Category Archives: IT projects

Whitehall defies NAO and Cameron on publishing status of big projects

Posted on 02/05/2012 | 1 comment

By Tony Collins

Government action to cut the number of failures of big projects including those with a major ICT component has made a difference, the National Audit Office reports today.

In its report “Assurance for major projects”  the NAO is largely supportive of actions by the Government, , the Cabinet Office’s Major Projects Authority and the Treasury in setting up reviews of major high-risk projects, including ICT-based programmes, to ensure that if they are failing they are put back on track or cancelled.

The NAO says the Government’s decision to “dismantle” the NPfIT was taken after the project was assessed by the Major Projects Authority.

But the report also shows how civil servants have managed to defy a mandate from the Prime Minister, and a separate NAO recommendation in 2010, for information on the status of big ICT and other high-risk projects to be published.

Says the NAO report

“The ambition to publish project information, as part of the government’s transparency agenda, has not been met.

“Our 2010 report recommended that the government should publicly report project status. We consider that public reporting of project information is key to providing greater accountability for projects and improving project outcomes… Regular transparent reporting of performance which highlights successes and non-compliance would also help to build an enduring assurance system.”

Separately in the report the NAO says

“There has been a lack of progress on transparency.  The [Cabinet Office’s Major Projects] Authority has not yet met its commitment to publish project information in line with government’s transparency agenda. The Authority cannot deliver this objective on its own. Senior level discussions are ongoing, between Cabinet Office, HM Treasury and departments, on the arrangements for public reporting.”

Should ministers intevene to force publication?

But the NAO report does not raise the question of why ministers have not intervened to force civil servants to publish the status information on high-risk projects.

Campaign4Changehas argued that publishing status reports on big ICT projects and programmes would be the most effective single action any government could take to reduce the number of failures. (see “Comment” below)

Prime Minister’s 2011 mandate

The NAO’s 2010 recommendation for status information on major projects to be published was backed by a mandate from the Prime Minister in January 2011 which included the undertaking to “require publication of project information consistent with the Coalition’s transparency agenda”.

The House of Commons’ Public Accounts Committee has recommended that departments publish information on the state of their major IT-based projects and programmes; and the Information Commissioner has rejected civil service arguments for not publishing such information.

In addition Francis Maude, the Cabinet Office minister, said, when in opposition, that the Conservatives, if they gained power,  would publish “Gateway” review reports soon after they are completed.  Gateway reports are similar to the assurance reviews carried out for the Major Projects Authority.

Yet none of this has happened.

The “rebel” civil servants

How is it that a group of civil servants who are opposed to publishing information on the status of large risky projects can defy the Prime Minister, Francis Maude, the National Audit Office, and the all-party Public Accounts Committee? Those recalcitrant civil servants argue that assurance reviewers would not tell the whole truth if they knew their assessments would be made public.

But how do we know they tell the whole truth when the reports are kept confidential? The Information Commissioner has pointed out in the past that civil servants have a public duty to be candid and honest. If they are not because their reports are to be published, they are failing in their public duty.

Today’s NAO report says there are differences of opinion among civil servants over whether to publish status information on projects.

Says the NAO

“There has been some support for greater transparency from departments who believe that tracking and publishing major milestones could create helpful tension in the system.

“However, concerns have been raised that increased transparency could limit the value of assurance, as it could inhibit assurance reviewers and project staff holding full and frank discussions.

“Some senior project staff also have concerns that public reporting could have a negative commercial impact, and would prefer delayed rather than real-time public reporting.”

The Cabinet Office told Campaign4Change in 2010 and 2011 that instead of publishing status reports on each major project, it will publish an annual report on the state of its programmes.

But that hasn’t happened either.

Says the NAO:

“As well as the objective to publish project information, the [Major Projects] Authority has not yet met its objective to publish an annual report on government’s major projects.

“The Authority initially expected to publish an annual report in December 2011 but is now expecting the report to be published in May or June 2012. The format of the annual report, and the information it will contain, has yet to be decided.”

Comment:

Many times over the last 20 years I have said that publishing status reports on major IT-based projects and programmes would be the most effective single action any government could take to deter departments from going ahead with overly ambitious schemes that are doomed to fail. If, against good sense, impractical schemes are approved, publishing status information will make all the difference.

