and procure whatever system they wanted.  The NHS would make a contribution of, say, £2 million for every acute Trust purchasing a system within, say, 4 years (total cost for 166 Trusts is £332 million).  In return, the Trusts would allow regular reviews of progress and lessons-learned.  This is what the NHS did with primary care over ten years ago and it resulted in virtually all GP Practices computerising over that period.

GETTING OUT OF THE CONTRACTS

All Local Service Providers clearly failed to do what they promised:

All acute Trusts were to have Patient Administration Systems in place by 2006.

All clinical systems were to have been completed at all Trusts by 2010.

Lorenzo was supposed to ship in 2004.

The interim systems were not supposed to happen at all.

The problem is that in a legal dispute over something this complex, lawyers will be able to claim mitigating circumstances of every type and the NHS is likely to end up paying severance, even when terminating for clear non-delivery.  Problems for the NHS include:

CONTRACTS:  The contracts and deliveries are very complex.  It is easy to drown in the detail –  i.e. we couldn’t deliver ‘x’ because of ‘y’.  One could be arguing for ever.

MANAGEMENT:  CfH managed badly.  Records of Correspondence are poor.  Many meetings were not minuted correctly.  Governance was unclear.

PEOPLE:  Lots of different NHS people and contractors worked on the programme and many have since left.  The NHS made CfH fire the majority of its contractors in April 2010.  CfH has been reduced to writing to ex-employees and contractors and asking them if they will come in for interview.

CHANGE:  The NHS has been in constant change with the introduction of major initiatives such as 18 week wait and the current restructuring.  The LSPs will claim ‘moving targets’.

In truth, the LSPs have been paid a lot and delivered little.  The factors above are convenient mitigation for them, but made no difference to whether or not they delivered.  iSoft (now CSC) is supposed to have delivered Lorenzo in every year for the last decade and even claimed to have done so in annual reports when it was a public company.  However, in 2006 a joint report by CSC and Accenture stated that there was “no believable plan” for delivery and in 2011 we still only have one large acute Trust using it.

The Fujitsu case is in arbitration and this is due to run until the end of 2012.  At the end of that period, the waters will have been so muddied that – although they didn’t deliver – it will be obvious that there were many “mitigating” circumstances and the final compromise will end up with the NHS paying half of what Fujitsu is demanding – say £300 million, plus enormous legal fees.

The same scenario will apply to CSC if the NHS tries to terminate them.  CSC’s defence is very well organised.  Morally, the NHS is completely in the right – i.e. there has not been “delivery” – but no matter how clear cut the moral case, it will not be so clear cut legally speaking; the contracts won’t really help the NHS “win” convincingly because it is so complex.  We shouldn’t spend more than a year and a lot more taxpayers’ money fannying around with this.  It will just end up with arbitration followed by some sort of 50 per cent deal plus £100 million to the lawyers. The only way of avoiding this is getting the right people in a room and applying a big stick.  In my view, the only way to terminate is to use the line from the PAC report  i.e. :

You haven’t delivered.  We know that this is so complex and badly documented that we could end up paying you for that non-delivery.  We want to can the arbitration, and save the legal fees and settle.  We are prepared to pay something.  But be aware that the outcome of this settlement and how you behave will have a direct impact on all other business you do now or in the future with the UK government.

The Cabinet Office’s emphasis on a Whole-of-Relationship-with-the-Crown approach to suppliers is vital here.

Avoid being over a barrel by including as part of the settlement a two or three year contract to CSC for the ongoing maintenance of the interim systems already installed (at Acute Trusts and also the others), so that the NHS does not end up in the position that the South ended up in when Fujitsu was terminated (i.e. paying hundreds of millions to maintain a handful of systems). This will give Trusts the time to make and implement alternative plans.

You could take the same approach in order to can the Fujitsu arbitration.”

Will CSC’s £3bn NHS IT contracts be cancelled?

Mutuals: meeting the leadership and change management challenge of spinning out

A recent blog post by the Transition Institute discusses the leadership and change management challenges that must be met in spinning out of the public sector.

The post, by Sarah Ashley, argues that there are a number of themes that recur among those spinning out, including a need for leadership, transparency, language and perceptions.

On leadership, she says, “To instigate and complete a successful change, leadership is extremely important. Though change champions can steer change from any layer of an organisation, the project needs to be spearheaded by an ambitious, dedicated and highly motivated individual. This person must be fully committed to change, and will have to confirm, persuade and assure others to support the change.

“Spinning out of the public sector and change management is not an overnight process, but the change does need to be swift. Once the decision to change has been made, the change should move quickly and throughout the transition the leader must be flexible but resolute. ”

You can read the rest of the post here

DH puts case against cancelling NPfIT contracts

By Tony Collins

The Department of Health has put a detailed case to MPs for not cancelling £4bn worth of NPfIT contracts with local service providers CSC and BT.

Among the points the DH makes is that “the NHS cannot continue without replacing the systems now covered by these contracts” – which refers to the NPfIT contracts with BT and CSC.

The DH also says that CSC and BT “have been clear that they are not willing simply to talk away”. Legal advice to the DH is of a “significant” risk that BT and CSC may, if their contracts are ended, work with Fujitsu in a unified legal action against the Department. Fujitsu and the DH are in a protracted legal dispute after the Department terminated Fujitsu’s NPfIT contract in 2008.

The Department’s memo to the Public Accounts Committee is published today in the PAC’s report entitled “The  National Programme for IT in the NHS: an update on the delivery of detailed care records systems”.

The report is highly critical of all the main parties to the NPfIT including:

– CSC which the report says has delivered only 10 of 166 of its ‘Lorenzo’ systems in the North, Midland and East. The PAC report calls on the Government to give “serious consideration to whether CSC has proved itself fit to tender for other Government work”.

– BT, the other main supplier to the NPfIT, which has “proved unable to deliver against its original contract”, says the report.

– Sir David Nicholson, the Chief Executive of the NHS who is senior responsible owner of the NPfIT, who is criticised by name. It’s rare for the committee’s MPs to personalise their criticism. It says there has been “weak programme management”  and adds: “We are concerned that, given his significant other responsibilities, David Nicholson has not fully discharged his responsibilities as the Senior Responsible Owner for this project. This has resulted in poor accountability for project performance…”

– The Department of Health and NHS Connecting for Health which cannot be trusted to give reliable or complete information on the NPfIT, even to government auditors.  The report says: “Basic information provided by the Department to the National Audit Office was late, inconsistent and contradictory… This occurred despite the fact that Connecting for Health, the NHS organisation responsible for managing the Programme nationally, has 1,300 staff and has spent £820m on central programme management.”

– The Department of Health over its poor ability to re-negotiate contracts with BT and CSC. The report says that the Department ended up “clearly overpaying BT to implement systems …BT is paid £9m to implement [RiO] systems at each NHS site, even though the same systems have been purchased for under £2m by NHS organisations outside the Programme.”  This “casts the Department’s negotiating capability in a very poor light”. The report adds: “We are worried that the Department will fare no better in its current negotiations with CSC …”

– The Department of Health for leaving NHS trusts in a mist of uncertainties. Trusts with NPfIT systems will not know the costs of supporting them after the BT and CSC contracts expire in 2014/15. It’s also uncertain how individual trusts will manage CSC and BT NPfIT contracts when the supplier agreements are held by the Secretary of State for Health.

– The Department of Health for leaving CSC in a controlling position to supply trusts with upgraded interim iSoft systems that were not part of the original contract. Says the PAC report: “It is important that CSC, particularly given its proposed purchase of iSoft, does not acquire an effective monopoly in the provision of care records systems in the North, Eastern and Midland clusters.

“This could result in the Lorenzo system effectively being dropped as the system of choice and many Trusts being left with little choice but to continue with out-dated interim systems that could be very expensive to maintain and to upgrade, or to accept a system of CSC’s choice.