Permanent secretaries will not lose sleep over a failing project, but they will not want information on it published – which is why that information should be published.

Publishing status information would give civil servants a good reason to tackle weaknesses as they developed.  Permanent secretaries may not mind losing public money on a failing project or programme. They will always fear embarrassment, however.

Who is really in control of Whitehall – civil servants or No 10? David Cameron’s office has issued a mandate that requires status information on projects to be published. The NAO has issued a similar recommendation. How long can the civil service hold out against the political will?

Links:

NAO report – Assurance for major projects

Firecontrol – same mistakes repeated on other projects

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Posted in cost reduction, culture, excessive secrecy, Freedom of Information, Gateway reviews, Government IT, IT projects, IT-related failures, Major Projects Authority, openness and transparency, operational issues, private sector lessons for the public sector, project management, public sector

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The debate over G-Cloud – have your say

Posted on 30/04/2012 | Leave a comment

By David Bicknell

A debate is running over the Government’s plans for G-Cloud. It follows Chris Chant’s Unacceptable IT is pervasive blog on his departure, a response to the comments received on Chant’s blog by his successor, Denise McDonagh, about Cloud Cynicism, and now, and this must break some new ground, a government-hosted ‘crowdsourcing’ opportunity for you to have your say and influence the debate.

Please add your thoughts here

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Posted in Campaign4Change, Cloud, G-Cloud, government, Government IT, IT projects, procurement

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New York’s new CIO to create centre of excellence to prevent failing IT projects

Posted on 25/04/2012 | Leave a comment

By David Bicknell

New York’s recent problems with IT projects have been well documented.

Its latest solution: appoint a new CIO, with a wide remit that includes innovation and the setting up of a ‘centre of excellence’  to nail down failing projects.

Rahul Merchant joins with a background served at US mortgage and housing specialist Fannie Mae and at financial services company Merrill Lynch.

He will become the first Citywide Chief Information and Innovation Officer and Commissioner of the Department of Information, Technology and Telecommunications reporting to New York’s mayor Michael Bloomberg.

His role will involve overseeing New York’s information technology development and management, with a focus on delivering technology projects on-time and on-budget.

Merchant will succeed Carole Post, who recently announced she will be leaving for a position at New York Law School.

“By bringing the City’s IT infrastructure and development under one office, we can ensure we are using best practices across agencies, leveraging the City’s enormous IT infrastructure to our maximum advantage and holding contractors accountable for delivering results,” said Bloomberg. “Rahul is a seasoned executive who has proven himself time and again as a leader and an innovator in the industry.  He is going to do an outstanding job as New York City’s first Chief Information and Innovation Officer and we are excited to add him to our talented team.”

Merchant will be responsible for New York City’s IT infrastructure, as well as oversight of the implementation of key technology initiatives that enable the City’s various agencies to serve 8.4 million New Yorkers.

What will be worth watching is seeing how he tackles New York’s reputation for troubled IT projects by creating a Centre of Excellence that will  “standardise business processes for the implementation of large technology projects, institute a system of vendor evaluation to hold contractors accountable for meeting project milestones, and update the City’s technology contracts to focus on the delivery of established milestones to meet agency business needs.”

According to Bloomberg, Merchant will work closely with agency commissioners and chief information officers “to ensure that IT projects leverage existing infrastructure and software to the maximum possible extent, and that the City’s overall IT budget meets core agency business needs and the City’s overall technology objectives.”

He will also spearhead the New York’s efforts to remain a leader in technology innovation, by leveraging its  technology assets and partnerships with academic institutions, technology firms, and entrepreneurs.

He won’t be short of people to help. Merchant will lead a 1,200-strong staff responsible for managing the City’s information technology infrastructure as well as serving the information technology needs of 45 mayoral agencies, dozens of other governmental entities, and nearly 300,000 employees.

Here’s how local sites reported Merchant’s appointment:

Crain’s New York Business: Major taps Merrill Lynch vet to tame tech projects

Tech President: New York City just radically changed who manages its IT projects

Government Technology: NYC names Rahul Merchant to CIO and Innovation role

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Posted in change, change management, CIO, contractors, Government IT, innovation, IT projects, IT-related failures, technology, US Government

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Information Age article questions Cabinet Office scrutiny of IT projects

Posted on 23/04/2012 | Leave a comment

By David Bicknell

Information Age has written an interesting piece examining the Cabinet Office’s scrutiny of IT projects worth over £1m.

It says that despite pledging to publish regular performance data on IT projects worth over £1m, the Cabinet Office is not even collecting the data.

It reports, “The Cabinet Office is not collecting data about the performance of government IT projects worth over £1 million, despite having made a commitment to publish this information regularly as open data.

“In February 2011, the Cabinet Office published performance data for all major IT projects up until July 2010 (just before the current government came into office)  on open data portal data.gov.uk. At the time, it said that the data would “updated regularly”, but that “the specific form of future publications has not yet been determined”.

A Freedom of Information Act request from Information Age revealed that the Cabinet Office is not collecting this data. In its response to the request, the department revealed that it holds “no recorded information … relating to the performance of ICT projects over £1m”.

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Posted in government, Government IT, IT projects

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How many organisations are failing to deliver on their Agile developments?

Posted on 23/04/2012 | 1 comment

By David Bicknell

How many organisations are struggling to see real value and business benefits from their Agile IT projects?

This blog, looking back at some of the predictions for Agile in 2012, argues that a number of organisations that have adopted Agile have an inability to understand its why and how, while others are inadaquately prepared for adoption, resulting in a failure to address management impact across teams and engineering practices in teams.

The piece cites the Cutter Consortium blog which, in looking ahead to 2012, argued that “many organisations worldwide will continue to adopt Agile. Most of them will do so with no expert guidance, with ho-hum results, and with little understanding of why they got those results.

It suggestted that, “People will continue to get their Agile skills certified while others rail against the value and implication of those certificates. Companies will still rely on head hunters to hire Agile coaches, and wonder why those coaches can’t seem to straighten out their Agile implementation.

“Organisations will continue to agonise over micro-estimation of detailed backlogs. They will continue to spend a pretty penny on “adding bodies” to projects riddled with technical debt, while not investing in the skills and habits their developers need to reduce or avoid increasing such debt. Managers will continue to use language like, “We just hired a resource in development” without investing proper attention in the hired person. And downsizings will continue until morale improves.”

Another blog predicted that, “Everyone will claim they are Agile, but that 50% of them will be wrong, and half of the rest won’t get any value from it. There are too many bad development practices at organisations that have too few people, with too little coaching, and hardly any tooling.”

Meanwhile, this survey suggests that Agile development has a higher priority in the private sector (in the US) than in the public sector.

So what is the true picture for Agile? Is it delivering project success, as JP Morgan and John Deere, have found? Or are some organisations adopting Agile almost as a fashion accessory, without really understanding where they’re going?

Related reading

Agile skills gain ground

JP Morgan adopts Agile in Australia

As Agile as a John Deere tractor

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Posted in Agile, change management, Government IT, IT and the Business, IT projects, managing change, project management

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Freedom of Information failures shine light on governments’ records management projects

Posted on 21/04/2012 | Leave a comment

By David Bicknell

The struggles that a number of governments and agencies are having in coping with Freedom of Information (FOI) requests has raised questions over the need for – or the status of – their IT projects for records management.

The UK government is itself in a tizzy about the number of requests it receives.   And it appears from this ZDNet article Down Under that state governments and public services in Australia are struggling to keep up too.

The article cites a recent report from the Victorian auditor-general that the Victorian Department of Human Services (DHS) needs a new electronic records-management system. It argues that not only is the department completely failing to fulfil FOI requests, which was the topic of the audit, but it is also probably losing hours of staff time as employees comb through its records for the information they need to do their jobs.

Apparently, the DHS received 1047 FOI requests in 2010-2011. However, instead of meeting the 45-day deadline for fulfilling these requests, the average fulfilment time was 75 days.

Admittedly, Australia has had 30 years of dealing with FOI, where here we have had twelve. But the report’s background and conclusions on FOI make for informative reading.   I wonder how many government departments and councils it might apply to over in the UK; what IT projects (if any) they have underway in terms of electronic records management; and just how long it might be before a similar critical report is written here.