“CSC should not be given minimum quantity guarantees or a licence to sell a product other than that procured and selected by the Programme within the Local Service Provider contract.”

But in its memo to the Committee the Department is unrepentant. Indeed the self-justifying detail and tone of the DH memos, which include selective, apparently corroborating quotations from a KPMG consultancy report that the Department has never published, suggest that, while the NPfIT has changed, the zeal with which DH officials defend the scheme, whatever its problems, has changed little since the programme was announced in 2002.

The DH’s case for not cancelling the contracts with CSC and BT was prompted by a written question from Richard Bacon, a Conservative MP and long-standing member of the Public Accounts Committee who has taken a close interest in the NPfIT.

Bacon asked:

What are the maximum payments to which NPFIT would be exposed for contract cancellation of the detailed care records systems, for each of the LSP providers [CSC and BT]?

The DH said that if the contracts were cancelled for convenience the maximum payments could be [DH italics] in excess of the currently anticipated costs to complete the BT and CSC contracts. If the DH were to cancel contracts for acute hospitals only, the maximum payments may reduce by 50%, said the DH.

The DH adds:

“These costs do not include the deployment or operational costs of any new systems that the NHS would need to procure. The NHS cannot continue without replacing the systems now covered by these contracts.”

Cancellation costs 

Cancellation costs could involve, said the DH:

– Contractual costs: The minimum amount the supplier is allowed to receive under the contract.

– Damages This would include covering some of the suppliers’ unrecovered costs to date and pre-accrued claims at the point of termination

– The costs of providing the ongoing services after termination. It is likely that suppliers will seek to increase these ongoing costs in an attempt to improve their financial position. The Department claims that Fujitsu increased its service charges and claimed it would turn systems off if outstanding sums were not paid.

– Costs of replacing systems, plus support and development of live services.

– Legal and professional fees for terminating, transferring work and investigating the facts around termination.

But the DH makes no mention that the Department would have a strong negotiating position if contracts were terminated because any dispute could cause the Cabinet Office to lose confidence in that supplier, which may affect the ability of the company to win further government work.

Would any major supplier want to fall out with government as a whole, rather than just one department?

Coalition changes mean that government considers itself as a single customer when reviewing the reputation and credibility of individual suppliers.

MPs don’t trust the DH’s information

Many of the points made by the DH in 15 pages of memos appear to have been largely discounted by the committee, partly because MPs did not trust what the Department said.

Comment

The Department of Health has a history of quoting selectively from consultancy and legal reports to support the argument it is making.  This is what tabloids do at times. Indeed the DH  never publishes the consultancy and legal reports it quotes from, so should we trust its arguments that point to keeping the NPfIT contracts with CSC and BT?

There may be good arguments for cancelling the contracts that have not, and are unlikely to be, mentioned by the DH.

Some benefits of cancelling NPfIT contracts

Cancelling could end the uncertainties for trusts that would otherwise be pressured to take NPfIT systems. It could also end the uncertainties for trusts that have yet to buy NPfIT systems and may face punishing costs to keep them running, and in step  with changes within the NHS, after the contracts with BT and CSC expire in 2014-2015.

If Campaign4Change were advising the coalition we would suggest it commission a genuinely independent review of the pros and cons of cancelling the NPfIT contracts.  The review  should not be commissioned by the DH or Connecting for Health because their lawyers and consultants will tend to tell the department what they think it  wants to hear.

One of the messages that comes loud and clear from today’s report of the Public Accounts Committee is that the DH cannot be trusted to make the right decisions on behalf of taxpayers and the NHS. The DH cannot even be trusted to tell the truth to judge from the PAC report.

The Cabinet Office needs to take control of major DH IT spending. Perhaps the sooner the better.

Public Accounts Committee report on NPfIT detailed care records systems.

NHS must consider scrapping NPfIT – MPs.