Background

Freedom of information (FOI) is a cornerstone of a thriving democracy. FOI upholds the public’s fundamental right to access information held by the government. The community’s ability to scrutinise public sector activities and hold the government of the day accountable for its decisions is affected by the transparency and accessibility of government information.

Since the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (the Act) was introduced, both the number and the complexity of requests for information have increased considerably. In 2010–11 there were 34 052 FOI requests, compared to 4 702 requests in 1984–85, the first full year the Act was in operation.

The Victorian Ombudsman identified systemic problems in his 2006 review of FOI. These included a lack of timely responses, inconsistent application of the Act and lost or non‑existent documents. In his 2011 Annual Report the Ombudsman concluded that these problems still remained five years later.

The audit examined the extent to which all 11 Victorian public sector departments and Victoria Police meet the requirements of the Act and associated guidelines. A detailed assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of FOI processes in Victoria Police and the Department of Human Services (DHS) was also performed. These two agencies were selected because they process 68 per cent of the FOI requests received by the 12 agencies audited.

Conclusions

Since FOI legislation was introduced 30 years ago, Victoria has gone from being at the forefront of FOI law and administration to one of the least progressive jurisdictions in Australia. Over time, apathy and resistance to scrutiny have adversely affected the operation of the Act, restricting the amount of information being released. As a result, agencies are not meeting the object of the Act, which is ‘to extend as far as possible the right of the community to access information’.

The public’s right to timely, comprehensive and accurate information is consequently being frustrated. The Victorian public sector’s systemic failure to support this right is a failure to deliver Parliament’s intent.

The prevailing culture and lack of transparent processes allow principal officers—secretaries and chief executive officers of agencies—to avoid fulfilling their responsibilities. Principal officers are not being held to account for their agency’s underperformance and non-compliance:

  • In 2010–11, the average response time for eight of the 12 audited agencies exceeded the statutory deadline for responding to applicants’ requests.
  • Of these agencies, four exceeded the 45-day time limit for over half of their requests.
  • None of the agencies adequately complied with the mandatory reporting requirements of the Act.
  • The principal officers of the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC), the Department of Health (DOH) and DHS have not managed adherence with ministerial noting periods consistent with the Attorney-General’s 2009 Guidelines on the Responsibilities and Obligations of Principal Officers and Agencies(the FOI Guidelines). This has led to delays in the release of documents.
  • Agencies have not managed to reach agreement on a consistent, whole‑of‑government approach to the proactive release of information, which would reduce the reliance on FOI processes for the release of non-personal information.
  • The more detailed review of DHS and Victoria Police revealed serious flaws in record keeping practices and FOI searches.

The cumulative effect of the multiple cultural and process issues is that the community does not receive the information it is entitled to receive, when it should receive it. Agency senior management is aware of these longstanding issues and their consequences, but has not taken sufficient action to address these systemic weaknesses.

This points to an absence of leadership and responsiveness, and a willingness of agencies to compromise the fundamental public service principles of integrity, accountability and respect. These are values that all public sector officials are expected to demonstrate under the Code of Conduct for Victorian Public Sector Employees. Principal officers who do not observe these values are failing the community and Parliament.

Embedding the appropriate pro-disclosure culture and processes, which underpin the intent of the Act, requires effective leadership. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has not adequately championed FOI across the public sector and, as such, has not satisfactorily fulfilled its role as the lead agency for FOI.

The introduction of the FOI Commissioner presents an opportunity for more proactive FOI leadership—in particular driving the cultural shift that is necessary to provide better quality services to the community. Significant change will only be possible if the commissioner is granted sufficient powers and resources. Since these amendments have not yet commenced, recommendations relating to the lead agency for FOI are addressed to DOJ, but will subsequently need to be reviewed once the FOI Commissioner has been appointed.

Findings

Department of Justice leadership

As the lead agency for FOI, DOJ is accountable for providing agencies with guidance and advising the minister responsible for the administration of the Act through the production of annual reports to Parliament on FOI performance. There have been significant shortcomings in the department’s approach in both of these areas.

Freedom of information culture and practices

DOJ has not adequately promoted and modelled the intent of the Act and accepted better practice, either in its own department or across the public sector. Specifically, DOJ has not:

  • developed a proactive release framework for agencies
  • addressed its own or other agencies’ processing delays
  • complied with the reporting or timeliness requirements of the Act, nor encouraged other agencies to do so
  • complied with the five-day ministerial noting time frame before documents are released.

The tolerance of these longstanding substandard practices, particularly with regard to proactive release, reflects an apathetic and obstructive culture. DOJ has acknowledged that it could have taken a stronger approach with agencies, but stated that its ability to address substandard practices is limited because it does not have adequate powers to mandate good practices. This lack of powers is not sufficient justification for DOJ to not exercise leadership. Further, there is no evidence that DOJ sought to extend its powers to address its inability to achieve an acceptable level of practice, consistent with the object of the legislation.

Proactively releasing information is an effective means of disseminating the maximum possible amount of information. It is recognised as better practice and, accordingly, is the approach adopted in other jurisdictions. Although Victorian agencies are publishing information, this does not necessarily constitute proactive release unless they have properly assessed the information to determine whether it is of significant public interest, appropriate, accurate, accessible and easy to use. This, combined with the continued reliance on formal FOI applications, means Victoria is less progressive than other jurisdictions.

Performance reporting

The apathy with regard to FOI is also evident in the reporting regime. The minister responsible for the Act relies on DOJ to collect, check and prepare data for inclusion in the FOI Annual Report to Parliament. However, DOJ is not reporting to the minister aspects of agencies’ performance as the letter and spirit of the Act requires.

DOJ does not report on measures that are explicitly specified in the Act, including disciplinary action taken against officers in respect to the administration of the Act, such as a breach of duty or misconduct.

DOJ collects information on the timeliness of agencies’ responses to FOI requests but does not include this information in the minister’s report to Parliament. Although DOJ is not specifically required to disclose this information to the minister, it is not precluded from doing so. Releasing agencies’ timeliness statistics would be in the spirit of the Act and encourage better performance.

Parliament and the public have the right to know if agencies’ performance is unsatisfactory. DOJ’s lack of comprehensive and transparent reporting in relation to the minister’s annual report does not satisfy the community’s expectations of a public sector agency.

Training

Training is an effective way to instil a positive FOI culture in agencies and to emphasise the importance of openness and transparency. DOJ’s FOI training program places too much emphasis on basic administrative process, rather than the intent of the Act. An important opportunity to promote a positive pro-release FOI culture has been missed.

Agency management

Timeliness of response is a good indicator of senior management’s attitude towards the importance of FOI. The number and complexity of requests can influence performance against the statutory time limit, however, the onus is on principal officers to provide adequate resources and support to meet the timeliness requirements. Only two of the audited agencies meet both the 45-day time limit and the five-day ministerial noting period.

Of the 12 agencies audited, only four had average request processing times that met the 45-day statutory limit in 2010­–11. These were the Department of Education and Early Childhood Development, Department of Transport, Department of Primary Industries and Department of Treasury and Finance. The worst performing agencies were Victoria Police, DPC and DHS, which averaged 98, 92 and 75 days respectively.

Victoria’s underperformance against its legislative target is even more concerning when compared with other states. Other states have better processing completion rates against shorter or similar standard time limits. Extensions to these time limits may be granted, in certain circumstances.

The five-day ministerial noting period recommended in the FOI Guidelines was exceeded by eight of the 12 agencies. The worst performing department was DPC, with an average noting period of 41 days. One FOI request was with the Office of the Premier for 88 days. DHS and DOH also recorded noting periods in excess of 20 days. Long noting periods delay the release of information and impede the effective operation of the Act.

When agencies do not respect the FOI Guidelines, this not only compounds the delays in processing FOI requests but also contributes to the public perception that there is political interference in the FOI process, particularly when there is repeated consultation between an agency and a minister’s office on requests.

Victoria Police and DHS have both attempted to improve the timeliness of their responses. At Victoria Police, timeliness improved when additional resources were temporarily assigned to the FOI unit, while DHS improved its response time by prioritising requests.

Department of Human Services and Victoria Police

An effective FOI system relies on strong agency leadership and support, a robust understanding and application of the Act, good records management, appropriately defined searches and open communication with applicants.

DHS and Victoria Police, the two agencies reviewed in more detail, have significant deficiencies in these areas. As a consequence, the public is being denied access to information.

Processing fees and waiver of time frame

DHS is offering applicants the opportunity to waive processing charges if they forgo the requirement for DHS to meet the 45-day processing time limit. DHS is not advising applicants who have little or no money and are seeking information that relates to their personal affairs that they have a right to request a waiver of charges under the Act without waiving the 45-day time limit.

This unacceptable practice was not observed in any of the other audited agencies. It allows DHS to extend its time frame for responding to requests without recording those requests as overdue, giving the mistaken impression that the department’s timeliness performance is better than it actually is.

Records management

DHS and Victoria Police need to address deficiencies in their record keeping practices as a priority. Records are being lost, disposed of incorrectly or rendered inaccessible.

DHS’s record management facility has inappropriate physical storage conditions—causing records to deteriorate—and inefficient indexing systems. As a result, information cannot be found when needed.

Although Victoria Police has a policy outlining the appropriate storage of records, it has not addressed the informal practice of police officers storing records, such as note books, at their homes. This practice increases the likelihood that these records may be lost or difficult for Victoria Police to locate.

Search techniques

DHS and Victoria Police both need to remedy weaknesses in their FOI searches to provide appropriately scoped responses.

DHS does not include records held by its contracted community service organisations (CSO) in the FOI requests the department processes. Instead, DHS refers applicants to the relevant CSOs. The quality of record keeping practices of CSOs varies widely and, consequently, so does the amount of information available to DHS’s clients.

DHS is failing to discharge its obligations to its clients. The Act refers to ‘possession’ when defining a document, not ownership. DHS has a right to possess CSO records under its service agreements, therefore CSO documents are subject to the Act. Furthermore, the department is contravening the specifications set out by the Public Records Office Victoria and the FOI Guidelines.

Victoria Police’s FOI unit does not conduct sufficiently thorough and diligent searches. The unit does not inspect proof of disposal documents to confirm whether documents cannot be provided because they no longer exist.

Related Links

FOI debate: the genie of freedom will never be put back

One in three public bodies failing on freedom of information requests

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Posted in Campaign4Change, Freedom of Information, Government IT, IT projects, public sector, public services

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FDA: “Much work remains” to modernise its IT systems, says US oversight team

Posted on 19/04/2012 | Leave a comment

By David Bicknell

Sometimes you have to applaud how seriously the US government takes accountability in its departments over their approach to IT projects.

One of the latest by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) is on the IT management at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

In a title, ‘Why the GAO did this study’, it points out that the FDA, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), relies heavily on IT to carry out its mission of ensuring the safety and effectiveness of regulated consumer products. Specifically, it says, IT systems are critical to the FDA’s product review, adverse event reporting, and compliance activities.

Recognising the limitations in its IT capabilities, the FDA has undertaken several initiatives to modernise its systems, with the GAO now being asked to assess the FDA’s current portfolio of IT systems, including the number of systems in use and under development, and their purpose and costs; assess the status and effectiveness of the FDA’s efforts to modernise the mission-critical systems that support its regulatory programs; and examine the agency’s progress in effectively integrating and sharing data among key systems.

In its report, the GAO argues that while the FDA has taken several important steps toward modernising its IT environment, much remains to be done.

According to the GAO, the FDA reported spending about $400 million for IT investments in the last  financial year (2011). But, it says, the agency currently lacks a comprehensive IT inventory that identifies and provides key information about the systems it uses and is developing.

It points that both Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the GAO’s own guidance calls for federal agencies to maintain such an inventory in order to monitor and manage their IT investments. The inventory should include information on each system, such as costs, functionality or purpose, and status. However, the GAO says, the FDA does not have such a comprehensive list of its systems, although budget documents included information on 44 IT investments for fiscal year 2011. 

Until the agency has a complete and comprehensive inventory, the GAO says, it will lack critical information needed to effectively assess its IT portfolio.

GAO goes on to point out that “much work remains on the FDA’s largest and costliest system modernisation effort, the Mission Accomplishments and Regulatory Compliance Services program.” The program is estimated to cost about $280 million and is intended to enhance existing applications and develop new systems that provide information for inspections, compliance activities, and laboratory operations.

However, the GAO argues, much of the planned functionality has not been delivered and its completion is uncertain. Moreover, the program lacks an integrated master schedule identifying all the work activities that need to be performed and their interdependencies.

The FDA’s CIO stated that the agency is now reevaluating the scope of the initiative. As a result, it is uncertain when or if FDA will meet its goals of replacing key legacy systems and providing modernised functionality to support its mission.

In addition, FDA has not yet fully implemented key IT management capabilities essential for successful modernisation, previously recommended by GAO. These include developing an actionable IT strategic plan, developing an enterprise architecture to guide its modernisation effort, and assessing its IT staffing needs.

One of the problems for the FDA has been changes in its management structure, which has meant that since 2008, the agency has had five different CIOs, hampering its ability to plan and effectively implement a long-range IT strategy.

The GAO recommended that the FDA should develop both a comprehensive inventory of its IT systems and an integrated master schedule for a major modernisation effort, and assess its  information needs to identify opportunities for greater sharing.

GAO Report

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Posted in Campaign4Change, government, Government IT, IT projects, IT-related failures, US Government

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Are your IT projects ‘drivers’ or ‘supporters’?

Posted on 18/04/2012 | Leave a comment

By David Bicknell

An article by Art Langer in the Wall St Journal argues that IT projects are either ‘drivers’ or ‘supporters’.

Drivers are those projects and activities that affect the relationship with an organisation’s clients i.e. projects that drive revenue directly or indirectly. Supporters, on the other hand, are those everyday activities that are more operational in nature.

Langer cites the work that Dana Deasy has done firstly at Siemens  and more recently at BP.

He writes: “We all know that executives are more interested in implementing technologies to drive the business, than they are in using cutting-edge technology for its own sake. For Deasy, the biggest challenge was mostly building internal consensus about  how the technology would help  customers–and how Siemens could be more competitive in the marketplace.

“Deasy also had to show his executives that the evaluation of investments in these projects would be different than evaluations of other kinds of IT work. With e-business, the market reaction to different product and service offerings can be less certain.

“So Deasy established the concept of “revalidation.” Approved technology projects were reviewed every 90 days to determine whether they were indeed providing the planned outcomes, whether new outcomes needed to be established, or whether the technology was no longer useful.

“Siemens was moving from a traditional process of analyse-develop-deliver to a new process of sensing what a customer might want, and then responding to it more dynamically.”

Langer concludes by saying that, “The idea that all IT projects must succeed is outdated and unrealistic in true “driver” initiatives. CIOs must learn from Deasy’s lesson: If you are engaging in true “driver” initiatives, you cannot evaluate them on the “supporter” method of simple success rates.”

Interesting piece – worth a read.

How to Develop and Evaluate Strategic IT Projects

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Posted in Campaign4Change, change management, Government IT, IT and the Business, IT projects, IT-related failures, project management

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New York’s CTO to leave as row deepens over city’s handling of IT projects

Posted on 17/04/2012 | Leave a comment

By David Bicknell

New York, New York (So Good They Named It Twice) – as the song goes -though not so good at delivering successful IT projects, it would seem.

According to The New York Times, the city’s chief technology official Carol Post has resigned after clashing with a deputy mayor over the management of several costly, ambitious IT projects.

According to the newspaper, city government spokespeople said Ms. Post, who is the commissioner of the Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications, should not be blamed for the mismanagement of the $2.3 billion 911 project, whose problems predated her arrival in the job. She is reported to be leaving to take up a new position at the New York Law School. 

Post’s departure  was announced a day before New York’s mayor, Michael Bloomberg said the city would challenge a judge’s order to release a report by consultants McKinsey on an overbudget, much-delayed modernisation of the city’s 911 emergency calls and dispatching system.

According to The New York Times story, concerns have been expressed about the cost of an upgrade to CityNet, the city’s internal data network; there are continuing problems and shortcomings with CitiServ, a data centre that was supposed to consolidate dozens of city agency servers; and a shortage of users for NYCWin, a secure municipal wireless network.

The wireless network cost $500 million to build and a further $40 million a year to operate, and is underused and arguably outdated.

CityNet has experienced interruptions in service, despite a system of redundant fiber optic rings intended to enable it to withstand a breakdown. The $95 million CitiServ project is reported to have confounded agency officials, with the technology department, DoITT, struggling to migrate old systems into the new data centre.

“The technology department is officially referred to by its acronym, DoITT, but is sometimes derided as “Don’t Do It” by city workers who seek to avoid working with the department,” The New York Times said.

Of Post’s departure, Bloomberg said, “Over the past ten years, we have fundamentally transformed the operations of New York City agencies and elevated New Yorkers’ expectations of how efficient, user-friendly and transparent their government should be, and a large part of that is because of the tirelessness and talent of Carole Post. From her work at the Department of Buildings to the Mayor’s Office of Operations to DoITT, Carole has brought agencies together in common cause, finding efficiencies, defining legal strategies and creating collaborations that use taxpayers’ dollars more effectively. There’s nobody better to help a great institution like New York Law School climb to new heights, and though I’m very disappointed to see her go, I wish her well in tackling this new challenge.”

NY’s CTO Resigns, As Some Question Bloomberg’s Handling of City’s Tech Projects

New York’s emergency call IT project: just seven years behind schedule and $1bn overbudget

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Posted in Campaign4Change, change management, CIO, Government IT, IT projects, IT-related failures, local government, public sector

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Standish Group: the 21 perils of using consultants

Posted on 16/04/2012 | Leave a comment

By David Bicknell

We always have a lot of time for the work of the Standish Group in the US on how and why IT projects fail.

The group’s recent Chaos newsletter makes some strong points about the perils of using consultants. (In fact, in all, it identified 21 perils!)

Standish argues that the number one consultancy misdeed is what is describes as “the X-Factor”. The X-Factor is the difference between what the consultant initially bids to win the contract, and what is ultimately delivered to the client. It is sometimes referred to as “low ball pricing.” These terms accurately reflect the standard practice of bidding on the project as defined. However, “there is conscious intent to solicit, promote, and champion requirements changes.” 

Standish Group continues: “The X-Factor will alter the ultimate deliverable from the project as initially defined and increase the cost. The X-Factor cost increase can occur through requirements analysis and validation. At the end of the process, the unselfish consultant provides recommendations for changes and/or additional requirements based upon user input and their own analysis, demonstrating that the project as originally defined and presented will not meet the business needs, which is something they knew all along. 

“The X-Factor final deliverable is not necessarily better. It might be worse. It is guaranteed to be different. Since requirements changes represent more money, the consultant will encourage changes at every opportunity. The end result of it being more billable hours for the consultant. The X-Factor and the other twenty factors message here is caveat emptor or let the buyer beware.

“On the surface, the X-Factor and the other twenty factors could be casually dismissed as justifiable and acceptable risks of doing business. In reality, they are carefully devised and skillfully practiced techniques designed to serve the primary objective of the consultant to maximize their profit.

“The addition of complexity and confusion is the common denominator. This gets manipulated into project expansion, schedule delays, requirements changes and additions, new hardware, new applications, system integration projects, and a “till death do we part” relationship. The consultant’s hooks are in so deep that the cost of terminating the relationship is unaffordable. The consultant will pretend to be a trusted and friendly advisor until the profit well runs dry.

“When a conflict occurs between the client’s interest and the consultant’s profit, the consultant will protect his profit. “Show Me the Money” was the mantra of the consulting world long before it became a signature line in a Hollywood movie. This mercenary depiction of consultants is not an individual or personal indictment. It reflects the nature of the industry. The behaviour pattern and mode of operation is a reaction to the “survival of the fittest” environment.

“Consultants are under enormous pressure to develop the business; and they face intense competition. This breeds their overly aggressive, relentless pursuit of the bottom line. The consultant is neither friend nor enemy; he’s an entrepreneur in business to make a profit.”

Admittedly, this X-Factor scenario will already be familiar to many companies in their dealings with consultants. Over the coming months, Standish says it plans to take a closer look at some of the other key factors to be aware of around using consultants.

Chaos Activity Newsletter

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Posted in Campaign4Change, consultants, Government IT, IT projects, IT-related failures, project management

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